Neither age, nor physical weakness and debility, nor disease of the body, nor even mental weakness, will affect the validity of a gift where the donor has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature and effect of his act. Unsoundness of mind may exist on certain subjects without affecting the donor's capacity to make a valid gift. 38 C.J.S. Gifts ยง 13, p. 790; Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227, 253 P.2d 474; Schwarz v. Taeger, 44 Idaho 625, 258 P. 1082. Unsoundness of mind to make a will cannot be inferred merely from old age, physical infirmity, pain and suffering or even partial mental debility, in and of themselves, or all concurring.
Many decades ago, a panel of the Second District addressed this issue in a context directly relevant here, the giving of a gift deed of real property by a father to his son. In Goldman v. Goldman (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 227 (Goldman), the appellate court reversed a trial court judgment quieting title in Los Angeles County property to the widow of the decedent who had, prior to his death, transferred that property to his son. The appellate court held that the lower courtโs judgmentโand the bases for itโwere inconsistent with prior California precedent on the issue of inter vivos gifts of property from a parent to a child.
In such cases the test of proving undue influence is indeed whether the legatee exercised "`a pressure which overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the testator at the very time the will was made,'" and that "`the influence was such as, in effect, to destroy the testator's free agency and substitute for his own another person's will.'" ( Estate of Dobrzensky (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 134, 143 [ 232 P.2d 886]; see also: Estate of Arnold (1940) 16 Cal.2d 573, 577 [ 107 P.2d 25]; Goldman v. Goldman (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 227, 234 [ 253 P.2d 474]; italics added.) However, the cases make it evident that in order to prove that one is in a mentally weakened condition within the meaning of section 1575 it is not necessary to show total incapacity to contract, but only that the grantor is lacking in such mental vigor as to enable him to protect himself against an imposition ( Peterson v. Ellebrecht (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 718, 721-722 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 349] ).
The degree of mental competency requisite to sustain the validity of a deed has been held to be the same degree of competency required to execute a will. Thus, in Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227, 232 [ 253 P.2d 474], we held, "Where one is able to understand his acts and the relation in which he stands to the objects of his bounty, free from any delusion, he has the capacity to dispose of his property. . . ." [2] Clearly, even though a grantor suffers a physical or mental debility or even where there is the possibility of incompetency as the result of the sustained use of drugs, he is not necessarily rendered incompetent as long as he can comprehend the nature of his act, the character of his property and his relation to the natural objects of his bounty. ( Estate of Fritschi, 60 Cal.2d 367, 372 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 264, 384 P.2d 656]; Goldman v. Goldman, supra.)
See McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal.2d 409 [ 101 P.2d 690, 129 A.L.R. 810]; Wardlow v. Pozzi, 170 Cal.App.2d 208 [ 338 P.2d 564]; California Trust Co. v. Anderson, 91 Cal.App.2d 832 [ 205 P.2d 1127]. See also Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227 [ 253 P.2d 474]. Section 683 of the Civil Code sets forth the definition and method of creating a joint tenancy.
" [5] It is clear that the oral agreement (if there was one in this case) between the joint tenants not to terminate the joint tenancy in their lifetimes is as said in Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227, 241 [ 253 P.2d 474] "of no value" and "It [the agreement] is not in writing as required of contracts concerning real property. Therefore, decedent was free to make a transfer of his [her] share at his [her] pleasure.
[16] Moreover, the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties to a transaction does not dictate the ultimate conclusion that a gift from one to the other was obtained by undue influence, even though it may give rise to a rebuttable presumption to that effect. ( Barney v. Fye, 156 Cal.App.2d 103, 107 [ 319 P.2d 29]; Camperi v. Chiechi, 134 Cal.App.2d 485, 504 [ 286 P.2d 399]; Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227, 237 [ 253 P.2d 474]; Azevedo v. Leavitt, 76 Cal.App.2d 321, 324 [ 172 P.2d 704].) Such a presumption is overcome by proof that the transaction was fair and free from undue influence.
No showing is made that respondents exercised any pressure whatsoever on the mind of decedent; in fact all of the evidence is to the contrary. The voluntary character of her acts in executing the deeds is amply shown by the statements made by her to her neighbors and to her grandnephew. ( Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227 [ 253 P.2d 474].) The judgment is affirmed.
This argument is without merit in the factual context confronting us. [14] Assuming the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence between Anna and Ciro and that a presumption of invalidity attended the transaction (Civ. Code, ยง 2235), such presumption may be overcome where it is manifest that the grantor acted voluntarily and with full understanding, and that the benevolent act was engendered in the testator's own mind without overreaching or improper importunity on the part of the grantee. ( Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227, 234 [ 253 P.2d 474]; Estate of Chamberlain, 44 Cal.App.2d 193, 198 [ 112 P.2d 53, 934]; Roeder v. Roeder, 118 Cal.App.2d 572, 580 [ 258 P.2d 581].) [15] Whether the donee has rebutted the presumption by showing the transaction was untainted by undue influence is a question for the trier of facts.
[5] Undue influence implies the exercise of such coercion as is calculated to hamper the free agency and will of another. ( Goldman v. Goldman, 116 Cal.App.2d 227, 235 [ 253 P.2d 474]. See Estate of Keizur, 64 Cal.App.2d 117, 122 [ 148 P.2d 116]; Estate of Higgins, 156 Cal. 257, 261 [ 104 P. 6].