Opinion
CA 3:03-CV-0076-R.
July 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed February 17, 2004). For the reasons detailed below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Angela Gomez ("Gomez" or "Plaintiff") is a Hispanic woman of Mexican-American origin. McDonald's and its subsidiary Chipotle ("McDonald's" or "Defendant") employed Gomez through early 2002. In 2001 and early 2002, McDonald's reorganized to create the Greater Southwest Region through the merger of its Oklahoma Region with its Dallas Region. Prior to the regional consolidation, Gomez held the position of Director of Operations in Oklahoma, and she reported to the Oklahoma Regional Vice President and General Manager, Shirley Rogers-Reece. At the time of her termination and after the regional consolidation, Gomez served as Director of Operations for the Greater Southwest Region, and she reported to the Vice President of Quality, Service, and Cleanliness, Rick Colon. Plaintiff was selected for the new position over four non-Hispanic male candidates, and she was the sole Hispanic female to hold that top-level executive position.McDonald's maintains a Zero Tolerance Policy Regarding Discrimination and Sexual Harassment. It assures employees a professional environment free from conduct that demeans or intimidates them on the basis of their race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, disability, veteran status, sexual orientation, or other prohibited bases. The policy applies to workplaces, company-sponsored training, and other outside work-related functions. During her tenure at McDonald's, Plaintiff obtained permission to send some McDonald's employees to a professional training program sponsored by Millennium 3 at a cost to McDonald's of $450 per attendee. Beyond basic promotional materials, the details and methods of the program were not shared with Gomez's supervisor at the time. Her request was nonetheless granted. McDonald's consequently sent employees to the one-to-three day "personal effectiveness" seminar, and the actual cost billed to McDonald's was approximately $1,200 per person.
McDonald's received complaints from employees who attended or were registered to attend the Millennium 3 program. They cited inappropriate conduct and methods at the sessions — an environment contrary to McDonald's Zero Tolerance Policy — and extreme pressure to attend the seminars by Plaintiff. An investigation then commenced to evaluate Millennium 3 and Gomez's role in promoting the program. On February 6, 2002, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave with pay during the pendency of the investigation. Following the investigation, on February 22, 2002, McDonald's terminated Plaintiff citing reasons of abuse of authority and poor judgment in connection with her advocacy of the Millennium 3 program. Plaintiff ultimately was replaced by an African American female.
Gomez advances employment discrimination claims under Title VII based on her gender, race, and national origin. She also alleges a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Gomez contends that McDonald's preferred African Americans over non-African Americans and males over females. Gomez claims that she was discriminated against when she was unable to pick her own subordinate employees as were her male counterparts and when open positions were filled with African American males rather than with females or Hispanics. Plaintiff also contends that she experienced emotional distress, including sleeplessness, loss of appetite, headaches, shoulder pain, and stress, as a result of McDonald's alleged conduct.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Because employment discrimination claims "involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent," summary judgment is generally an inappropriate tool for resolving these cases. Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). However, if Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, Bauer v. Albermarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999), or if defendant presents strong evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and the plaintiff is unable to counter with additional evidence of pretext, summary judgment may be properly granted. Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. Gender Discrimination
Plaintiff's gender discrimination claim fails as a matter of law. In reviewing discrimination claims, courts apply the familiar burden-shifting framework applied by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1990). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, thus creating a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). Once the employer puts forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, all presumptions drop from the case. See Grimes v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health, 102 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of showing pretext on the part of the employer. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Swanson v. General Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1186 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1997). Alternatively, under a mixed-motives analysis, Plaintiff may offer evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact "that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another `motivating factor' is the plaintiff's protected characteristic." Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 2004 WL 1427046, *5 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Richel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.Supp.2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C. 2003)).
To successfully advance a gender discrimination claim under Title VII, Gomez must put forth a prima facie case of discrimination. She must demonstrate: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she is qualified for the relevant position; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) that she was replaced with a person who is not a member of the protected class. See Meinecke v. HR Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff was replaced by a woman. While the fact that Plaintiff was replaced by a woman does not absolutely foreclose the possibility of gender discrimination, Plaintiff has failed to convince this Court that gender was a motivating factor in McDonald's decision to terminate Gomez. As Gomez cannot put forth a prima facie case for gender discrimination, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants as to this claim.
C. Race Discrimination
Gomez next asserts a claim of race discrimination. Race discrimination claims also follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for analysis. To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Gomez must establish: (1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was qualified for the position she held; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) that she was replaced by someone outside of the protected group. See Byers v. Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is a Hispanic woman and thus the member of a protected racial group. Defendants have disputed neither her qualifications for the position she held nor that she was discharged. Plaintiff was replaced by an African American woman, someone outside her protected group and a member of another protected racial group. For the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff has satisfied her burden to prove a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Defendant puts forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Gomez's termination. McDonald's contends that Plaintiff's deficiencies in judgment and abuse of discretion, not discrimination, led to her termination. Specifically, Defendant cites the unconventional outside training aggressively encouraged by Gomez. Plaintiff suggested that McDonald's send employees to the Millennium 3 training program. She obtained permission from her supervisor for the training after disclosing only limited information about the methods of the program. After some employees attended the Millennium 3 programs, McDonald's fielded complaints about it as contrary to McDonald's corporate values, and they issued a notice of nonsupport of the program. Defendant's subsequent investigation revealed unconventional training methods involving inappropriate conduct such as verbal abuse and humiliation of attendees. Plaintiff actively encouraged employees under her charge to participate in the programs, pressuring them to attend and suggesting that employees' continued employment with McDonald's depended on their participation in Millennium 3 training.
Plaintiff argues that these stated reasons by Defendant for her termination simply serve as pretext for discrimination, but she fails to put forth any evidence to support a finding by this Court of pretext. While Gomez suggests that she was treated more harshly than similarly situated male and African American employees, she offers nothing to indicate that race was a motivating factor in her termination. Under a mixed-motives analysis, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's own evidence mentions an additional reason for her termination — Gomez "coercively" questioned an employee as to his sexual orientation. Plaintiff offers examples of other employees' questioning of colleagues' sexual orientation, but the examples still fail to indicate that Plaintiff was treated differently due to her race. Rather, Plaintiff appears to cite discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation as the root cause of her termination. Unfortunately, Gomez's sexual orientation provides no basis for an actionable claim of discrimination, and Gomez produces no evidence to support a finding that McDonald's actions constitute either a pretext for discrimination on the basis of race or an additional, racially discriminatory reason for her termination.
Defendant also argues that the facts in this case require this Court to employ "same actor" and common-protected-class inferences in its analysis. Defendant claims that Richard Colon both hired and fired Gomez, and that an inference of nondiscrimination exists as Mr. Colon is Hispanic and a member of the same protected class as Plaintiff. Plaintiff maintains that she was hired by Don Thompson, not by Mr. Colon. While this disagreement presents a factual issue before the Court, it does not involve a material fact because Plaintiff fails to present a successful argument that Defendant's stated reasons for terminating Plaintiff are pretextual or that racial discrimination is an additional reason for her termination. No disputed issues of material fact remain as to this claim, so Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted with regard to Plaintiff's race discrimination claim.
D. National Origin Discrimination
Plaintiff's national origin claim also fails as a matter of law. The burden-shifting analysis in McDonnell Douglas also applies to national origin claims. See Magana v. Tarrant/Dallas Printing, Inc., 1998 WL 548686, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 1998); see also Meinecke v. HR Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995). To establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination, Gomez must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) despite her qualifications, she suffered an adverse employment action or decision made by McDonald's; and (4) she was replaced by, or received less favorable treatment than, similarly situated non-Mexican Americans. See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980).
As in her race discrimination claim, Plaintiff puts forth evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case for national origin discrimination and Defendant puts forth evidence in support of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff. Again, Plaintiff fails to satisfy her ultimate burden of proving pretext or, under a mixed-motives analysis, that national-origin discrimination was an additional reason for her termination. Plaintiff instead focuses on her sexual orientation as the root cause of her termination. This Court disapproves of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and recognizes the workplace challenges faced by an employee whose race, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender each put her in the minority. However, Plaintiff's sexual orientation does not provide the basis for an actionable claim. Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence calling to question Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff. No disputed issues of material fact remain as to this claim, and Defendant's is granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's national origin discrimination claim.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Plaintiff puts forth a claim against Defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In this claim, Plaintiff points to facts different from those leading relating to her termination and replacement. Rather, Gomez claims that McDonald's disclosure of her termination to third parties constitutes "extreme and outrageous" conduct. Defendant admits to informing its travel agency and health plan provider that Gomez no longer was employed by McDonald's.
Plaintiff's emotional distress claim fails as a matter of law. To prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Texas, Gomez must prove: (1) that McDonald's acted intentionally and recklessly; (2) that McDonald's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that McDonald's conduct caused Gomez emotional distress; and (4) that Gomez's emotional distress was severe. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993); Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 920 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003).
In Texas, the first requirement of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is that severe emotional distress be the intended consequence or primary risk of the tortfeasor's conduct. See Standard Fruit Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex. 1998). No such factual allegation supports this claim; Gomez has failed to show that McDonald's disclosure of her employment status to certain third parties was intended to cause her emotional distress. Second, to qualify as extreme and outrageous, the conduct must have gone beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. See GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999). This Court is unconvinced that McDonald's disclosure of Gomez's termination meets the threshold of "extreme and outrageous" conduct. As Plaintiff has failed to meet the first two requirements of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, this Court need not address whether McDonald's caused Gomez emotional distress nor whether the alleged emotional distress was sufficiently severe to support a claim. No genuine issues of material fact remain, so Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to this claim.
E. Christianburg Fees
Defendant asks this Court to grant Christianburg fees. Under Christianburg, a Title VII plaintiff may be required to pay defendant's attorney's fees if the plaintiff's claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christianburg Garment Co. V. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). This Court disagrees with McDonald's that Christianburg fees are appropriate in this case. Plaintiff's case fails to meet the standard necessary for such an imposition, and Defendant's request is DENIED.
Nice try, though.