Golden v. Golden

11 Citing cases

  1. Newberry v. Newberry

    351 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App. 2011)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in accepting some witness testimony and rejecting other, contrary evidence in dividing community estate

    Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, no writ). If, for instance, the complaining spouse suffers only nervousness or embarrassment, a trial court may not grant the divorce on the ground of cruelty. Golden v. Golden, 238 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1951, no writ). Abuse need not be limited to bodily injury; nonetheless, physical abuse will support granting a divorce on cruelty grounds. Waheed v. Waheed, 423 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1967, no writ); Cote v. Cote, 404 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1966, writ dism'd); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 163 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1942, no writ). Acts occurring after separation may be used to support a finding of cruelty.

  2. In re Marriage of Rice

    96 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App. 2003)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that wife's testimony that husband had physically abused her on several occasions in past was sufficient evidence to support trial court's findings of cruel treatment

    Mere disagreements or trifling matters will not justify granting a divorce for cruelty. Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1969, no writ). If, for instance, the complaining spouse suffers only nervousness or embarrassment, a trial court may not grant the divorce on the ground of cruelty. Golden v. Golden, 238 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1951, no writ). Abuse need not be limited to bodily injury; nonetheless, physical abuse will support granting a divorce on cruelty grounds. Waheed v. Waheed, 423 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1967, no writ); Cote v. Cote, 404 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1966, writ dism'd); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 163 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1942, no writ). Acts occurring after separation may be used to support a finding of cruelty.

  3. Henry v. Henry

    48 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App. 2001)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that testimony "regarding the reasonableness of the fees, the hours worked, the rate charged, and the services provided" was sufficient evidence for attorney's fee award

    Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, no writ). See also Golden v. Golden, 238 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1951, no writ) (complaining spouse suffered only some nervousness and embarrassment). Acts occurring after separation can support a finding of cruel treatment.

  4. Gentry v. Gentry

    394 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)   Cited 6 times

    The evidence fell short of being "full and satisfactory" and was, therefore, insufficient to establish such cruel treatment as would constitute a statutory ground for divorce. Appellant's point is sustained. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W.2d 210; Allen v. Allen, Tex.Civ.App., 267 S.W.2d 911; Cantwell v. Cantwell, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W.2d 450; Golden v. Golden, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 619; Garcia v. Garcia, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 227. For the reasons stated, the decree of the court below is reversed and judgment here rendered that appellee be denied a divorce.

  5. Milam v. Milam

    393 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)   Cited 1 times

    This record does not indicate that the conduct of appellant was done wilfully with intent to injure the appellee. Golden v. Golden (Tex.Civ.App.), 238 S.W.2d 619. Mr. Milam was not asked and he did not testify that his wife's conduct was such as to render their further living together insupportable. We think the evidence falls far short to justify the granting of a divorce to appellee under the requirements of Article 4632, V.A.C.S.

  6. Popper v. Popper

    388 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)   Cited 2 times

    This element of wilfulness has been consistently recognized by the authorities. See, Alexander v. Alexander, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 800; Barrett v. Barrett, Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 709; Daughtry v. Daughtry, Tex.Civ.App., 312 S.W.2d 957; Resendez v. Resendez, Tex.Civ.App., 282 S.W.2d 318; Golden v. Golden, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 619; Norvell v. Norvell, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W.2d 270; McNabb v. McNabb, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 129; 20 Tex.Jur.2d, Divorce Separation, Sec. 13. It is our opinion, from a review of the record, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mrs. Popper did not commit any acts of cruelty prior to her becoming afflicted with the mental illness of schizophrenia, and that the effect of this illness was such that she was not responsible for the acts resulting from same.

  7. Bell v. Bell

    389 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)   Cited 5 times

    He never testified, however, that he could not live with her or that living with her would be intolerable or insupportable, nor did he testify that his wife's conduct in any way injured his health or wellbeing. There is no evidence of any physical violence or that the actions of appellant complained of were studied, deliberate, wilful or intended to injure appellee. Although mental cruelty constitutes a ground for divorce, without proof of physical violence, it must be established that such mental cruelty was inflicted wilfully or intentionally. McNabb v. McNabb, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 129; Buckner v. Buckner, Tex.Civ.App., 27 S.W.2d 311; Golden v. Golden, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 619; Norvell v. Norvell, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W.2d 270; Humphreys v. Humphreys, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 453; Bartels v. Bartels, Tex.Civ.App., 227 S.W.2d 260; Stevenson v. Stevenson, Tex.Civ.App. 1964, 383 S.W.2d 92. The quarrels and disputes about purchases and bills and as to which clubs the parties would join were not sufficient to constitute grounds for divorce. There is no testimony by appellee as to the effect that such alleged conduct on the part of his wife had on his mind or sensibilities or that the alleged acts complained of endangered his health or outraged his feelings, or inflicted any mental pain or anguish on him, or that such alleged conduct on appellant's part was insupportable or unbearable.

  8. Stevenson v. Stevenson

    383 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)   Cited 3 times

    Appellee wholly failed to establish by full and satisfactory evidence excesses, cruel treatment or outrages that would render living with appellant unendurable or intolerable. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W.2d 210; Allen v. Allen, Tex.Civ.App., 267 S.W.2d 911; Cantwell v. Cantwell, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W.2d 450; Golden v. Golden, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 619; Garcia v. Garcia, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 227. Even if we assume that appellee is a highly sensitive person, there is no evidence in the record before us showing that the actions he complains of with respect to mental cruelty, were studied, deliberate, willful or intended to injure him.

  9. Christen v. Christen

    333 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)   Cited 6 times

    Moreover, the evidence shows that the act of leaving appellee in John Sealy Hospital was not done wilfully with the intent to injure him. Golden v. Golden, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 619. Appellee admitted that he had made no attempt to see appellant, nor did he make any effort to talk or communicate with her. There is no evidence that he said one word or even civilly greeted her on the one occasion he saw her after returning from Galveston.

  10. James v. James

    328 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)   Cited 1 times

    We see no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. See Golden v. Golden, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 619, points 1, 2 and 3, and Allen v. Allen, Tex.Civ.App., 267 S.W.2d 911, points 1 and 2. Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court in refusing to grant appellant a divorce is in all things affirmed.