Indeed, if litigants could invoke the Act merely by alleging an intentional or fraudulent breach of a contract, common-law breach of contract actions would be supplemented in every case with an additional and redundant remedy under the Act. ( Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc. (1994), 262 Ill. App.3d 1082, 1093.) This could not have been the legislature's intent.

Illinois courts, apparently suspicious of the motives of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, repeatedly caution against transforming every breach of contract into consumer fraud. Long v. Wix Auto, No. 00 C 5842 (N.D.Ill January 4, 2001) (Mot. to Dismiss Op.) (Judge Zagel); Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, 635 N.E.2d 452, 460 (1St Dist. 1994). "Every individual breach of contract between two parties . . . does not amount to a cause of action cognizable under the (ICFA) . . . If the (ICFA) did apply, then common law breach of contract actions "would be supplemented in every case with an additional and redundant remedy."' Golembiewski, 635 N.E.2d at 121 (quoting Exchange National Bank v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Cc, 438 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (111. 1982)).

A breach of contractual promise, without more, is not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233, 115 S.Ct. 817, 826, 130 L.Ed.2d 715, 728 (1995), quoting Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc., 262 Ill.App.3d 1082, 1093, 200 Ill.Dec. 113, 635 N.E.2d 452 (1994). As our appellate court has explained:

A breach of contractual promise, without more, is not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233, 130 L. Ed. 2d 715, 728, 115 S. Ct. 817, 826 (1995), quoting Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1093 (1994). As our appellate court has explained:

¶ 45 Nonetheless, it is important to note that "[a] breach of a contractual promise, without more, is not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act." Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill.2d 100, 169 (2005) (citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 (1995) (quoting Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc., 262 Ill.App.3d 1082, 1093 (1994))). In other words, the purpose of the Consumer Fraud Act is not to" 'supplement every breach of contract claim with a redundant remedy.'" Id.

Here, there was no evidence that plaintiffs were deceived by defendant. Plaintiffs did not consent to the price increase, and indeed, their contracts were terminated. ¶ 38 Not every individual breach of contract between two parties amounts to a cause of action cognizable under the Consumer Fraud Act. Nilsson v. NBD Bank of Illinois, 313 Ill. App. 3d 751, 765 (1999) (citing Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1093 (1994)). Rather, the Consumer Fraud Act should not apply to simple breach of contract claims because if the Act did apply to such claims, common law breach of contract actions " 'would be supplemented in every case with an additional and redundant remedy.

Moreover, the court noted that not every individual breach of contract between two parties amounts to a cause of action cognizable under the Consumer Fraud Act. Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App.3d 1082, 1093, 635 N.E.2d 452, 460 (1994). Rather, the Consumer Fraud Act should not apply to simple breach of contract claims because if the Act did apply to such claims, common law breach of contract actions " 'would be supplemented in every case with an additional and redundant remedy.'"

But a breach of contract, without more, "does not amount to a cause of action cognizable under the [Consumer Fraud] Act and the Act should not apply to simple breach of contract claims." Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App.3d 1082, 1093, 635 N.E.2d 452, 460 (1st Dist. 1994). The basis for a contract action is the parties' agreement; to succeed under the consumer protection law, one must show not necessarily an agreement, but in all cases, an unfair or deceptive practice.

Greenberger has cited a number of cases involving allegations of systemic fraud in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, but all are distinguishable because they involved affirmative acts of misrepresentation and not a simple breach of contract multiplied over a prospective plaintiff class. See Rumford v. Countrywide Funding Corp., 287 Ill. App.3d 330, 222 Ill. Dec. 757, 678 N.E.2d 369, 373 (1997) (involving an ICFA claim based on a "pattern of misrepresenting to customers" that they would not be assessed additional charges when their mortgages were released); Petri v. Gatlin, 997 F.Supp. 956, 967-68 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (ICFA claim based on the dissemination of "promotional brochures containing misrepresentations of material facts"); cf. Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App.3d 1082, 200 Ill. Dec. 113, 635 N.E.2d 452, 460 (1994) (reversing a directed verdict for the plaintiff because the consumer-fraud allegation was nothing more than a breach-of-contract claim). Greenberger is correct that a widespread, systematic practice of engaging in unfair or deceptive conduct, even in a contractual setting, may be actionable under the statute.

However, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs' ICFA claim is merely its breach of express warranty claim clothed in different garb. It is settled that the ICFA "should not apply to simple breach of contract claims." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 (1995) (quoting Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 452, 460 (Ill. App. 1994)). Other than Plaintiffs' addition of boilerplate language concerning Dollar General's "malice, motive, and a reckless disregard of the truth" (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73, 78), there is no "allegation of misrepresentation that Plaintiffs allege in Count III that they do not also identify as an express warranty in Count I."