We review the challenge to the sufficiency of evidence under the whole-record standard of review. Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 118 N.M. 449, 451, 882 P.2d 40, 42 (Ct.App. 1994) (court will not disturb findings of WCJ if supported by substantial evidence on record as a whole). Where there is a conflict in the testimony of the medical evidence of the health care providers, it is for the fact finder to reconcile or determine the weight to be given to each such opinion.

"We review [the w]orker's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the whole record standard of review." Gomez v. Bernalillo Cnty. Clerk's Office, 118 N.M. 449, 451, 882 P.2d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 1994). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the WCJ, "and the WCJ's findings will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole."

{26} Without a state constitutional argument presented to the Court of Appeals, either in briefing or at oral argument, that Court was not required to conduct its own interstitial analysis. See City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 665, 845 P.2d 753, 759 (1992) (stating that the Court would not review issues not briefed on appeal); Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 118 N.M. 449, 455, 882 P.2d 40, 46 (Ct.App. 1994) (same). Nor did the Court of Appeals, absent a state constitutional argument before it, need to inquire about preservation in the trial court.

See Baca, 2002-NMCA-002, ¶ 4, 131 N.M. 413, 38 P.3d 181 (concluding an injury to the right knee resulting in a 20 percent loss of use of knee is a scheduled injury to one leg at or above the knee entitling worker to 150 weeks of benefits under Subsection (A)(30)); Gomez v. Bernalillo Cnty. Clerk’s Off., 1994-NMCA-102, ¶ 10, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40 (concluding that an injury to an elbow, resulting in a 13 percent loss of use of one arm at elbow, dextrous member is a scheduled injury entitling worker to 160 weeks of benefits under Subsection (A)(2)). Thus, the longstanding construction of this phrase by the agency administering the WCA also supports the decision of the WCJ.

This language has been construed to mean that, where there is a separate and distinct impairment to other parts of the body in addition to the disability resulting from injury to the scheduled member, a worker may receive both scheduled injury (pursuant to Section 52-1-43) and PPD (pursuant to Section 52-1-42) benefits. See Hise Constr. v. Candelaria, 1982-NMSC-109, ¶¶ 10-13, 98 N.M. 759, 652 P.2d 1210; Gomez v. Bernalillo Cty. Clerk's Office, 1994-NMCA-102, ¶ 12, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40. Pain itself, without more, can constitute a separate and distinct impairment to a non-scheduled part of the body. See Harrison v. Animas Valley Auto & Truck Repair, 1988-NMSC-055, ¶ 13, 107 N.M. 373, 758 P.2d 787 (Ransom, J., specially concurring); Gordon v. Dennisson Doors, Inc., 1992-NMCA-136, ¶ 10, 114 N.M. 767, 845 P.2d 861.

Given this, the WCJ's reliance in this case on Employer/Insurer's explanation in determining there was no unfair claims processing was rational. See Gomez v. Bernalillo Cty. Clerk's Office, 1994-NMCA-102, ¶ 6, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40 ("When a finding is made against the party bearing the burden of persuasion, the reviewing court will affirm if the fact finder acted rationally."). {20} We conclude that the WCJ's findings pertaining to the reasonableness of the delay are supported by substantial evidence in the limited record before us.

We reaffirm that holding. Cf. Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40 (Ct.App. 1994) (holding that a worker who fell at work, injuring her wrist and elbow, was not entitled to compensation for a later shoulder injury that was caused by a fall at home). {13} We went on to say that "our holding today would not bar recovery for disability resulting from aggravation of a work-related injury by the normal physical stresses of everyday life."

Id., at 179, 824 P.2d at 319. {18} Similarly, in Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40 (Ct.App. 1994), the worker fell at work, fracturing her left wrist and shattering her right elbow. About three months later, she fell at home and injured her shoulder.

Accordingly, we will sustain the grant of a Rule 1-041(B) motion even if the plaintiff has produced enough evidence to withstand a directed verdict under Rule 1-050(A), so long as the decision of the trial judge is rationally based on the evidence. See Panhandle Pipe Steel v. Jesko, 80 N.M. 457, 459-60, 457 P.2d 705, 707-08 (1969); cf. Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 118 N.M. 449, 452, 882 P.2d 40, 43 (Ct.App. 1994) (finding against party bearing burden of persuasion will be affirmed if "fact finder acted rationally"). Because Rule 1-041(B) leaves the fact finding to the trial judge, "we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to support the findings and judgments of the trial [judge]."

The Court stated that, "[a]ttorneys are entitled to adequate compensation for work necessarily performed in workers' compensation cases[,]" id. at 171, 824 P.2d at 311, and held that although the statute did not specifically address the matter, fundamental fairness required an award of fees where the employer had put the worker's past benefits in jeopardy, thereby requiring effort on the part of the attorney to preserve them, id. at 172, 824 P.2d at 312. See also Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 118 N.M. 449, 455-56, 882 P.2d 40, 46-47 (Ct.App. 1994). 13. Employer contends that Baca and Gomez are distinguishable because it was the actual compensation benefits that were at risk in those cases, whereas it is the tort recovery that is at risk here.