Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co.

53 Citing cases

  1. Mohamed v. 1st Class Staffing, LLC

    286 F. Supp. 3d 884 (S.D. Ohio 2017)   Cited 8 times
    Discussing Shikles and Oberweis and applying the rationale articulated in Oberweis

    42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Courts thus have recognized, as a variant of a religious discrimination claim, a cause of action for an employer's failure to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs. See Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Religious discrimination can arise out of an employer's failure to accommodate those employees who refuse to work on particular days of the week because of their religious beliefs.") (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the reasonable accommodation standard expressly incorporated into the definition of "religion," the Supreme Court has held:

  2. Reed v. International Union United Auto., Aero.

    523 F. Supp. 2d 592 (E.D. Mich. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    Virts v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 516 (6th Cir. 2002). The employee bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case, and sustains that burden by showing that: 1) he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; 2) he has informed his employer of the conflict; and 3) he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1378 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2003); Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007). With respect to that third element of a prima facie case, the Sixth Circuit has "consistently held that a prima facie case of religious discrimination requires discharge or discipline for failure to comply with an employment requirement."

  3. McCray v. Fed. Express Corp.

    Case No. 2:17-cv-2918-JPM-cgc (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 12, 2020)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining that the concept of "discharge or discipline" is narrower than the concept of "adverse employment action."

    The Sixth Circuit has found that in some circumstances the use of accrued vacation time is not a reasonable accommodation, and that such a requirement may support a prima facie case of religious discrimination. See Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375 (6th Cir. 1994). In Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., the Sixth Circuit found that an employer failed to reasonably accommodate an employee who requested an accommodation to take off Saturday for church services when it required the employee to use all accrued vacation days to avoid working on Saturday. 15 F.3d at 1379.

  4. Reed v. International Union

    569 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009)   Cited 41 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting argument that withdrawal by union of former accommodation that permitted Plaintiff not to work on Sabbath days, and replacement with requirement that plaintiff take unpaid leave was not a form of discipline, because “more than loss of pay is required to demonstrate discipline or discharge”

    We have declined to relieve a religious accommodation plaintiff of his burden to establish a prima facie case, including the requirement that he demonstrate that he has been discharged or disciplined. Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2003). Reed cannot avoid this requirement by insisting that the only controversy here concerns the reasonableness — not the necessity — of his accommodation.

  5. Reed v. Int'l Union

    564 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 2009)   Cited 3 times

    We have declined to relieve a religious accommodation plaintiff of his burden to establish a prima facie case, including the requirement that he demonstrate that he has been discharged or disciplined. Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2003). Reed cannot avoid this requirement by insisting that the only controversy here concerns the reasonableness — not the necessity — of his accommodation.

  6. Savel v. Metrohealth Sys.

    1:22-CV-02154 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    To do this, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person; and (2) the employer did so with the intention of forcing the employee to quit. See Laster, 746 F.3d at 728; Edwards v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:22-CV-503,2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4748, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10,2023), atf'dlUX U.S. App LEXIS 22057 (6th Cir. Aug. 21,2023); Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2003). An employee's subjective beliefs are not sufficient to meet the burden of establishing a constructive discharge.

  7. Marsico v. Sears Holding Corporation

    Case No. 06-10235 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2011)

    In the case of constructive discharge, `working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2003). In determining whether an environment is one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, courts look at all of the circumstances, which include: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's performance.

  8. Winchester v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-00025-TBR (W.D. Ky. Jun. 24, 2015)   Cited 1 times

    "In the case of constructive discharge, working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The "constructive discharge issue depends upon the facts of each case and requires an inquiry into the intent of the employer and the reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer's conduct upon the employee."

  9. Bond v. Sodecia N.A.

    Case No. 12-cv-15160 (E.D. Mich. Jun. 24, 2014)   Cited 4 times
    Finding that a staffing agency was not liable in part because there was no evidence that it had any control over the plaintiff's working environment

    But to qualify under a constructive discharge theory, the conduct must be "sever[e]" and "humiliating," not a collection of "mere offensive utterance[s]." Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2003). Bond has failed to satisfy that standard.

  10. Burnett v. Select Specialty Hosp.

    Case No. 1:10-cv-505 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2012)

    To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must show that her employer deliberately created "working conditions 'so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.'" Id. at 882 (quoting Easter v. Jeep Corp.,750 F.2d 520, 522-23 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2003). Whether a reasonable person feels compelled to resign depends on the particular facts of each case.