Opinion
C.A. No. 01C-10-097 WCC.
Submitted: January 6, 2003.
Decided: April 30, 2003.
On Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial on Liability. Denied. On Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial on Damages. Granted. On Defendant's Motion for Costs. Denied.
Francis J. Murphy, Esquire Murphy, Spadaro Landon Wilmington, DE
Colin Shalk, Esquire Casarino, Christman Shalk, P.A. Wilmington, DE
Dear Counsel:
The Court has before it several post-trial motions in the above-captioned matter. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or Judgment as a Matter of Law as to liability is denied. The plaintiff's Motion for New Trial as to damages is granted.
This litigation arose from an automobile accident that occurred on October 17, 1999 at approximately 5:20 p.m. near Lewes. Generally the collision resulted from the defendant pulling onto Route 9 from an adjacent side road whereup on he was struck by the plaintiff's vehicle. The four day trial began on November 12, 2002 and the jury found the defendant 51% negligent, the plaintiff 49% negligent, but a warded no monetary damages.
The plaintiff first argues that the facts presented at trial did not support the Court's instructing the jury on comparative negligence. This simply is incorrect. The testimony of the parties as well as the detective who investigated the accident clearly created a factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff was maintaining a proper lookout and whether this conduct contributed to the accident. The location of the vehicles' contact as well as the distance the defendant's vehicle would have traveled in front of the plaintiff's vehicle prior to the collision simply raised an issue as to whether Mr. Goldsborough was appropriately observing the conditions of the road which could have contributed to the accident. It is the Court's recollection that this instruction on comparative negligence was requested by defense counsel at the prayer conference after the Court had rejected other submissions regarding the operation of the plaintiff's vehicle without headlights and was not one suggested or created by the Court. In any event, the Court has an obligation to fairly instruct the jury on issues of law for which there is a reasonable basis in the record to support. While counsel for the plaintiff may strongly feel that his view of the facts are correct and should be the only logical conclusion one could reach, the Court believed the evidence suggested otherwise and supported the defendant's request. Perhaps the best evidence that the Court's perception of the facts were correct is the ultimate decision of the jury. Their 51/49 split on liability clearly suggests that the plaintiff's view that only the defendant was liable for the accident is simply incorrect. The Court appreciates that the plaintiff and his counsel are disappointed with the jury's decision, but the Court remains convinced that the jury was properly instructed on the law, these instructions were supported by the evidence presented, and there was no basis to overturn the jury decision on liability. As such, that motion is denied.
Before leaving this area the Court feels compelled to comment on several references in the parties briefs as to an off the record discussion between counsel and the Court. The only time the interaction between the Court and counsel was unrecorded was the prayer conference relating to jury instructions conducted before closing arguments. The parties memorandums may leave the impression that there was substantive legal arguments or motions that occurred at that conference, and the Court believes that is an unfair characterization of what occurred. While the Court agrees that counsel discussed with the Court the liability issues on which the jury was to be instructed, the Court recalls that these discussions occurred solely within the context of deciding what appropriate jury instruction to give to the jury. It is the routine practice of this Court not to record prayer conferences and obviously if the plaintiff was making any oral motion at the conference or making some legal point, the Could would instruct them to make the motion in open court when a reporter was present. In fact, that is what occurred here. The Court made legal rulings regarding the instructions which had relevance to liability issues. When the parties returned to the courtroom, the plaintiff was given an opportunity in open court to make a record regarding his request for a directed verdict on liability and to object to the instruction that the Court intended to give. The motion was argued by both counsel, placing on the record their respective positions, and the Court then set forth on there cord its ruling. In this case the Court stated:
One, I'm going to allow a comparative negligence instruction to go forward with the — the issue of whether or not the plaintiff had a sufficient opportunity and to observe the defendant's vehicle and react to it. So — and whether or not he failed to maintain a proper lookout. Primarily based upon the officer's testimony concerning where the vehicles impacted because it would be — if the jury believed that testimony, which there is no reason for them not to, the vehicle crossed an improved shoulder and significantly into the roadway of the plaintiff before being struck, and so I think there is a fair issue as to whether or not there was sufficient opportunity for Mr. Goldsborough to observe the vehicle and react to it. I'm not saying that that is what the jury would find, but I have to instruct them in what is at least a reasonable inference if they decided to view the evidence in that way.
As to the lights issue, I decided not to give that instruction because the only evidence that's in the record is that the plaintiff had his lights on, based upon his testimony, and that defendant was not helpful in regards to the issue because he had just never seen the car. If it was one of those testimony where he had said I didn't see him coming, when I looked he didn't have his lights on, or I saw him coming and I looked and he didn't have his lights on, in fairness to Mr. Bunting, he testified fairly what he remembered and he just doesn't remember the car and, therefore, as a result, there is nothing, I believe, in the record to support an instruction, a jury instruction on comparative negligence dealing with the — whether the lights were properly on at a time in — in regard to the statute.
As to the issue of directed verdict, that motion is denied. There is, I believe, an issue for the jury to decide in regards to . . . liability. And it would be inappropriate for the Court to remove that issue from them. There is evidence which if they decide to give credibility and credence to, would support some dispute in regards to the liability issue in regards to the accident that occurred. So the motion for directed verdict on liability is denied.
Any implication that there was some improper off-the-record discussion is simply unfounded. The Court's rulings at the prayer conference related to the jury instructions. While by implication they reflected the Court's position on a directed verdict, the plaintiff was given a full opportunity to argue and make a record of his position both for trial and appeal purposes. Nothing occurred at the prayer conference that was not subsequently set forth by counsel or the Court on the record.
While the Court finds that there is no basis to overturn the jury decision on liability, it is troubled by the decision on damages. While each party has set forth in their memorandum their litigation position on the damage testimony, it would be difficult to fairly argue that the plaintiff was not injured in this accident. While the nature and extent of those injuries may be hotly disputed, to award no compensation can simply not be supported. Even the defendant's own doctor acknowledges that the accident may have triggered or aggravated a pre-existing physical condition of the plaintiff. Any reasonable consideration of the expert testimony and the medical records introduced could only logically result in the recognition of some injuries for the plaintiff related to the accident. The Court can only surmise that the jury misunderstood that they were to make the damage award independent of the liability percentage determination, and since they were nearly equally divided as to fault, decided to make no award.
The Court would note that while the plaintiff is quick to criticize the jury process by suggesting that they must have spent little time reviewing the medical records, perhaps counsel needs to review what is unfortunately a more than common practice of submitting hundreds of pages of medical records into the evidence, many of which are difficult to read, and then provide little guidance to the jury in reviewing what is contained or what may be relevant within those documents. To believe the jury will painstakingly go through each document searching for evidence to support the plaintiff's claim is simply naive. It is the plaintiff who has the burden of proof, not the jury, and if the plaintiff is relying upon those records to support his case, they need to be addressed in an organized and effective manner. In spite of this concern, it would be both unfair to the plaintiff and a windfall to the defendant to not correct this injustice. As such, the Court will conduct a new trial on damages only.
Finally, the Court has before it a motion filed by the defendant for costs. Since this motion is premised on the lack of a monetary damage award for the plaintiff, it would be inappropriate to grant the costs at this juncture until the issue of damages has been resolved. As such, that motion is denied without prejudice to re-file if the subsequent verdict provides a legal basis to request those costs.
I am available to retry this case as to damages on October 8, 2003. Please let me know your availability.