Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2008-00086424-CU-WM-CTL, Rafael A. Arreola, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
This appeal raises a single issue: did a police officer lawfully detain Joshua Goldsmith after the officer observed that Goldsmith did not stop his vehicle until its front wheels had crossed over a marked limit line at two consecutive stop-signed intersections? Goldsmith asserts the officer mistakenly understood the proscriptions of Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a), and this mistake of law made the stop unreasonable and requires exclusion of all evidence obtained from the stop. We conclude Goldsmith did violate section 22450, subdivision (a), and therefore affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Shortly after midnight on March 9, 2008, Officer Nguyen was driving behind Goldsmith's vehicle when he saw Goldsmith approach an intersection with a stop sign and a marked limit line. Although Goldsmith stopped, he did not do so until his vehicle had crossed over the limit line and Nguyen could see the limit line behind the front passenger-side wheel of Goldsmith's vehicle. Goldsmith turned left, proceeded east, and approached the next intersection, which also had a stop sign with a marked limit line. Goldsmith again did not stop until his vehicle had crossed several feet over the limit line. Nguyen stopped Goldsmith for violating section 22450, subdivision (a).
Nguyen observed signs Goldsmith was intoxicated, and also learned Goldsmith was driving on a suspended license. Subsequent investigation, accomplished over Goldsmith's resistance, revealed Goldsmith was intoxicated at the time he was stopped with a blood alcohol content nearly twice the legal limit.
B. Administrative and Court Proceedings
The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Goldsmith's driver's license based on his prior license suspension for drunk driving and because of Goldsmith's refusal to consent to alcohol testing. Goldsmith challenged the revocation at an administrative hearing before a DMV hearing officer. The hearing officer rejected Goldsmith's claim that the traffic stop was unlawful, and upheld the license revocation. Goldsmith petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate, arguing the stop was unlawful because Goldsmith stopped before his vehicle had entirely passed the limit line, and therefore he did not violate section 22450, subdivision (a). Goldsmith asserted all evidence obtained as a result of the stop, which was based on Nguyen's mistaken understanding of section 22450, subdivision (a), should have been suppressed. The trial court rejected Goldsmith's argument, concluding he did violate section 22450, subdivision (a), and also concluding Nguyen had articulable facts justifying the traffic stop, and therefore denied Goldsmith's petition. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Goldsmith contends Nguyen had no cause to initiate a traffic stop, and therefore all fruits of that stop must be suppressed, because Nguyen made the stop under the belief that section 22450, subdivision (a), is violated if any portion of a vehicle crosses the limit line before stopping, and this belief is erroneous as a matter of law. Goldsmith, citing People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, argues Nguyen's mistake of law, even if the mistake was reasonable and in good faith, cannot provide reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop and therefore all fruits of the traffic stop must be suppressed.
We conclude Nguyen correctly applied section 22450, subdivision (a), and therefore the traffic stop was valid. That section provides that "[t]he driver of any vehicle approaching a stop sign at the entrance to, or within, an intersection shall stop at a limit line, if marked, otherwise before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. [¶] If there is no limit line or crosswalk, the driver shall stop at the entrance to the intersecting roadway." (§ 22450, subd. (a).) Goldsmith contends Nguyen was not justified in detaining him because the undisputed facts show that only his front tires had crossed the limit lines before he stopped, and therefore he in fact complied with the statute by stopping "at" the line. This argument requires us to examine the statutory language to ascertain what the Legislature intended by enacting section 22450. We must determine what the Legislature meant by requiring a motorist to stop "at" a limit line.
We need not determine whether the exclusionary remedy for stops based on reasonable and good faith mistakes of law, as applied in People v. White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 636 and the cases on which it was premised, survives Herring v. U.S. (2009) __U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 and Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586.
When interpreting statutory language, we consider the intent of the Legislature to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898.) We look first to "the plain and commonsense meaning of the statute because it is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and purpose. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and we need not resort to legislative history to determine the statute's true meaning." (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401.) The statute requires a driver to stop at a "limit line," if one is marked. The Vehicle Code expressly defines a limit line as "a solid white line... extending across a roadway or any portion thereof to indicate the point at which traffic is required to stop in compliance with legal requirements." (§ 377.) A "point" is defined as "a narrowly localized place having a precisely indicated position" (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) p. 957, col. 1) or a "particular narrowly limited part of a surface [that occupies a] precisely indicated spot." (Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1749, col. 3.) Reading these statutes as a whole (Pieters, at p. 899), the limit line defines the "precisely indicated position" at which a motorist must stop, and does not permit the motorist to pass through the precisely indicated position before stopping.
The term "limit," which is used to describe the term "line," is defined as something that "bounds, restrains, or confines," and "implies setting a point or line... beyond which something cannot or is not permitted to go." (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) p. 722, col. 1.) The dictionary definition of the term "limit" accords with the commonsense understanding that a limit line sets the point beyond which the vehicle is not permitted to go.
Even if there existed some residual ambiguity on the position at which the motorist must stop, our consideration of the objects the Legislature sought to achieve and the harm it sought to prevent (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159) convinces us that Goldsmith's contrary construction of the statute does violence to its intended purpose. Section 22450 requires a driver to stop (1) at a limit line if one is marked, (2) before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection if no limit line is marked, or (3) at the entrance to the intersecting roadway if there is neither a limit line nor a crosswalk. The apparent purpose of the statute is to require a vehicle to stop before it is in a position where it could interfere with cross-traffic seeking to traverse the intersection, or where it might impede or hit pedestrians who seek to use a crosswalk. Goldsmith's construction would offend these goals, because the widely divergent lengths of vehicles would permit a driver of some vehicles to stop in a manner that interferes with (or, in the case of a big-rig truck, completely blocks) cross-traffic or pedestrians, while nevertheless complying with the "limit line" requirements of section 22450, as long as the rear bumper straddled the limit line.
Section 22500 prohibits a motorist from "stop[ping]... any vehicle whether attended or unattended... [¶] (a) Within an intersection... [or] [¶] (b) On a crosswalk." Our construction of section 22450 is in harmony with section 22500, while Goldsmith's construction creates tension between those sections.
We therefore interpret section 22450's requirement that a motorist "stop at a limit line" to require the motorist to fully stop before any part of his or her vehicle crosses the limit line. This construction, which is in accord with the interpretation of section 22450 adopted by the court in People v. Binkowski (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, enforces both the language and the apparent intended purpose of that section. Goldsmith argues, however, that we should interpret the word "at" as meaning "before, on or near," because safety is promoted if the driver is permitted to select how far he should intrude into the intersection to ascertain whether he may safely proceed. We decline Goldsmith's invitation to interpret section 22450 in a manner that would effectively replace the term "limit line" with a nebulous "stopping zone," a zone that would be variable to each individual driver and would be restrained only by the individual driver's determination of how far into the intersection he or she deemed it was necessary to intrude to assess the driver's ability to proceed safely.
Goldsmith also appears to argue that because the placement of any specific limit line is not controlled by statute or administrative regulation, drivers are constitutionally protected from being subjected to sanction for violating arbitrarily-located limit lines. Goldsmith cites no relevant law supporting this assertion, and we decline further to consider it. (See Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [claim unsupported by reasoned argument and citations to authority deemed waived].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The DMV is entitled to costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J., O'ROURKE, J.