(quoted authority omitted). In Gonzales v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 427, 839 P.2d 630, 637 (Ct.App. 1992), the Court noted, "Misrepresentations contrary to the material facts to be relied on, even when made innocently or by mistake, will support application of the doctrine." Therefore, the good faith of the AG and the DOL is not dispositive.
{28} We examine the conduct of both parties to determine whether estoppel applies. See Gonzales v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 427, 839 P.2d 630, 637 (Ct.App. 1992). We have been willing to grant estoppel when a party relied on written assertions made by the taxing authorities, but not when the party relied on oral representations.
The contributions are based on a percentage of the employee's salary. See, e.g., NMSA § 10-11-26, et seq.; Gonzales v. Public Employees Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 422, 839 P.2d 630 (Ct. App.) ("PERA membership contributions were deducted from the salary of each plaintiff, and corresponding employer contributions were made by the state on behalf of each plaintiff"), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 227 (1992). In about 2003, Clough separated from his employment with the State of New Mexico and relocated to the State of Colorado.
In addition to this economic realities test, the Court finds that because Grace relied on Tafoya's representation that the Contract was a lease-to-own agreement, the principle of equitable estoppel is applicable here. "The party seeking enforcement of equitable estoppel must show (1) lack of knowledge of the true facts in question, and (2) detrimental reliance on the other party's conduct." Gonzales v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 427, 839 P.2d 630, 637 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 227, 836 P.2d 1248 (1992) (citing Green v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, Income Support Div., 107 N.M. 628, 629-30, 762 P.2d 915, 916-17 (Ct.App. 1988)). "In addition, the New Mexico Supreme Court has recently amplified these elements, specifying that the party seeking to assert the doctrine must also demonstrate that its reliance was reasonable."
The appellate court recognized the general rule that estoppel will not lie against the government in Tice v. Pennington, 2001 OK CIV APP 95, ¶ 16, 30 P.3d 1164. Nevertheless, it allowed the doctrine's use where to fail to do so would injure the public interest in proficient medical care absent prevarication, concealment, and/or misrepresentation. But see, Branca v. City of Miramar, 634 So.2d 604-05 (Fla. 1994); Gonzales v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 839 P.2d 630, 634 (1992) cert. denied, 114 N.M. 227, 836 P.2d 1248 (1992); Quillian v. Employees' Retirement Sys. of Georgia, 259 Ga. 253, 379 S.E.2d 515-16 (1989); Law Enforcement Labor Serv., Inc. v. County of Mower, 483 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1992); Gorman v. City of Haines, 675 P.2d 646, 648-49 (Alaska 1984); Nevada Pub. Employees Retirement Bd. v. Byrne, 96 Nev. 276, 607 P.2d 1351, 1353 (1980); Hatcher v. Flockhart Foods, Inc., 161 N.C.App. 706, 589 S.E.2d 140, 143 (2003), review denied, 358 N.C. 234, 595 S.E.2d 150 (2004); City of Mobile v. Sumrall, 727 So.2d 118, 120-21 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999); Hitchcock v. Washington State Dept. of Retirement Sys., 39 Wash.App. 67, 692 P.2d 834, 838 (1984), review denied, 103 Wash.2d 1025 (1985); Kern v. City of Flint, 125 Mich.App. 24, 335 N.W.2d 708-09 (1983); Hauser v. New York State Comptroller, 83 A.D.2d 649, 442 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1981); Albright v. City of Shamokin, 277 Pa.Super. 344, 419 A.2d 1176-77 (1980).
The statements relied upon by Judge Rainaldi to the effect that he would qualify for the elected official exception were not representations of facts that existed; they were opinions as to the effect of the law upon a certain factual situation. Generally, statements of opinion on a matter of law raise no estoppel where the facts are equally well known to both parties. State ex rel. Reynolds v. McLean, 76 N.M. 45, 47, 412 P.2d 1, 3 (1966); see also, 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 47 (1966) (expression of opinion on matter of law not generally basis for estoppel); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 79 (1964) (same); cf. Gonzales v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 426, 839 P.2d 630, 636 (Ct.App.) (specific statements concerning amount of retirement benefits were considered to be statements of fact sufficient to warrant application of estoppel), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 227, 836 P.2d 1248 (1992). An exception to the general rule may be made where the advisor has actual or professed special knowledge.
PERA was established to collect, hold in trust, and invest monies contributed by employees and employers to pay “future retirement benefits to ... PERA members.” Gonzales v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 422, 839 P.2d 630, 632 (Ct.App.1992). The PERA Board is charged “to preserve, protect, and administer the trust to meet its current and future obligations and provide quality services to Association members.”
PERA was established to collect, hold in trust, and invest monies contributed by employees and employers to pay "future retirement benefits to . . . PERA members." Gonzales v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 422, 839 P.2d 630, 632 (Ct. App. 1992). The PERA Board is charged "to preserve, protect, and administer the trust to meet its current and future obligations and provide quality services to Association members."
{59} Araz further argues that even if Alliance's promissory estoppel claim is not preempted, summary judgment was appropriate on that claim because Alliance failed to establish that Defendants acted with the requisite scienter necessary to bring an estoppel claim in New Mexico. See Capo v. Century Life Ins. Co., 94 N.M. 373, 377, 610 P.2d 1202, 1206 (1980); Gonzales v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 427, 839 P.2d 630, 637 (Ct.App. 1992). However, the matter was before the trial court on a motion to dismiss, not a summary judgment.
We therefore address the facts according to the procedure agreed to and followed by the parties. See Barncastle v. Am. Nat'l Prop. Cas. Cos., 2000-NMCA-095, ¶ 5, 129 N.M. 672, 11 P.3d 1234 (stipulated facts); Barnae v. Barnae, 1997-NMCA-077, ¶ 14, 123 N.M. 583, 943 P.2d 1036 (attorney representations); Gonzales v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 422, 839 P.2d 630, 632 (Ct.App. 1992) (agreement that facts were not in dispute); see also Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2003-NMCA-066, ¶ 7, 133 N.M. 696, 68 P.3d 936 (citing foregoing cases and reviewing summary judgment de novo due to agreed-on posture of case on appeal); Ontiveros Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 2000-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 8-9, 129 N.M. 200, 3 P.3d 695 (distinguishing the standard of review applicable to judgments "on the merits" as opposed to "summary judgment" in case decided on cross-motions for summary judgment). B. Background on Medicare