Opinion
08-30-2017
Anat GOLUB, et al., respondents, v. George N. LOURIS, et al., appellants.
Martyn, Toher, Martyn & Rossi, Mineola, NY (Christine J. Hill of counsel), for appellants. Kubick & Associates, P.C. (The Altman Law Firm, PLLC, New York, NY [Michael T. Altman ], of counsel), for respondents.
Martyn, Toher, Martyn & Rossi, Mineola, NY (Christine J. Hill of counsel), for appellants.
Kubick & Associates, P.C. (The Altman Law Firm, PLLC, New York, NY [Michael T. Altman ], of counsel), for respondents.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Velasquez, J.), dated June 30, 2016, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants, who owned an apartment rented by the plaintiffs, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from an armed robbery of the plaintiffs that occurred in the apartment. The intruders apparently gained entry by breaking into a basement apartment in the same building through a window, which allowed them to enter a garage, from which they climbed a stairway that led up to a rear door to the plaintiffs' apartment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' failure to provide an interior rear door that was secured or an apparatus that would permit the door to be locked from inside was the cause of the robbery. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In an order dated June 30, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion.
"Landlords have a common-law duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm, including foreseeable criminal conduct by a third person" ( Mason v. U.E.S.S. Leasing Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 875, 878, 730 N.Y.S.2d 770, 756 N.E.2d 58 ; see Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 544, 548, 684 N.Y.S.2d 139, 706 N.E.2d 1163 ; Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 293–294, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 614 N.E.2d 723 ). "To establish that criminal acts were foreseeable, the criminal conduct at issue must be shown to be reasonably predictable based on the prior occurrence of the same or similar criminal activity at a location sufficiently proximate to the subject location" ( Karim v. 89th Jamaica Realty Co., L.P., 127 A.D.3d 1030, 1030, 7 N.Y.S.3d 488 ; see Novikova v. Greenbriar Owners Corp., 258 A.D.2d 149, 152–153, 694 N.Y.S.2d 445 ). " ‘Without evidentiary proof of notice of prior criminal activity, the owner's duty reasonably to protect those using the premises from such activity never arises' " ( Beato v. Cosmopolitan Assoc., LLC, 69 A.D.3d 774, 776, 893 N.Y.S.2d 578, quoting Williams v. Citibank, 247 A.D.2d 49, 51, 677 N.Y.S.2d 318 ; see Evans v. 141 Condominium Corp., 258 A.D.2d 293, 295–296, 685 N.Y.S.2d 191 ; Ragona v. Hamilton Hall Realty, 251 A.D.2d 391, 391–392, 674 N.Y.S.2d 113 ; Francis v. Ocean Vil. Apts., 222 A.D.2d 551, 551–552, 635 N.Y.S.2d 262 ).
Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they lacked notice of the prior occurrence of the same or similar criminal activity at a location sufficiently proximate to the subject premises (see Beato v. Cosmopolitan Assoc., LLC, 69 A.D.3d at 776, 893 N.Y.S.2d 578 ; Soto v. 2101 Realty Co., 266 A.D.2d 529, 530, 699 N.Y.S.2d 107 ; Ragona v. Hamilton Hall Realty, 251 A.D.2d at 391–392, 674 N.Y.S.2d 113 ). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Johnson v. City of New York, 7 A.D.3d 577, 578, 777 N.Y.S.2d 135 ; see also Beato v. Cosmopolitan Assoc., LLC, 69 A.D.3d at 777, 893 N.Y.S.2d 578 ; Novikova v. Greenbriar Owners Corp., 258 A.D.2d at 153, 694 N.Y.S.2d 445 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.