Opinion
5:20-cv-00085 (DNH/TWD)
04-21-2021
RODERICK GOLDEN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN GAGNE, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: RODERICK GOLDEN Plaintiff, pro se 208 Melrose Ave Syracuse, NY 13206
APPEARANCES: RODERICK GOLDEN
Plaintiff, pro se
208 Melrose Ave
Syracuse, NY 13206 THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Roderick Golden ("Plaintiff") filed an action against John Gagne, Field Investigator, Syracuse DMV; Timothy Furlong, Regional Director, Syracuse DMV; Detective William Root, Onondaga County Sheriff's Dept.; William Fitzpatrick, Onondaga County District Attorney ("DA Fitzpatrick"); and Hon. Lawrence Marks, NY Chief Administrative Judge for NY Courts ("Judge Marks") (collectively, "Defendants"). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee for this action. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application") and Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 3.)
I. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, his IFP Application is granted.
Plaintiff should note that, although his IFP Application to proceed has been granted, he will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
II. SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that when a person proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Id. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, "the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a less strict standard than attorney drafted pleadings. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) ("Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties."). Where, as in this case, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes his pleadings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this "does not exempt a [pro se litigant] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint "without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff's complaint fails to provide sufficient information for the Court to review or for Defendants to have notice of the claims against them. Although Plaintiff has utilized the pro forma complaint for a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he sets forth no facts in the body of the complaint and instead instructs the Court and Defendants to "see attached," totaling 194 pages. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 5; Dkt. No. 1-1.) As for the causes of action, Plaintiff lists violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth (Due Process) Amendments but provides no further details such as the specific claims or which cause of action is asserted against each Defendant. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Also problematic, from the face of the complaint, is Plaintiff has named DA Fitzpatrick and Judge Marks as Defendants, both of whom may be immune from § 1983 actions based on absolute prosecutorial and judicial immunity, respectively. See Parkinson v. Cozzolino, 238 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2001); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per curiam).
Citations to the filings refer to the pagination CM/ECF automatically generates.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . ;Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8's purpose "is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense." Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)). The statement should be "short" because "[u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 365 (1969)).
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Moreover, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . .Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to "provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]" Laspisa v. Citifinancial Does 1 to 20, 269 F. Supp. 3d 11, 13 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (citations omitted).
A complaint that does not comply with these Rules "presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims," and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). "Dismissal, however, is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised." Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court recommends the complaint be dismissed because it is not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and because Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants are unclear. However, considering his pro se status, the Court further recommends Plaintiff be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to comply with the basic pleading requirements set forth above. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995). The Court takes no position at this time on the merits of any such amended complaint.
Specifically, any amended complaint must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules. Any such amended complaint must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. See Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Any such amended complaint will replace the existing complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.").
III. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff has also moved for appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 3.) There is no right to appointment of counsel in civil matters. Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1994). In Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit reiterated the factors that a court must consider in ruling upon such a motion. In deciding whether to appoint counsel, the court should first determine whether the indigent's position seems likely to be of substance. If the claim meets this threshold requirement, the court should then consider a number of other factors in making its determination. Id. at 1341 (quoting Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)).
When moving for the appointment of counsel, a party must demonstrate that he is unable to obtain counsel through the private sector or public interest firms. Cooper v. A. Sargenti, Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Hodge, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). Here, Plaintiff has made no such showing. (Dkt. No. 3.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's request is denied as premature.
Even if Plaintiff had shown that he is unable to obtain counsel through the private sector or public interest firms, his motion would be denied without prejudice at this time as a more fully developed record would be necessary before an assessment can be made as to whether counsel should be appointed, including, whether Plaintiff's position "seems likely to be of substance." See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997). The denial is without prejudice.
Plaintiff may renew his application for appointed counsel if he can demonstrate he has attempted to find pro bono counsel on his own and if he can demonstrate why he is entitled to such assistance.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 3) is DENIED without prejudice and with leave to renew; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation along with a copy of the unpublished decision cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: April 21, 2021
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge