Opinion
CIVIL 3:18-CV-2254
09-18-2023
JUAN GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DOE #1, et al., Defendants.
Mariani, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
This is a civil rights case filed by the plaintiff, Juan Gonzalez, against several Pennsylvania State Police officers and three agents of the United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The plaintiff asserts his claims against the state officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged Bivens constitutional tort claims against the federal agents, asserting violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by these federal and state officials, arising out of a July 13, 2018, law enforcement encounter. We have addressed, and resolved, the plaintiff's claims against the three ICE agents identified as defendants in this lawsuit-Defendants Clark, Carlo, and Wiss. Initially, all claims against ICE were dismissed, the due process claims against Defendants Clark, Carlo, and Wiss, were dismissed, and consideration of the Bivens Fourth Amendment claims against these individual defendants was deferred pending the development of a full factual record on summary judgment. (Doc. 70). The federal defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment in this case on this sole remaining claim lodged against the federal defendants. (Doc. 85). We recommended that this motion be granted, (Doc. 95), and the district court adopted this recommendation. (Doc. 99).
The federal defendants have now moved pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for entry of a final judgment in their favor on these dismissed claims. (Doc. 103). This motion is fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 104, 105). For the following reasons, we recommend that the court grant the federal defendants' motion.
For his part, in his response to this motion Gonzalez “respects the right of this Honorable Court to grant such a request, but the Plaintiff cannot be a party to such a ruling in the interests of a possible appeal of the instant case.” (Doc. 105, at 3). Thus, Gonzalez acknowledges the ability of the court to grant this motion while declining to expressly concur in the relief sought.
II. Discussion
The federal defendants have moved for entry of judgment in their favor pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that:
(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.
When an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
As the text of the rule implies, decisions regarding whether to certify a final judgment for some parties in a multi-party case rest in the sound discretion of the court. However, the exercise of that discretion entails a two-part analysis. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 76 S.Ct. 895, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956), this Court outlined the steps to be followed in making determinations under Rule 54(b). A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a “final judgment.” It must be a “judgment” in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be “final” in the sense that it is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” 351 U.S., at 436, 76 S.Ct., at 900.
Once having found finality, the district court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Not all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims. The
function of the district court under the Rule is to act as a “dispatcher.” Id., at 435, 76 S.Ct. at 899. It is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court to determine the “appropriate time” when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. Ibid. This discretion is to be exercised “in the interest of sound judicial administration.” Id., at 437, 76 S.Ct., at 900.Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7-8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1464-65, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980).
Both of these requisites must be met in order to certify a final judgment under Rule 54(b). In particular, courts must speak to the issue of whether there is no just reason for delaying the entry of judgment in favor of some parties. As the Court of Appeals has noted:
This latter requirement, that a district court “must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay,” is not merely formalistic. Rule 54(b) makes clear that a district court may direct entry of a final judgment under the rule “only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” See also Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 3, 100 S.Ct. at 1462 (“[Rule 54(b) ] allows a district court dealing with multiple claims or multiple parties to direct the entry of final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties; to do so, the court must make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. ”) (emphasis added). Otherwise, if the court does not make that determination, “any order or other decision, however designated” that does not dispose of all claims against all parties is not final under Rule 54(b).Elliott v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2012). Thus, “in a case . . ., in which a district court clearly intends to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), it must state expressly that it has determined that there is no just reason for delay.” Id. at 224. However:
Rule 54(b) does not require that a district court use the talismanic phrase “there is no just reason for delay.” The district court may state that it has determined expressly that “there is no just reason for delay” using those precise words, or it may paraphrase or use language “of an indisputably similar effect,” Berckeley I, 259 F.3d at 141, so long as the district court's order clearly contains the “express” determination Rule 54(b) requires.Id. at 225.
In making this “just reason for delay” determination, we are enjoined to consider an array of factors. In this regard:
The Third Circuit has suggested several factors that courts should consider when evaluating whether there is “just reason for delay”:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims;
(2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court;
(3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time;
(4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final;
(5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.Luster v. PuraCap Lab'ys, LLC, No. CV 18-503 (MN), 2021 WL 311256, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2021) (citing Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 2006)).
In the instant case, turning to this two-part analysis, we have little difficulty concluding at the outset that the summary judgment entered in favor of the federal defendants may be considered a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b). See Berckeley, 455 F.3d at 202. Therefore, the sole remaining question is whether there is no just reason for delaying the certification of this summary judgment determination in favor of the federal defendants.
We find that there is no just reason to further delay entry of judgment in favor of the federal defendants at this time. On this score, it is important to note that the claims against the federal defendants stand in a decidedly different legal posture from Gonzalez's allegations against the state police. Unlike the state police claims, which rest upon a specific federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Gonzalez's federal claims were largely grounded upon the Bivens doctrine, a judicially crafted remedy fashioned by the courts.
This is a significant difference since it is now well settled that implying Bivens causes of action is now a disfavored judicial activity. As the Supreme Court has observed:
[T]he Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a “disfavored” judicial activity. Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This is in accord with the Court's observation that it has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001).Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017).
Moreover, in Egbert v. Boule, 213 L.Ed.2d 54, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 1803 (2022) the Supreme Court rejected extension of Bivens to Fourth Amendment arrest claims lodged against immigration officers like those made here. In this regard, the Court in Egbert held that implying a Bivens cause of action against immigration agents presented a “new context” where great caution should be exercised before inferring a civil cause of action. Id. at 1804. The Court then found that “special factors” relating to immigration enforcement as well as border and national security, weighed against implying a Bivens cause of action in this factual context. Id. at 1806-07. Finally, the Court held that other, alternate remedies existed for persons aggrieved by immigration agent actions, a factor “that independently foreclose[d] a Bivens action.” Id. at 1806.
This fundamental legal difference between the plaintiff's claims against the state and federal defendants supports a finding that there is no just reason for delaying the entry ofjudgment in favor of the federal defendants at this time. Indeed, when one considers the discretionary factors that we must assess in making this Rule 54 determination, it is clear that many of these factors now permit entry of judgment in favor of the federal defendants. For example, given the profound differences in the legal bases for these claims, the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are clearly unrelated. Therefore, there is no possibility that the need for review might be mooted by future developments in the district court concerning the state police claims. This factor favors Rule 54(b) certification. Further, the district court has now fully addressed the legal barriers to pursuit of claims against these federal defendants. Therefore, there is no likelihood that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider these uniquely federal issues a second time. Accordingly, yet another factor favoring certification is met here. Finally, as to the federal defendants, there is no counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final. Therefore, this final factor presents no obstacle to Rule 54(b) certification.
In fact, we note that certifying this ruling as a final judgment under Rule 54 is entirely consistent with a rising tide of case that has certified final judgments under Rule 54(b) in favor of federal defendants who are charged with Bivens claims in the course of larger and more sweeping lawsuits. Xi v. Haugen, 68 F.4th 824, 831 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2023); Downie v. City of Middleburg Heights, 301 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2002); Terry v. Newell, No. CV-12-02659-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 351897, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2014), affd, 667 Fed.Appx. 257 (9th Cir. 2016); Powers-Bunce v. D.C., No. CIV.A. 06-1586 RMC, 2009 WL 8658066, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009). Given this rising tide of legal authority favoring this course, and recognizing that all of the requisites of Rule 54(b) are fully satisfied in this case, it is recommended that the defendants' motion be granted.
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the federal defendants' motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) (Doc. 103), be GRANTED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.