Opinion
24A-CR-1156
12-05-2024
Bryan Gonzalez-Medina, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Brandon E. Murphy Cannon Bruns & Murphy Muncie, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Blackford Circuit Court The Honorable Brian Bade, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 05C01-2209-F1-340
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Brandon E. Murphy
Cannon Bruns & Murphy
Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General
Alexandria Sons
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Bryan Gonzalez-Medina pled guilty to two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting, and the trial court sentenced him to maximum and consecutive terms totaling twenty-four years. Gonzalez-Medina now appeals, arguing his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2022, Gonzalez-Medina was married to A.B. Gonzalez-Medina and A.B. had one child together, and A.B. had three other children, including T.N. That September, T.N., then twelve years old, reported to a school counselor that Gonzalez-Medina had been molesting her. Thereafter, the State charged Gonzalez-Medina with four counts of Level 1 felony child molesting (sexual intercourse or "other sexual conduct") and four counts of Level 4 felony child molesting (touching or fondling).
[¶3] Gonzalez-Medina and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Gonzalez-Medina would plead guilty to two of the Level 4 felonies, the State would dismiss the six remaining counts, and Gonzalez-Medina would be sentenced to twenty-four years, with eleven years in prison and thirteen years on probation. The court conditionally accepted the plea agreement and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI).
[¶4] In the PSI, the probation officer noted that she had interviewed Gonzalez-Medina at the jail. During the interview, Gonzalez-Medina reported that he had a "sex addiction" and that he and his wife were "drifting apart and not having sex often." Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 53, 54. He said that T.N. was eleven years old when he began molesting her. At first, he "tongue kiss[ed]" her when she was sleeping. Id. at 53. He progressed to touching her when she was sleeping and then when she was awake. He acknowledged molesting T.N. around twenty-five times. The molestations included him "press[ing] his penis against her body, while she was clothed and unclothed," and having her "masturbate" him. Id. at 53, 54. He said A.B. was typically asleep during the molestations but sometimes the other children were awake. On one occasion, Gonzalez-Medina molested T.N. when they were in the same bed as A.B., who was asleep. Although Gonzalez-Medina denied penetrating T.N., he said one time he "may have pushed too hard and a finger got in about a fourth (1/4) of his fingernail." Id. at 53. He also recounted at least three times when he put his tongue "against her vagina." Id. Finally, Gonzalez-Medina said he instructed T.N. not to tell anyone because he would go to "jail." Id. The probation officer recommended that the trial court reject the plea agreement.
[¶5] A hearing was held to determine whether the trial court would accept or reject the plea agreement. The court first addressed the PSI and asked Gonzalez-Medina if he had any objections. Gonzalez-Medina said no, so the court accepted the PSI. Tr. p. 16. The court then explained that it was torn about whether to accept or reject the plea agreement since there was neither "objection from the victim" nor "advocation . . . for the specific plea." Id. at 19. The court stated that based on the PSI and T.N.'s victim-impact statement (in which she claimed she had lost her "sanity"), it was "entirely comfortable with the overall length of the sentence," i.e., twenty-four years. Id. at 20; Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 73. However, the court wasn't comfortable with the fact that thirteen of those years were to be served on probation. Tr. p. 20; see also Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 74-75. The court rejected the plea agreement and set the case for a jury trial.
[¶6] The parties then entered into a second plea agreement. Again, Gonzalez-Medina agreed to plead guilty to two of the Level 4 felonies and the State agreed to dismiss the six remaining counts. This time, however, sentencing was left entirely to the trial court's discretion. The court accepted the agreement and held a sentencing hearing. The court identified five aggravators: (1) Gonzalez-Medina, as T.N.'s stepfather, was in a position of trust with her; (2) his conduct will have a "lasting life-time" effect on T.N. and her mental health; (3) he instructed T.N. not to report the molestations because he would go to jail, which showed that he "understood the wrongfulness of his conduct and the implications associated therewith"; (4) there are "ancillary victims created by [him] insomuch that the siblings of the victim will be unable to escape the breach of trust, their lives are upended, and their standard of living is decreased having lost their father/stepfather's income"; and (5) a lesser sentence would "significantly undermine the seriousness of this offense and the impact it has had on the victim, as well as the entire Blackford County community." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 88. The court found three mitigators: (1) Gonzalez-Medina had no prior criminal history; (2) he had been regularly employed and maintained steady income; and (3) he pled guilty and "indicated part of his motivation to be forthright through all stages of the proceedings was to minimize damage to the victim, to the extent possible." Id. at 87. Finding the aggravators to significantly outweigh the mitigators, the court sentenced Gonzalez-Medina to the maximum term of twelve years on each count, to be served consecutively, for a total of twenty-four years in prison. The court acknowledged that Gonzalez-Medina had asked for a "second chance" but said his second chance was the plea agreement, "because at least from what I've seen, it appears there was somewhat of a likelihood . . . you could have been convicted of Level 1 felonies." Tr. p. 68.
[¶7] Gonzalez-Medina now appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] Gonzalez-Medina contends his maximum sentence of twenty-four years is inappropriate and asks us to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an appellate court "may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." The appellate court's role under Rule 7(B) is to "leaven the outliers," and "we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases." Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (quotation omitted). "Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case." Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Because we generally defer to the judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016).
[¶9] We acknowledge that Gonzalez-Medina has some positive character traits. He had no prior criminal history or substance-abuse issues and had been regularly employed and financially supported his family. He cooperated throughout the investigation, indicated he wanted to minimize the trauma to T.N., and pled guilty to two counts (although six counts, including four Level 1 felonies, were dismissed). He also had the support of several family members. As the trial court noted, Gonzalez-Medina was unlike many defendants who appear before it.
[¶10] Although Gonzalez-Medina acknowledges that the nature of the offenses is "serious," he claims that his conduct was "exactly what the statute requires for the convictions, that being a sexual touching or fondling of a child." Appellant's Br. pp. 10-11. But Gonzalez-Medina admitted to much more, as reflected in the PSI. And he didn't just molest his stepdaughter twice; he acknowledged molesting her around twenty-five times. They included at least three instances of him putting his tongue "against her vagina" and one incident of him inserting his finger, which are really Level 1 felonies that carry much greater penalties. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5 (defining "other sexual conduct" as an act involving "(1) a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (2) the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object"); I.C. § 35-50-2-4(c) (providing that a person who commits certain Level 1 felony child-molesting offenses faces a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years). And at least one time, Gonzalez-Medina molested T.N. in the same bed where her mother was sleeping. Despite some positive character traits, Gonzalez-Medina has failed to persuade us that his twenty-four-year sentence is inappropriate.
Gonzalez-Medina raises as a separate issue that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively given the mitigators. But as the State responds, a single aggravator may support consecutive sentences. Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied. Here, the trial court found five aggravators, none of which Gonzalez-Martinez challenges. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively.
[¶11] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Crone, Sr. J., concur.