The Department also argues that rule 106 prohibits Miller's cross-merchandising promotion. Relying on this court's decision in Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172 (hereafter Gonzales), the superior court ruled that the cash rebates offered by Miller are not premiums, and therefore are not prohibited by section 25600. The court also held the rebates are not barred by the Department's interpretation of rule 106 because the Department does not have the authority to issue a regulation exceeding the scope of the enabling statute.

It asserts that the act of entering the sweepstakes and becoming a random winner is sufficient consideration to preclude defining the sweepstakes prize as a "gift." (See Civ. Code, § 1146) And, according to Coors, the fact that a sweepstakes prize is not a "premium" is established by the decision in Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172. In Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, supra, this court was called upon to determine whether a winegrower was prohibited from offering a rebate to retail purchasers.

When a statute distinguishes different words in the same connection, it is presumed the Legislature intended different meanings and effect. ( Charles S. v. Board of Education (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 83, 95 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 422]; Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 178-179 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479].) Other sections that conditionally allow or prohibit fees for pets, guests, and the cost of management (§§ 798.33, 798.34, and 798.42) further illuminate the distinction between rent and fees within the context of the Mobilehome Residency Law.

' [Citations.]" ( Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 178-179 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479], quoting Hennigan v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 408]. See also Ford Motor Co. v. County of Tulare (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 688, 691 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 511] [dismissal of action for tax refund for failure to return summons: although section 581a excuses failure if defendant has generally appeared, similar dismissal statute under Revenue and Taxation Code specifically omitted similar provision, showing legislative intent to treat matters differently].

(3), (4) In accordance with the principle of statutory interpretation that "[c]ourts must give effect to the words of a statute according to their usual and ordinary meaning [Citations.]" ( Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 175 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479]), we find that the sale or purchase of a "business opportunity" encompasses any transfer of the ownership of an entire ongoing business in corporate form whether by transfer of all the stock or all the assets. Other courts interpreting similar state licensing provisions have reached the same conclusion.

Within the context of this case, the amended versions of section 1916.1 and subdivision (a)(1) are clearly in pari materia to the issue of broker compensation and can therefore be construed in light of each other. (See Hunstock v. Estate Development Corp. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 205, 210-211 [ 138 P.2d 1, 148 A.L.R. 968]; Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 178 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479]; Guthman v. Moss (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 501, 508 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 54] .) (12) "`"[A]pplication of the rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together is most justified, and light from that source has the greatest probative force, in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter that were passed at the same session of the [L]egislature, especially if they were passed or approved or take effect on the same day. . . ."'" ( International Business Machines v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 26 Cal.3d 923, 932 [163 Cal.Rptr. 782, 609 P.2d 1]; accord People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 585 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274]; 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1984) § 51.03, p. 469; see Raynor v. City of Arcata (1938) 11 Cal.2d 113, 118 [ 77 P.2d 1054]; People v. Jackson (1866) 30 Cal. 427, 430; Kriz v. Taylor (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 302, 311 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 824]; Old Homestead Bakery, Inc. v. Marsh (1925) 75 Cal.App. 247, 259 [ 242

(1c) In the case before us, an "aggrieved" party has appealed to the Appeals Board, which is empowered by law to review a "decision of the department . . . transferring . . . any license. . . ." (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22.) The Department also cites Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479], in which the Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate commanding the Department to refrain from undertaking any measures to curtail or restrain petitioner's consumer rebate program on the ground that it violated a provision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. The Department claims the court held that an immediate writ was the proper remedy to review an administrative decision of the Department.

(4) Courts must give effect to the words of a statute according to their usual and ordinary meaning. ( Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224]; Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 175 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479].) A word or phrase with a well-known and definite legal meaning will be construed to have that meaning when used in a statute.

The Legislature's use of "authorize" in one place and "order" in two other places in this statute reflects its intent to change what the juvenile court can do at a permanency planning hearing. "Where the Legislature has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded." ( Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. etc. Regulation (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 372, 380 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 101]; see also Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 178 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479].) For some unexplainable reason, sections 361.5 and 358, in referring to section 366.25, say that the court may "order" the institution of a Civil Code section 232 proceeding at a permanency planning hearing.

As Engs points out, a familiar canon of construction holds that statutes relating to the same subject should be construed in light of one another and that a word or phrase contained in one but omitted from another thus may signal a different legislative intent. (See, e.g., Gonzales Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 178 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 479]; Hennigan v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 408].) However, application of that rule in this case would achieve a result inconsistent with the evident purpose of section 6396, as just discussed.