Opinion
2:23-cv-03569-ODW (MAA)
02-23-2024
FRANK GOMEZ, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN JENKINS et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
On May 5, 2023, Plaintiff Frank Gomez (“Plaintiff”), a federal pretrial detainee, filed a Complaint alleging violations of his civil rights. (ECF No. 1.) On July 24, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to refile his Complaint no later than August 23, 2023, as large portions of the Complaint were missing. (ECF No. 9.) The Court “cautioned that failure to respond or comply with this order may result in a recommendation that the lawsuit be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with a court order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-1.” (Id.)
On August 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a letter addressed to Magistrate Judge Maria A. Audero, seeking an extension of time to refile the Complaint. (ECF No. 10.) The Clerk issued a Notice of Deficiency regarding the letter based on Central District of California Local Civil Rule (“Local Rule”) 83-2.5, which forbids parties from sending letters to the judge. (ECF No. 11.) Despite the impermissible form of Plaintiff's extension request, on August 29, 2023, the Court extended Plaintiff's deadline to refile his Complaint to September 28, 2023. (ECF No. 12.)
On October 25, 2023, in the absence of a refiled Complaint or other response to the Court's August 29, 2023 Order, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering Plaintiff to show cause by November 24, 2023 why the Court should not recommend the case be dismissed for want of prosecution. (ECF No. 13.) Again, the Court “advised that failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that the lawsuit be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-1.” (Id.)
In the continued absence of a refiled Complaint or other response to the Court's August 29, 2023 Order or October 25, 2023 Order to Show Cause, on January 3, 2024, the Court sua sponte extended Plaintiff's deadline to refile his Complaint to February 2, 2024. (ECF No. 14.) Again, the Court “advised that failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that the lawsuit be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-1.” (Id.)
On January 19, 2024, the Court's January 3, 2024 Order was returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 15.) Handwritten on the envelope were “RTS” and NIC,” which the Court understands to mean “Return to Sender” and “Not In Custody.” (Id.) Though not obligated to do so, on February 21, 2024, the Court performed an independent search on the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) inmate locator website, which revealed that Plaintiff is “not in BOP custody” and that his release date is “unknown.” See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2024). The Court takes judicial notice of the information contained on the BOP inmate locator website. See United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of the BOP inmate locator that is available to the public).
To date, Plaintiff has failed to refile his Complaint; has failed to respond to the Court's August 29, 2023 Order, October 25, 2023 Order to Show Cause, and January 3, 2024 Order; and has failed to update his address with the Court. Indeed, Plaintiff has not participated in this action since August 23, 2023. (See ECF No. 10.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Local Rule 41-6 states:
A party proceeding pro se must keep the Court and all other parties informed of the party's current address as well as any telephone number and email address. If a Court order or other mail served on a pro se plaintiff at his address of record is returned by the Postal Service as undeliverable and the pro se party has not filed a notice of change of address within 14 days of the service date of the order or other Court document, the Court may dismiss the action with or without prejudice for failure to prosecute.C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-6.
District courts may dismiss cases sua sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with a court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 41(b). Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (holding that the court has “inherent power” to dismiss cases sua sponte for lack of prosecution). Unless the Court states otherwise, a dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). “Dismissal is a harsh penalty and is to be imposed only in extreme circumstances.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. USPS, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)).
“A Rule 41(b) dismissal ‘must be supported by a showing of unreasonable delay.'” Omstead v. Dell, 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, the court must weigh the following factors in determining whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is warranted: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit will “affirm a dismissal where at least four factors support dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Finally, “in order to warrant a sanction of dismissal, the party's violations of the court's orders must be due to wilfulness or bad faith.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Public's Interest in Expeditious Resolution and the Court's Need to Manage Its Docket
The first and second factors (the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court's need to manage its docket) weigh in favor of dismissal. “Orderly and expeditious resolution of disputes is of great importance to the rule of law.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227. “The public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (quoting Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990). In addition, district courts “have an inherent power to control their dockets,” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)), and “are best suited to determine when delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public interest.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (quoting Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984)).
The first two factors usually are reviewed together “to determine if there is an unreasonable delay.” In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff has failed to refile his Complaint; has failed to respond to the Court's August 29, 2023 Order, October 25, 2023 Order to Show Cause, or January 3, 2024 Order; has failed to update his address with the Court; and has not participated in this lawsuit since August 23, 2023. The Court concludes that Plaintiff's inaction and lack of communication with the Court constitute willful unreasonable delay. See, e.g., Thomas v. Maricopa Cnty. Jail, 265 F. App'x. 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing pro se prisoner lawsuit for failure to respond to a court order for almost three months). Plaintiff's noncompliance also interferes with the public's interest in the expeditious resolution of this litigation and hinders the Court's ability to manage its docket. See In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (“[The Ninth Circuit] defer[s] to the district court's judgment about when a delay becomes unreasonable ‘because it is in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.”) (quoting In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1451)). The first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
B. Risk of Prejudice to Defendants
The third factor (risk of prejudice to the defendants) also weighs in favor of dismissal. “A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990)). “The law also presumes prejudice from unreasonable delay.” Id. The risk of prejudice to a defendant is related to a plaintiff's reason for failure to prosecute an action. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 . “Whether prejudice is sufficient to support an order of dismissal is in part judged with reference to the strength of the plaintiff's excuse for the default.” Malone, 833 F.2d at 131.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to refile his Complaint; has failed to respond to the Court's August 29, 2023 Order, October 25, 2023 Order to Show Cause, and January 3, 2024 Order; has failed to update his address with the Court; and has not participated in this lawsuit since August 23, 2023. As Plaintiff has not updated his address with the Court, the Court cannot ascertain his reason for failing to prosecute this lawsuit or comply with Court orders. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It would be absurd to require the district court to hold a case in abeyance indefinitely just because it is unable, through the plaintiff's own fault, to contact the plaintiff to determine if his reasons for not prosecuting his lawsuit are reasonable or not.”) “[A] presumption of prejudice arises from the plaintiff's unexplained failure to prosecute[.]” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 400 (9th Cir. 1998). The third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
C. Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives
The fourth factor (the availability of less drastic alternatives) also supports dismissal. “The district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424.
The Court considered and implemented less drastic alternatives prior to dismissal. The Court warned Plaintiff three times that failure to respond to the Court's orders would result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with Court orders pursuant to Rule 41(b). (ECF Nos. 9, 13-14.) See In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1229 (“Warning that failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can itself meet the ‘consideration of alternatives' requirement.”). The Court also extended Plaintiff's deadline to refile his Complaint from August 23, 2023 to September 28, 2023 (ECF No. 12); again to November 24, 2023 (ECF No. 13); and a third time to February 2, 2024 (ECF No. 14). See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court's allowance of an additional thirty days for plaintiff to file an amended complaint was an attempt at a less drastic sanction). Moreover, as Plaintiff has not updated his address with the Court, no alternatives to dismissal currently are available. See Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441 (concluding that there was no less drastic sanction available than dismissal where mail addressed to plaintiff was returned by the post office as undeliverable and plaintiff did not provide updated address to court). The fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
D. Public Policy Favoring Disposition on the Merits
As to the fifth factor, “[p]ublic policy favors disposition of cases on the merits.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. However, “a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party's failure to comply with deadlines . . . cannot move toward resolution on the merits.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1228. Thus, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case towards disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The case has been stalled by Plaintiff's failure to refile his Complaint; failure to respond to the Court's August 29, 2023 Order, October 25, 2023 Order to Show Cause, or January 3, 2024 Order; failure to update his address with the Court; and failure to otherwise participate in this lawsuit since August 23, 2023. Still, the public policy favoring the resolution of disputes on the merits is strong and, under the circumstances, outweighs Plaintiff's noncompliance and inaction. The fifth factor weighs against dismissal.
E. Dismissal Without Prejudice
In summary, Plaintiff's failures-to refile his Complaint; to respond to the Court's August 29, 2023 Order, October 25, 2023 Order to Show Cause, and January 3, 2024 Order; to update his address with the Court; and to otherwise participate in this lawsuit since August 23, 2023-constitute willful unreasonable delay. Four of the Rule 41(b) dismissal factors weigh in favor of dismissal, whereas only one factor weighs against dismissal. “While the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits weighs against [dismissal], that single factor is not enough to preclude imposition of this sanction when the other four factors weigh in its favor.” Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court concludes that dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and to comply with Court orders is warranted, but, consistent with Rule 41(b) and this Court's exercise of its discretion, the dismissal is without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that this lawsuit is DISMISSED without prejudice. No further filings shall be accepted under this case number.
MARIA A. AUDERO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.