Opinion
No. 04-15-00611-CV
05-18-2016
Francisco J. GONZALEZ-GONZALEZ, Appellant v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-CV-03073
Honorable Jason Wolff, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Jason Pulliam, Justice AFFIRMED
Appellant Francisco Gonzalez-Gonzalez appeals from a trial court's judgment affirming an administrative order suspending his driver's license. On appeal, Gonzalez-Gonzalez contends the trial court erred in affirming the order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) because the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are undisputed. While on patrol, police officer Eddie Santana saw Gonzalez-Gonzalez, who was traveling west bound in the left lane, enter the eastbound left-turn only land and execute a U-turn into eastbound traffic. Believing this to be a traffic violation, Officer Santana stopped the vehicle. After stopping the vehicle and interacting with Gonzalez-Gonzalez, Officer Santana detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Gonzalez-Gonzalez and noted his speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Gonzalez-Gonzalez admitted to consuming three or four drinks three hours prior to the traffic stop. When Officer Santana asked Gonzalez-Gonzalez to place himself on an "assumed intoxication scale" from one to ten, with one representing sobriety and ten representing "falling-down drunk," Gonzalez-Gonzalez rated himself a six. Officer Santana proceeded to administer field sobriety tests to Gonzalez-Gonzalez where he observed all six points in the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, five out of eight clues on the walk-and-turn test, and one clue on the one-leg stand test. Because the officer believed Gonzalez-Gonzales was "not in control of his physical/mental faculties to safely operate a motor vehicle on a public roadway, due to his level of intoxication," he placed Gonzales-Gonzalez under arrest. When asked, Gonzalez-Gonzales refused to provide a breath specimen.
Based on the foregoing events, an administrative hearing was held regarding the suspension of Gonzalez-Gonzalez's driver's license. At the hearing, Officer Santana was the only witness. Most of Officer Santana's testimony pertained to the events that occurred after he stopped Gonzalez-Gonzalez's vehicle. However, Officer Santana's sworn police report was admitted into evidence at the hearing. In the report, Officer Santana stated that while monitoring traffic, he saw a vehicle "traveling westbound in the left lane" before making a U-turn through the "'left-only' turn lane on the eastbound side." After seeing the vehicle make the aforementioned U-turn, Officer Santana initiated the traffic stop that resulted in the arrest of Gonzalez-Gonzalez for the offense of driving while intoxicated.
At the conclusion of the administrative hearing, the ALJ issued an order authorizing the Texas Department of Public Safety ("the Department") to suspend Gonzalez-Gonzalez's driver's license. The administrative decision contained the ALJ's findings. The ALJ found Officer Santana had reasonable suspicion to stop Gonzalez-Gonzales, stating: "[Officer Santana], a Texas Peace Officer observed [Gonzalez-Gonzalez] make a U-turn from a lane designated for left turns only while operating a motor vehicle on a Texas public roadway within the officer's jurisdiction."
Gonzalez-Gonzalez appealed the ALJ's decision to the county court, contending Officer Santana lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop that led to his arrest for DWI. According to Gonzalez-Gonzalez, Officer Santana's statements did not present sufficiently specific, articulable facts that would support a finding of reasonable suspicion. The trial court disagreed and upheld Gonzalez-Gonzalez's suspension, noting the administrative decision was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Gonzalez-Gonzalez now appeals the trial court's decision, arguing the trial court erred in affirming the order suspending his license.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, Gonzalez-Gonzalez contends the trial court erred in affirming the ALJ's order of suspension because the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. The Department contends the finding of reasonable suspicion was supported by substantial evidence.
Standard of Review
A court reviewing an administrative order examines the record as a whole to determine whether the order is supported by substantial evidence. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(E) (West 2016); Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). This standard is highly deferential. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh'g). A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ on matters regarding the weight or credibility of the evidence. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174); Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 91. "The issue for the reviewing court is not whether the ALJ's decision was correct, but rather whether there is some reasonable basis in the record for the administrative decision." Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 91 (citing City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994)). Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the complaining party has the burden of overcoming a presumption that substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge's inferences, findings, conclusions, and decisions. Id. If the ALJ's decision is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, the decision must be affirmed — even if the evidence preponderates against it. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. Reviewing courts may reverse an ALJ's decision only if they find an appellant's substantial rights have been impaired because the ALJ's findings are not supported by the record in its entirety. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 91 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(E)).
We review the trial court's substantial evidence using a de novo standard. Id. "Substantial evidence exists if reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion." Id. In determining whether substantial evidence supports the administrative decision, we are governed by the following principles: (1) the trial court will hear and consider evidence to determine whether reasonable support for the ALJ's order exists, but the ALJ remains the primary fact-finding body, and the question for the trial court is strictly one of law; (2) the trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ on controverted issues of fact; (3) if the ALJ heard substantial evidence that would support either an affirmative or negative finding, the trial court must allow the ALJ's order to stand, even if the court would have differed with the result; (4) the trial court may not set aside the ALJ's ruling merely because there was conflicting or disputed testimony; and (5) the trial court is concerned only with the reasonableness of the ALJ's order not its correctness. Id.
Applicable Law: License Revocation
Section 724.042 of the Texas Transportation Code sets forth the issues to be decided in hearings regarding the suspension of a license for refusal to submit to the taking of a breath specimen. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.042 (West 2011). At a driver's license suspension hearing, the Department has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person; (2) probable cause existed to believe the person was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; (3) the person was arrested and asked to submit to a the taking of a specimen of breath or blood; and (4) the person refused to submit to the taking of a specimen. Id.; Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 130. In this appeal, Gonzalez-Gonzalez argues only that the trial court erred in affirming the ALJ's decision because there is no evidence supporting the finding that Officer Santana had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. Neither party disputes the ALJ's findings as to the other elements. Accordingly, we need only determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that reasonable suspicion existed to stop Gonzalez-Gonzalez.
Applicable Law: Reasonable Suspicion
An officer conducts a lawful stop when the officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual is violating the law. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 92; Kalia v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 04-08-00001-CV, 2008 WL 2715291, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 9, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). An officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in a violation of the law. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 92; Kalia, 2008 WL 2715291, at *2. In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain, we look at the totality of the circumstances through an objective lens. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 93. "An officer may stop a driver if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation was in progress or had been committed." Id. Moreover, the evidence need not establish that a traffic violation actually occurred; rather, it need only establish a reasonable suspicion that a violation occurred or was in progress. Kalia, 2008 WL 2714291, at *2. Thus, in this appeal we must determine whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that Officer Santana had reasonable suspicion to stop Gonzalez-Gonzalez's vehicle, i.e., was Gonzalez-Gonzalez in the process of committing a traffic violation or a violation had occurred.
Application
Gonzalez-Gonzalez contends the Department failed to demonstrate he actually committed a traffic violation. But, as noted above, the Department was not required to do so. See Kalia, 2008 WL 2715291, at *2; see also State v. Daniel, 446 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) ("The State is not required to show a traffic offense was actually committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed a violation was in progress."). In this case, however, the evidence established Gonzalez-Gonzalez committed a traffic violation.
Failing to comply with an "official traffic-control device" is a violation of the Texas Transportation Code. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.004; see also id. § 542.301 (providing that person commits misdemeanor offense if he performs act prohibited or fails to perform act required by this portion of Transportation Code). An official traffic-control device is any "sign, signal, marking or device that is: (A) consistent with [Section 7, subtitle C of the Texas Transportation Code]; (B) placed or erected by a public body or officer having jurisdiction; and (C) used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic." Id. § 541.304.
Based on the record, we hold the ALJ's finding that Officer Santana had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Gonzalez-Gonzalez is supported by substantial evidence. Officer Santana's report stated Gonzalez-Gonzalez was "traveling westbound in the left lane" and then made a U-turn through a "'left-only' turn lane on the eastbound side." In other words, Gonzalez-Gonzalez ignored the road markings that indicated the lane which he entered from the west and used to execute a U-turn was a left-turn only lane for eastbound traffic. Thus, the evidence shows Gonzalez-Gonzalez ignored a "sign, signal, marking or device . . . used to regulate traffic, warn, or guide traffic," thereby committing a traffic violation and imbuing Officer Santana with reasonable suspicion. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.004 (stating that failure to comply with "official traffic-control device" is violation of Transportation Code); Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 93 (holding officer may stop driver if he has reasonable suspicion that traffic violation was in progress or had been committed). Accordingly, we hold there was substantial evidence to allow the ALJ to conclude that a police officer in Officer Santana's position would have reasonably believed Gonzalez-Gonzalez had committed a violation by disregarding an official traffic control device placed on the road to indicate the lane as a left-turn-only lane. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.004; see also Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (stating compliance with "applicable official traffic-control device" is required by Texas Transportation Code); Kortemier v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 05-08-01182-CV, 2009 WL 1959256, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating failure to comply with traffic-control devices was violation of Transportation Code where driver failed to turn right from right-turn-only lane).
In sum, the record establishes Gonzalez-Gonzalez committed a traffic violation when he made a U-turn using a lane marked for left turns by vehicles traveling in the opposite direction. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.004. When observed by an officer, such an act supports the conclusion that a traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d at 93. We therefore overrule Gonzalez-Gonzalez's complaints.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice