Opinion
19-72352
05-25-2022
JORGE BUSTILLO GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A094-293-432
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Jorge Bustillo Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's decision denying his applications for withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), and cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency's factual findings, including determinations regarding social distinction. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA's interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. Id. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
In his opening brief, Bustillo Gonzalez does not challenge the agency's determination that his proposed particular social group of deportees was not cognizable. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party's opening brief are waived).
Substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that Bustillo Gonzalez failed to establish his remaining proposed particular social groups are socially distinct. See Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (proposed particular social group not cognizable given absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction). Thus, the agency did not err in concluding that Bustillo Gonzalez did not establish membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, "[t]he applicant must 'establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question'" (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). To the extent Bustillo Gonzalez raises an imputed political opinion claim for the first time in his opening brief, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency). Thus, Bustillo Gonzalez's withholding of removal claim fails.
Bustillo Gonzalez does not make any arguments challenging the agency's denial of CAT relief. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned."). Thus, we deny the petition for review as to Bustillo Gonzalez's CAT claim.
We lack jurisdiction to review the agency's discretionary determination that Bustillo Gonzalez did not show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005). The petition does not raise a colorable legal or constitutional claim over which we retain jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Martinez-Rosas, 424 F.3d at 930. Thus, we dismiss the petition for review as to Bustillo Gonzalez's cancellation of removal claim.
We reject Bustillo Gonzalez's challenge to the BIA's use of summary affirmance procedures, because the BIA's final order was not a summary affirmance.
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate. The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).