Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat. Bank

26 Citing cases

  1. Green v. Premier Distributing Company

    No. CIV-03-0287 JB/RHS (D.N.M. Oct. 9, 2003)

    Green argues that this renders the Agreement inapplicable to Green's claims, which were not filed until after his employment was terminated. See Response at 6 (citing Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'1 Bank of Santa Fe, 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619 (1979)). Premier terminated Green on July 28, 2001.

  2. Todd v. RWI Acquisition LLC

    No. 2:12-CV-00114-MCA-GBW (D.N.M. Jun. 1, 2012)   Cited 2 times

    At the evidentiary hearing, the Court found that the Todds' Employment Agreements had expired on March 30, 2010 and that the non-compete clauses had expired two years later, on March 30, 2012. RWI acknowledged that the Employment Agreements and the non-compete clauses had expired and that there was no automatic renewal provision, but argued that these contractual terms nonetheless were renewed for a one-year term by virtue of the Todds' continued employment after March 30, 2010. The Court rejected this argument on the basis of Gonzales v. United Southwest National Bank of Santa Fe, 602 P.2d 619 (N.M. 1979), in which the New Mexico Supreme Court held in a similar context that: The argument assumes the existence of a provision for automatic renewal.

  3. Leon v. Kelly

    618 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (D.N.M. 2008)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that, "unless displaced by the particular provisions of the UPA, the principles of law and equity supplement the UPA"

    An employment contract that expressly lasts for a term of three years, on the other hand, does fall within the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds. See Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat. Bank of Santa Fe, 93 N.M. 522, 524, 602 P.2d 619, 621 (1979). RELEVANT LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS

  4. Reptronix, Ltd. v. International Rectifier, Inc.

    Civ. No. 01-890 JP/DJS (D.N.M. Feb. 25, 2002)

    Consequently, the subsequent agreement was subject to the statute of frauds requirement of a writing. See Gonzales v. United Southwest National Bank of Santa Fe, 93 N.M. 522, 524, 602 P.2d 619, 621 (1979) (Where a written contract is for a period of more than one year, a renewal contract for a like period is not enforceable without a writing.). The Plaintiff also argues that the subsequent verbal agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds because of the parties partial performance of the subsequent agreement and reliance on the subsequent agreement.

  5. Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co.

    115 N.M. 665 (N.M. 1993)   Cited 191 times
    Holding that, "[o]rdinarily, to be legally enforceable, a contract must be factually supported by an offer"

    — Consideration. Paxton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support an implied contract because there was no evidence that Hartbarger gave additional consideration for any agreement beyond at-will employment.See Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'l Bank, 93 N.M. 522, 524, 602 P.2d 619, 621 (1979) (noting uniform rule, in 1979, that an employment contract for permanent employment not supported by consideration other than performance of duties and payment of wages is terminable at will). However, since 1980 when we recognized an implied employment contract in Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. at 782, 606 P.2d at 192, we have not required that additional consideration be shown factually.

  6. Eavenson v. Lewis Means, Inc.

    105 N.M. 161 (N.M. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    Holding promissory estoppel applicable to oral promise of employment

    The court held that the oral agreement, which was not to be performed within a year, should be enforced against Ralston Purina because the farmer relied upon the agreement and had made extensive investments upon such reliance. We distinguish Gonzales v. United Southwest National Bank of Santa Fe, 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619 (1979). In that case the court dealt with the issue of an employee with a written contract for a three-year period of performance.

  7. Vigil v. Arzola

    101 N.M. 687 (N.M. 1984)   Cited 82 times
    Recognizing retaliatory discharge cause of action when plaintiff discharged for reporting misuse of public funds

    The majority concludes as a matter of fact that there was a breach of contract. In Gonzales v. United Southwest National Bank, 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619 (1979), this Court held that an employment contract for an indefinite period with the payment of wages as the only consideration for the performance of duties, was "terminable at the will of either party." 93 N.M. at 524, 602 P.2d 621.

  8. Campbell v. Millennium Ventures

    132 N.M. 733 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 19 times
    Concluding that an employment agreement with a non-solicitation clause was assignable with consent of the parties to the assignment

    Our case law makes it clear that "the threshold issue of whether there was an existing agreement requiring arbitration is a matter for the court, not the arbitrator." Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'l Bank, 93 N.M. 522, 523, 602 P.2d 619, 620 (1979); see also Bernalillo County Med. Ctr. Employees' Ass'n v. Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307, 308, 587 P.2d 960, 961 (1978) (stating "[w]here provision for arbitration is disputed, the court's function is to determine whether there is an agreement to arbitrate"). Thus, the trial court correctly undertook to decide whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate their dispute.

  9. Wiard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

    Civil No. 02-1544 WJ/RHS (D.N.M. Aug. 12, 2003)

    The threshold issue of whether there was an existing agreement requiring arbitration is for the Court to determine. Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'l Bank, 93 N.M. 522, 523 (1979); Bernalillo County Med. Ctr. Employees' Ass'n v. Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307, 308 (1978) ("[w]here provision for arbitration is disputed, the court's function is to determine whether there is an agreement to arbitrate"), cited in Campbell v. Millenium Ventures, LLC., 132 N.M. 733, 736 (Ct.App. 2002). The terms of the agreement "define the scope of the jurisdiction, conditions, limitations and restrictions on the matters to be arbitrated."

  10. Ewing v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    6 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (D.N.M. 1998)   Cited 6 times
    Recognizing the holding in Schmitz that prima facie tort cannot be used to avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and concluding that "it is unlikely that [prima facie tort] was meant to interfere with a company's prerogative to select its employees or independent contractors"

    State Farm argues that a two-year appointment as a trainee agent must precede appointment as an agent, therefore, the alleged promises could not be performed within a year and the statute of frauds applies. See Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'l Bank, 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619, 621 (1979). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, however, a reasonable inference exists that the length of the training period is discretionary and could be less than two years.