This sound reasoning applies equally to a criminal case. To the same effect is Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 762-63, (Mo.App. 1976), where the court said: We note parenthetically that plaintiffs did not pursue their unsuccessful challenge to venireman Duffy by peremptorily challenging him.

The western district added, "Over the years a few Missouri courts, in dicta, have erroneously assumed that civil litigants have a similar statutory right to make their peremptory strikes from a venire of qualified jurors." Id. at 390 (emphasis in original), citing, as examples, two eastern district cases, Holtgrave v. Hoffman, 716 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo.App. 1986), and Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo.App. 1976), and one western district case, Butler v. Talge, 516 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Mo.App. 1974). Cases from the Supreme Court of Missouri and from this district have also stated, in dicta, that litigants in civil cases are entitled to a full panel of qualified prospective jurors from which to make peremptory challenges.

Section 24, entitled "Peremptory Challenges Not to be Made Until When", provided: See, e.g., Holtgrave v. Hoffman, 716 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo.App. 1986); Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo.App. 1976); Butler v. Talge, 516 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Mo.App. 1974). Significantly, in each of these cases the challenged venireperson actually served on the jury.

All business or personal relationships with a party do not warrant disqualification to serve on a jury. See Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761 (Mo.App. 1976) (trial court properly refused to dismiss for cause venireman whose son was employed as a law clerk by defendant's counsel). The challenged venireperson's relationship to the insurance company was too tenuous to require her disqualification.

Id. Therefore, determinations by the trial courts such as the one at bar are overturned only when they are clearly and manifestly wrong. Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo.App., St.L.Dist. 1976). Any doubts which exist are to be resolved in favor of the trial court's decision.

In McGrew at 551, the court held that friendship alone is not sufficient to disqualify a venireperson. In Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 764-765 (Mo.App. 1976), there was no error found by the trial court's failure to remove a venireperson whose son was employed by the defendant's attorney's law firm because there was no showing of actual bias or prejudice. In Grimm v. Gargis, 303 S.W.2d 43, 49-50 (Mo. 1957), it was held that the trial court did not err by refusing to strike a venireperson for cause who had been a friend of the plaintiff for thirty years and had seen the plaintiff while the plaintiff was in the hospital recovering from injuries, which were the subject of the cause before the court.

Id. Where the sense of the voir dire examination is that the juror would base his verdict solely on the evidence, there is no abuse of the trial court's discretion. Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo.App. 1976). From our review of the record the sense of both venirepersons' voir dire testimony was that they could render an impartial verdict.

Even though a juror has some business or personal relationship with a party, the trial court has broad discretion in determining the qualifications of such veniremen to sit as jurors and its rulings are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly and manifestly wrong. Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo.App. 1976) (upholding refusal to dismiss for cause veniremen whose son was employed by defendant's counsel). The cases which plaintiff cites contending that the relationship of these veniremen to defendant was such that they should have been stricken for cause are distinguishable.

This court has held that "a litigant is entitled to a full panel of qualified jurors before making peremptory challenges." Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo.App. 1976). See also Butler v. Talge, 516 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Mo.App. 1974).

Furthermore, the court in Morrison, supra, held that a defendant does not waive his right to challenge on appeal the action of the trial court in overruling his challenge to the prospective jurors for cause, regardless of whether his peremptory challenges were already exhausted, or if not, whether he used a peremptory challenge to dispose of the juror. Id., 557 S.W.2d at 447; cf. Theobald v. St. Louis Transit Co., 191 Mo. 395, 90 S.W. 354, 361 (1905) (civil suit); Golden v. Chipman, 536 S.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Mo.App. 1976) (civil suit). Therefore, applying the holding in Morrison, supra, appellant did not have to allege that he was forced to expend one of his peremptory challenges in order to preserve his right to appeal this point.