Opinion
04-22-00418-CR
11-22-2023
Johnny GONZALES, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019-CR-0573 Honorable Melisa C. Skinner, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice, Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.)
Sitting by assignment pursuant to section 74.003(b) of the Texas Government Code.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
After a jury trial, Johnny Gonzales was found guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (habitual) and was sentenced to forty-two years of imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the evidence was legally insufficient to show that he shot the complainant. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This "familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. "Faced with a record of historical facts that support conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and must defer to that resolution." Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326) (alteration in original).
"Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Rodriguez v. State, 521 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). "Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). "Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences 'as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial.'" Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15). "Juries are not permitted 'to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.'" Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15). "An inference 'is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them,' while speculation 'is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented.'" Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). "Faced with a record of historical facts that support conflicting inferences," we must presume that the jury "resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and must defer to that resolution." Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166 (quoting Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts and the weight to be given to the testimony. Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). As the sole judge of credibility of the witnesses, the jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see also Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) ("Even when a witness's testimony is uncontradicted, the jury can choose to disbelieve a witness."). We defer to the jury's credibility determinations and may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
"We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to 'the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.'" Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "A hypothetically correct jury charge is 'one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.'" Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
As applicable to this case, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another, and during the commission of the aggravated assault, used a deadly weapon and caused serious bodily injury to a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by section 71.0021 of the Family Code. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
On appeal, Gonzales argues that there is no evidence he was the person who shot the complainant and that it was pure speculation on the jury's part to conclude he was the shooter. In reviewing the record, we conclude the following evidence supports the jury's reasonable inference that Gonzales was the person who shot the complainant eight times:
1. The complainant and Gonzales had four children together and had just separated right before she was shot.
2. At the time of the shooting, the complainant was living with another man, and Gonzales had just seen them together in public. She and her boyfriend left, and Gonzales chased after the car they were in. After that incident, Gonzales's text messages to the complainant were aggressive from which the complainant concluded Gonzales was angry and agitated. The complainant refused to meet with Gonzales because she was afraid of him.
3. The complainant knew Gonzales owned a firearm because he possessed one when they lived together. The firearm was a silver chrome nine-millimeter Taurus that fired seventeen rounds.
4. The complainant knew Gonzales had access to his mother's vehicle, a silver Mitsubishi Lancer.
5. On the afternoon of the shooting, October 24, 2018, the complainant was leaving her apartment with her four-year-old daughter, who was in the backseat of the car. The complainant put her car in reverse when she heard a loud bang, followed by a second of silence. Then, sixteen more gunshots were fired at her in the car. The complainant and her child exited the car and ran away, yelling for help. The complainant was shot eight times but survived.
6. The complainant described the shooter as being "masked up" and wearing "a gray sweater, jeans, [and] white tennies." She saw the gun as the shooter was running. The shooter got into a car, which looked like Gonzales's mother's Silver Mitsubishi. The complainant immediately concluded that the shooter was Gonzales based on the car and because of the way the shooter was running. According to the complainant, Gonzales has a specific walk and run because he "tippy-toes." The complainant told the police that she believed she had been shot by Gonzales.
7. Bystanders to the shooting were able to give the license plate number and description of the shooter's car to police.
8. One bystander took a video of the shooter running away. The video shows a man running in the distinctive manner described by complainant.
9. A police officer who went to Gonzales's apartment complex saw a car without license plates; it matched the description of the shooter's vehicle. The hood was still warm, indicating that it had been recently driven. The VIN number of the car (a grey/silver Mitsubishi Lancer) matched the license plate given by bystanders and was registered to Gonzales's mother.
10.Other officers at Gonzales's apartment knocked on Gonzales's door for several minutes. Gonzales and his two brothers then exited a sliding glass door. Gonzales was detained.
11.In the search of Gonzales apartment, officers found on the dining room table a box of nine-millimeter ammunition. Inside one of the bedroom closets were the license plates that matched the VIN number of the Mitsubishi Lancer found by police. On the floor of the closet was extra ammunition in a cologne box.
12.In conducting a search of the Mitsubishi Lancer, officers found black gloves between the console and the seat. The black workout gloves had latex gloves stuffed inside of them.
13.Gonzales's brother, Seth, testified that on the day of the shooting, Gonzales took his mother's Mitsubishi Lancer and was gone for about an hour. When Gonzales returned, he was "rushing around" and moving from room to room. About thirty minutes later, the police began banging on the apartment door and continued banging for five to ten minutes. Gonzales told his brothers that he loved them and that he wanted to say goodbye and would think about them every day. Seth was confused about why Gonzales was saying that. Seth testified that neither he nor his brother Caleb owned a firearm or ammunition. According to Seth, the first time he saw ammunition on the table was when the police were knocking on the door and Gonzales was saying good-bye.
14.A total of seventeen shell casings were collected at the scene of the shooting. Holli Worden, a forensic scientist at the Bexar County Criminal Investigative Laboratory, concluded all seventeen fired casings were fired from the same firearm, and the markings were typical of those fired by semiautomatic firearms.
15.The black workout gloves found in the Mitsubishi Lancer had gunshot residue on them. Chrystina Vachon, the quality assurance manager at the Bexar County Criminal Investigatory Lab, performed the gunshot residue test and found ten particles containing lead, barium, and antimony on the back and palm of both gloves. She concluded the black gloves may have come into contact with a discharged firearm, or were in close proximity to a discharged firearm.
16.Rogelio Olvera, a forensic scientist at the Bexar County Criminal Investigation Laboratory in the serology DNA section, conducted an analysis of the buccal swab taken from Gonzales. Olvera extracted DNA from swabs of the black workout gloves and the latex gloves found in the Mitsubishi Lancer. The swabs were extracted for any possible DNA that may be on them. DNA tests showed that DNA on the gloves came
from two different individuals. Gonzales's DNA was 94% of the DNA found on the latex gloves and 78% of the DNA found on the black workout gloves.
From the above evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Gonzales was the person who shot the complainant. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. We therefore hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support Gonzales's conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.