would perceive that the restriction at issue was drafted, not as an independent section implying general application, but as a subdivision of a section concerned only with one aspect of the entire budgetary process (cf. McKinney's Cons Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 97). He would find the restriction rational in its application to the submission and approval of the budget because subdivision b of section 120 grants the Mayor veto power (cf. MVAIC v. Eisenberg, 18 N.Y.2d 1, 3). Finally, the intelligent, careful voter would perceive that sections 121, 122 and subdivision f of section 124 prohibit the Mayor from voting on certain other budgetary actions, and he would realize then, if he had not before, that subdivision d of section 120 could not be all encompassing because it would render these other sections redundant (cf. McKinney's Cons Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 231; Matter of Albano v. Kirby, 36 N.Y.2d 526). Concur — Murphy, P.J., Kupferman, Lane, Lupiano and Lynch, JJ. [ 98 Misc.2d 972.]
The affidavit of a former member of the city council concerning his intent and the intent of the council in enacting the Rent Stabilization Law is disregarded. Such recollections expressed for the purpose of litigation may not be used to ascertain the intent of a statute (cf. Golden v Koch, 98 Misc.2d 972).