Opinion
Civil No. 01-499 (JRT/FLN)
August 9, 2002
Fay E. Fishman, Peterson Fishman, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
Lonnie F. Bryan, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on defendant's objections to the report and recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge John M. Mason dated March 19, 2002, in which he recommended that plaintiff be awarded attorney fees in the amount of $5,000 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The Court has conducted a de novo review of defendant's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and awards plaintiff $5,000 in attorney fees.
The Court notes with great sadness that Magistrate Judge Mason passed away on June 8, 2002.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on February 9, 1998. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied her application initially and upon reconsideration. Hearings were held on March 18, 1999 and November 18, 1999, after which the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits. Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of the ALJ's decision. The Appeals Council subsequently denied that request.
On March 21, 2001, plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On November 13, 2001, the Court adopted the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. On January 22, 2002, plaintiff filed a petition for attorney fees as the prevailing party, to which defendant responded. On March 19, 2002, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the time plaintiff's counsel expended was not unreasonable and accordingly recommended that plaintiff be awarded $5,000 in attorney fees. Defendant objects to the report and recommendation on the basis that the fees plaintiff's counsel requested are excessive.
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has held that the fees awarded pursuant to fee shifting statutes must be reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A number of factors are relevant in determining reasonableness. For one, reasonableness is determined in consideration of the facts of the case at issue. McMullen v. Apfel, 57 F. Supp.2d 773, 774 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). Additionally, the "results obtained" must be considered in light of the plaintiff's litigation objectives. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Success or failure in light of these goals may lead a court to adjust the fee award upward or downward, respectively. Id. After considering all the relevant factors, the court possesses the authority to reduce the number of hours for which payment can be received based on its finding that the total number of hours claimed is unreasonable. McMullen, 57 F. Supp.2d at 774.
I. Preparation of Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant argues, both in its response and its objections, that plaintiff's counsel has billed an excessive number of hours in connection with plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees.
The medical record in this case is quite extensive. Even a cursory examination of the documentary history in this case reveals a lengthy series of medical appointments, reports from physical therapists, work-related absences, and psychological profiling. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, many important documents from the plaintiff's years of medical treatment are handwritten in the inscrutable script long associated with the medical profession. The process of reading, understanding, and at times deciphering this enormous medical history required a substantial commitment of time.
Although defendant objects that the 17.5 hours billed by plaintiff's counsel in preparation of the motion for summary judgment represents an excessive amount of time, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that this figure is reasonable. The brief in support of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment presented for the first time a thorough distillation of plaintiff's extensive and complex medical history. This section constituted fifteen pages of the motion. In contrast, plaintiff's letter to the Appeals Council includes only a five-page overview of plaintiff's medical history and addresses her years of illness and treatment in only a cursory fashion. The Court finds that despite the similarities and duplication of portions of plaintiff's argument in the summary judgment motion and plaintiff's letter to the Appeals Council, the two documents are not so similar that plaintiff's counsel was unjustified in spending 17.5 hours on the motion's research, drafting, and editing. Defendant does not and could not contend that the medical history sections of the two documents are substantially duplicative. The number of hours billed was not an excessive amount.
The fact that plaintiff prevailed on her motion for summary judgment is also highly relevant. The Supreme Court counseled in Hensley that the "results obtained" by plaintiffs were an important factor in calculating attorney fees. 461 U.S. 424, 434-436 (1983). Defendant's objection to the 17. 5 hours billed is thus overruled.
II. "Routine" activities
Defendant argues next that plaintiff's counsel has billed an excessive number of hours for what defendant deems to be "routine matters." The court may exclude from its fee calculation any hours that were not reasonably spent. McMullen, 57 F. Supp.2d at 774. When actually recording the amount of hours worked for the purpose of seeking fee shifting, the record keeping requirements are rudimentary. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(b) requires an itemized statement including the actual time expended and the rate at which the expenses were calculated. An itemization is adequate if it sets forth in sufficient detail the number of hours expended, the date on which the work was incurred, and a brief identification of the work done in each time increment. TGS Int'l v. United States, 983 F.2d 229 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The requirement is not intended to be unduly burdensome: "[P]laintiff's counsel, of course, is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended. But at least counsel should identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n. 12. Defendant asserts that plaintiff has billed excessively by billing one-half hour each for such "routine activities" as: 1) receipt and review of Action of Appeals Council; 2) letter to client regarding district court appeal; 3) receipt and review of motion to remand, 4) letter to client regarding district court loss of file, 5) receipt and review of order from Magistrate Judge; and 6) receipt and review of order. Additionally, defendant argues that the 2.25 hours billed by plaintiff for preparing a summons and complaint for filing in district court is excessive.
Little evidence is offered to support defendant's assertions beyond stating that the amount plaintiff has billed "seems excessive given the routine nature" of the documents prepared and reviewed. The Court is not persuaded by this assertion. Plaintiff's counsel billed one-half hour each for activities such as writing letters to the client and reviewing motions. These activities are necessary and important aspects of counsel's representation of plaintiff that required plaintiff's counsel to bill some time for them. The expenditure of one-half hour for each of these activities is not unreasonable.
Defendant also claims that the 2.25 hours billed in connection with plaintiff's complaint and summons to the district court is excessive. Defendant asserts that this "form complaint" required less than the excessive number of hours billed. The Court finds that although the complaint and summons perhaps could have been completed in somewhat less time, the plaintiff's interest in completeness and accuracy and the relatively short period of 2.25 hours billed do not merit a reduction by the Court in the awarded fees. Setting forth the required factual overview for the case as well as the important procedural and jurisdictional elements of the complaint justified spending the hours recorded. The amount of time billed was not so excessive as to require a reduction by the Court.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the submissions, of the parties, and all of the files, records, and proceedings therein, the Court OVERRULES defendant's objections to the Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 24] and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 23]. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's petition for attorney fees under the EAJA is GRANTED. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), representing 40 hours of work by plaintiff's counsel at a work rate of $125.00 per hour.