Opinion
No. 2:05-CV-0096.
August 18, 2005
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner has filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a May 11, 2004 prison disciplinary proceeding and the resultant loss of previously earned good time credits. Petitioner predominantly challenges, however, his re-classification to administrative segregation. The disciplinary proceeding took place at the Clements Unit in Potter County, Texas. As of the date the instant habeas application was filed, petitioner remained incarcerated in the Clements Unit.
In order to challenge a prison disciplinary adjudication by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must, at a minimum, be eligible for mandatory supervised release and have received a punishment sanction which included forfeiture of previously accrued good time credits. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000). Inquiry to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, reveals petitioner is in respondent's custody pursuant to a December 7, 1990 conviction for the felony offense of murder with a deadly weapon out of El Paso County, Texas, and the resulting 45-year sentence. In his habeas application, petitioner acknowledges there was a finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon, and that he is not eligible for mandatory supervised release. Petitioner is not eligible for mandatory supervised release due to his conviction for murder and, thus, may not challenge the prison disciplinary adjudication by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. Gov't Code § 508.149(a)(2).
To the extent petitioner challenges his re-classification to administrative segregation, such claim does not present a proper ground for federal habeas corpus review. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is not implicated by a change in the conditions of a petitioner's confinement. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997). Only liberty interests, whether inherent or state-created, are protected by the Due Process Clause. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). These liberty interests are generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), or state created regulations or statutes which affect the quantity of time rather than the quality of time served by a prisoner. Madison, 104 F.3d at 767. Here, petitioner's placement in administrative segregation did not "impose atypical and significant hardship on [petitioner] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at 484; see also Cagle v. Anderson 2001 WL 274476, *1 (5th Cir. 2001). Nor will petitioner's confinement in administrative segregation "inevitably" affect the duration of his sentence since the decision to release a prisoner on parole "rests on a myriad of considerations." See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at 487. The possibility that petitioner's confinement in administrative segregation would affect when he was ultimately released from prison "is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause." Id. Petitioner's federal habeas application should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
It is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner MIGUEL ANGEL GONZALEZ be DENIED.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a file-marked copy of this Report and Recommendation to petitioner by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.