Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court Santa Barbara County Super. Ct. No. SM 26051 Zel Canter, Judge.
Wittenburg, O'Neil & Gray and George L. Wittenburg for Appellant.
John F. Hodges and Buddy Jaquith for Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Olga Gonzalez appeals an order interpreting the 1979 final judgment of dissolution regarding her marriage with Juan Gonzalez. We conclude that the parties and the family law court intended that Olga receive only a community property interest in Juan's retirement pension based upon the duration of their marriage, and affirm.
We refer to the parties by their first names, not from disrespect, but to ease the reader's task.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Olga and Juan separated in 1978 following a ten-year marriage. On July 12, 1979, the family law court entered a final judgment of dissolution which incorporated the parties' marital settlement agreement.
Juan's attorney drafted the marital settlement agreement; Olga was not represented by counsel. The agreement provides in part:
"SECOND: Any and all property acquired by either of the parties hereto from and after the date hereof shall be the sole and separate property of the one so acquiring same."
"THIRD: That each of said parties shall have an immediate right to dispose of . . . his or her respective interest in and to any and all property belonging to him or her from and after the date hereof."
"SEVENTEENTH: . . . [Olga] shall receive as her sole and separate property the following:
. . . . d. One-half of total years of service at retirement of [Juan], payable to [Olga] when received and when matured."
EIGHTEENTH: . . . [Juan] shall received 2nd Trust Deed on residence of $7,000.00 at 8% interest, payable when house is sold or 10 years, whichever is first . . . in order to equalize the community property division."
Twenty-four years following the final judgment of dissolution, Olga sought a family law court order requiring Juan's retirement pension plan, the Painters' Union Pension Fund, to pay her one-half of his entire pension. Olga asserted that the language of the martial settlement agreement, as incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution, unambiguously requires payment of one-half of Juan's pre- and post-dissolution pension.
Following argument by the parties, the family law court decided that the "language as written in the Judgment is ambiguous and requires interpretation." The court stated that equitable principles require limiting Olga's interest in the retirement pension to her community property interest "as of the date of separation of the parties." The family law court did not permit extrinsic evidence regarding the intentions of the parties. (In re Marriage of Benson (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 907, 912 ["The marital settlement agreement, accepted by the court and incorporated into the judgment, no longer exists as an independent, enforceable contract; and parol evidence concerning the intentions of litigants is of no use in the interpretation of a judgment of a court."].) It did allow evidence of Olga's declaration in a 1982 child support motion that stated that Juan "was unemployed" at the "time of dissolution."
Olga appeals the order of the family law court and contends that it plainly allows her an interest in Juan's post-dissolution pension.
DISCUSSION
Olga asserts that the marital settlement agreement does not restrict her interest in Juan's pension to a community property pre-dissolution interest. She adds that Juan's attorney drafted the agreement and that the court may not rewrite an agreement that now appears unfair. (Civ. Code § 1654 ["In cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules [of interpretation], the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against he party who caused the uncertainty to exist."].)
The interpretation of a judgment is a question of law. (John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 565.) We independently interpret a written instrument where the trial court has not admitted extrinsic evidence to assist its interpretation, or where no conflict in the evidence exists. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865,)
Rules regarding interpretation of a writing also apply to the interpretation of a judgment. (Southern Pacific Pipe Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. Of Equalization (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 42, 49 [statement of general rule].) As with contracts and statutes, the court should not consider individual clauses or provisions of a judgment separately; the judgment must be construed as a whole to carry forth its intention. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 617, 622 ["[T]he entire document is to be taken by its four corners and construed as a whole to effectuate the obvious intention.]".) "In case of doubt regarding the meaning or consequence of a judgment, or any part of it, the whole record may be examined to ascertain the meaning." (John Siebel Associates v. Keele, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 565.)
Here our interpretation of the judgment as a whole indicates the parties and the family law court's intention in 1979 to award Olga a community property interest in Juan's retirement pension limited to the years of their marriage. The second and third paragraphs of the marital settlement agreement indicate that each party would hold property acquired after the date of the agreement as "sole and separate property" to be held or disposed of as each party desired. The eighteenth paragraph awarded Juan a $7,000 payment "in order to equalize the community property division." Moreover, Juan was not employed when the agreement was signed. (John Siebel Associates v. Keele, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 565 [court may examine entire record of judgment to determine its meaning].) "The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other." (Civ. Code, § 1641.) Consideration of the entire contract discloses the parties' intent to divide only the community property interest in the retirement pension. (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.2d 617, 622.)
Moreover, the rule requiring an uncertainty to be construed against the party drafting the agreement applies only "[i]n cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules [Civ. Code, § 1635 et seq.]." (Civ. Code, § 1654.) Here application of the statutory rules of construction remove any uncertainty of Paragraph Seventeen concerning the retirement pension.
The order is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
We concur: YEGAN, J., COFFEE, J.