"Probable cause . . . turns on 'objective facts, not the subjective opinion of a police officer.'" Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 101, 109, 582 S.E.2d 448, 451 (2003) (quotingGolden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 618, 625, 519 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1999)). Thus, "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.
This standard "turns only on 'objective facts,' not the 'subjective opinion' of a police officer." Id. at 109, 582 S.E.2d at 451 (quoting Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 618, 625, 519 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1999) (citations omitted)).
Probable cause, however, turns only on "`objective facts,' not the `subjective opinion' of a police officer." Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 618, 625, 519 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1999) (citations omitted). As a result, "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."
Consequently, the record, viewed under the proper standard, establishes probable cause to believe that the appellant had abducted the Tuckers. See generally Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 101, 109 (2003) ("Probable cause . . . turns only on '"objective facts," not the "subjective opinion" of a police officer.'" (quoting Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 618, 625 (1999))). These facts provided an objectively reasonable basis for conducting a search incident to arrest.
It likewise does not matter that English was ultimately charged and convicted for a different crime from the one for which she could have been lawfully arrested earlier. See Doscoli, 66 Va.App. at 429; Slayton, 41 Va.App. at 108-09; Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 618, 624-25 (1999).
However, "[p]robable cause ... turns only on " ‘objective facts," not the "subjective opinion" of a police officer.’ " Id. at 109, 582 S.E.2d 448 (quoting Golden v. Commonwealth , 30 Va. App. 618, 625, 519 S.E.2d 378 (1999) ). Further, the appellant's recitation of Officer Ciarrocchi's testimony fails to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
But probable cause depends only on "'objective facts,' not the 'subjective opinion' of a police officer." Slayton, 41 Va. App. at 109 (quoting Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 618, 625 (1999)). "[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."
See Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 101, 109, 582 S.E.2d 448, 451 (2003) ("Probable cause . . . turns only on '"objective facts," not the "subjective opinion" of a police officer.'" (quoting Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 618, 625, 519 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1999))). Generally speaking, in order for a warrantless search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be supported by probable cause or consent. See, e.g., Knight v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 297, 312, 734 S.E.2d 716, 723-24 (2012).
So strong is this principle that, even when an officer's testimony shows that he misjudged the legal basis for the stop, his subjective misjudgment does not undermine the objective validity of a stop that could be based on a wholly different legal basis. See, e.g., Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 101, 109, 582 S.E.2d 448, 451–52 (2003) (applying this principle to arrests); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 584, 596–97, 525 S.E.2d 43, 49 (2000) (same); Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 618, 625, 519 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1999) (same).See also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n. 2, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 1465 n. 2, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000) ; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ; Scott, 436 U.S. at 138, 98 S.Ct. at 1723–24; United States v. Johnson, 734 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.2013) ; United States v. Singh, 363 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir.2004) ; United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C.Cir.1991) ; Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 697, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (2008) ; Robinson, 273 Va. at 37–38, 639 S.E.2d at 223–24.
Under settled principles, the “absence of probable cause to believe a suspect committed the particular crime for which he was arrested does not necessarily invalidate the arrest if the officer possessed sufficient objective information to support an arrest on a different charge.” Slayton, 41 Va.App. at 109, 582 S.E.2d at 452 (emphasis added); see also McGuire v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 584, 596–97, 525 S.E.2d 43, 49 (2000); Golden v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 618, 625, 519 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1999). The quantum of probable cause justifying Tizon's arrest, therefore, need not be specific to a first-degree murder charge (requiring premeditation), or a second-degree murder charge (requiring malice), or, for that matter, any murder charge.