Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0907-13T2
05-22-2014
GOLD MEDAL BAKERY, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SUPER BREAD II CORP., SUPER CAKES CORP., and ARMENIO N. MARTINS, Defendants-Appellants. SUPER BREAD II CORP., Third-Party Plaintiff, v. KARINA FOGLIA, Third-Party Defendant.
Joel N. Kreizman argued the cause for appellants (Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Kreizman and Fernando M. Pinguelo, on the brief). William J. Rocha, of the Massachusetts bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondent (Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP, and Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi LLP, attorneys; Anthony J. Sylvester and Anthony C. Valenziano, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher, Espinosa and Koblitz.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-691-12.
Joel N. Kreizman argued the cause for appellants (Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Kreizman and Fernando M. Pinguelo, on the brief).
William J. Rocha, of the Massachusetts bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondent (Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP, and Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi LLP, attorneys; Anthony J. Sylvester and Anthony C. Valenziano, on the brief). PER CURIAM
We granted leave to consider the extent to which plaintiff Gold Medal Bakery, Inc. should be permitted discovery into the immigration status of defendant Armenio N. Martins. In reversing the trial judge's denial of a protective order, we conclude that plaintiff failed to demonstrate what Judge Carchman referred to as the "direct[] relevan[ce]" of this information to the issues in the case and, as a result, plaintiff has not overcome the information's "potential for undue prejudice." Serrano v. Underground Util. Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 253, 286 (App. Div. 2009) (concurring opinion).
Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in 1996, it entered into a series of contracts with defendant Super Bread for the purchase of bakery goods, baking and delivery equipment, and related accoutrements. According to plaintiff's pleadings, in late 2010, following a nearly fifteen-year supplier-distributor relationship, Super Bread began to fall behind in its payments, thus leading to this lawsuit.
At a deposition more than one year after commencement of the action, defendant Armenio N. Martins was questioned about his immigration status. In responding, Armenio N. Martins revealed that he has been issued, on an annual basis, an "immigration card," which "authorizes [him] to be in th[is] country." Armenio N. Martins was also asked whether he could leave the United States and, if he were to leave, whether he would be permitted to return; he responded that he did not know.
Jose Martins and Jorge Santos, both of whom have some affiliation with Super Bread, were also deposed and questioned about their immigration status. Plaintiff's right to have inquired into their immigration status at those times, and plaintiff's future use at trial of the answers then elicited, are not before us.
Defendants moved to bar further inquiry into Armenio N. Martins's immigration status. After hearing argument, the trial judge denied the motion for a protective order and ordered Armenio N. Martins to produce residency documentation or, failing that, respond to further "narrow questioning" about his immigration status. We granted defendants' timely motion for leave to appeal.
In Serrano, we addressed when a party's immigration status may be relevant in a civil dispute and outlined the manner in which such a question should be considered. In that case, the plaintiffs sought damages for the defendant-employer's alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 207 and 216(b), and New Jersey's Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.25 to -56.47. Because the plaintiffs had emigrated from Ecuador, defense counsel sought to elicit information about the plaintiffs' residency and immigration status at their depositions. The plaintiffs objected and later moved for a protective order. The trial judge permitted some additional questioning into the offending areas, and the plaintiffs moved for leave to appeal, which we granted.
Judge Sabatino's opinion for the court thoroughly analyzed the applicable considerations, observing that the admissibility of information relating to a party's right to be present in this country requires a careful application of N.J.R.E. 403. Serrano, supra, 407 N.J. Super. at 274. Judge Sabatino concluded that "[t]he evidentiary mechanics by which defendants might get such credibility-related proofs admitted at trial" were not demonstrated on appeal. Id. at 276.
N.J.R.E. 403 provides that "relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." See also Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 491-96 (1999).
In a separate opinion, Judge Carchman expressed his agreement with Judge Sabatino's approach but also stated that he would "go further" and "start with a presumption that any inquiry into matters of immigration status is not appropriate." Id. at 285. In that regard, Judge Carchman concluded that he would "place the burden on the proponent to demonstrate, beyond the issue of credibility, why such inquiry is germane to the issues in dispute." Id. at 285. Because the panel's third member, Judge Simonelli, joined in Judge Carchman's opinion, id. at 286, it is Judge Carchman's opinion that expresses the grounds for the court's judgment.
We, too, agree with the application of this "further" step, which Judge Carchman described in the following way:
My concern is that beyond credibility and unless directly relevant to the issues in dispute, inquiries into matters of immigration status, including employment issues, are so fraught with the potential for undue prejudice that little more will be heard or considered after the salvo of inquiry into such status.
. . . Even during discovery, such inquiry has no place as well unless a meaningful nexus can be demonstrated to overcome the obvious prejudice that will follow from such inquiry.
[Id. at 286 (emphasis added).]
In attempting to convince us that there exists "a meaningful nexus" for the inquiry in question, plaintiff refers to what it claims is Super Bread's pattern of using noncitizen representatives in its dealings with others. Plaintiff contends those representatives are prohibited from being employed in this country because of their immigration status. In furtherance of this argument, plaintiff relies upon the immigration information obtained at the depositions of two other individuals, Jose Santos and Jorge Martins, and argues that it is entitled to determine whether Armenio N. Martins is similarly situated. We fail to see the nexus between, on the one hand, the immigration status of Jose Martins and Jorge Santos and any alleged role they may have played, and, on the other, Armenio N. Martins's immigration status and the role he played in the circumstances giving rise to this suit. The one thing simply does not logically relate to or follow from the other.
Even if there was a link, plaintiff only argues that its alleged right to this discovery is based on the claim that Armenio N. Martins's "potential inability to legally work [in this country] may be the main reason why the company does not follow corporate formalities in this area." In other words, plaintiff argues that Super Bread's corporate veil should be pierced because of the involvement of noncitizens who are either not in this country legally or whose status does not permit their employment. Plaintiff provides no legal support for this contention. Moreover, we do not see how the immigration status of a corporation's employees jeopardizes the corporate form or exposes its shareholders to personal liability to any parties that may have contracted with the corporation. In addition, plaintiff has not demonstrated why, in this case, it is necessary to pierce the corporate veil. Until such time, if ever, plaintiff obtains a judgment against Super Bread, there is no reason to inquire whether the corporate form was inequitably or improperly used to shield Super Bread's shareholders from personal liability. See Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 300 (1982) (recognizing that "a corporation is an entity separate from its stockholders," and "[i]n the absence of fraud or injustice, courts generally will not pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on the corporate principals"); see also State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 (1983) ; Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 5 N.J. 28, 34-35 (1950).
This theory is loosely alleged in plaintiff's complaint.
We do not mean to suggest laintiff would be barred from making — or, on the other hand, ppermitted to make — inquiries into Armenio N. Martins's immigration status in the future should a judgment entered in plaintiff's favor prove uncollectible.
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Plaintiff also argues the information sought is relevant in determining whether Armenio N. Martins was authorized to speak for Super Bread when contracting with plaintiff. There is, however, nothing in the record to suggest that Super Bread has or will disavow any actions taken on its behalf by Armenio N. Martins, nor has plaintiff provided legal support for the contention that the actions taken by a noncitizen on behalf of a domestic corporation are ultra vires.
In the final analysis, we agree with Serrano's holding that permitting discovery into an individual's immigration status is "fraught with the potential for undue prejudice" and should not be permitted absent "a meaningful nexus . . . to overcome the obvious prejudice that will follow from such inquiry." 407 N.J. Super. at 286. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a meaningful nexus here.
To the extent other purported grounds for this discovery may be discernible from plaintiff's arguments, we find they have insufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Reversed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION