In reviewing the denial of motions for directed verdict and J.N.O.V., this Court must apply the same standard the trial court applies to its rulings on the motions. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826 (Ala. 1994); Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1992). This Court determines whether the party with the burden of proof produced sufficient evidence to require a jury determination of the issue.

In reviewing the punitive-damages award, we "must presume that the jury awarded the proper amount of punitive damages and [we] may not disturb the verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that the verdict was `plainly and palpably wrong and unjust.'"Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1994) (quotingContinental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1992)). We have stated that punitive damages are especially appropriate in retaliatory-discharge cases, based on "the gravity of wrongfully depriving [the employee] of what was [his] livelihood, [and] . . . the chilling effect of retaliatory discharges."

The employer further contends that it is entitled to a JNOV, because, it says, Golson failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the employer acted consciously or deliberately or engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice in terminating Golson's employment. In Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1994), our supreme court stated the following: "In reviewing punitive damages awards, this Court must presume that the jury awarded the proper amount of punitive damages and may not disturb the verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that the verdict was `plainly and palpably wrong and unjust.' Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313, 322 (Ala. 1992)]."

Dees's failure to look for work prohibits her from arguing that her discharge negatively impacted her ability to find a job. See Lozier Corp. v. Gray, 624 So.2d 1034, 1037 (Ala.1993) (noting the absence of “evidence at trial that [the employer's] termination of [the employee] caused [the employee] to be less marketable as an employee”); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826, 829–30 (Ala.1994) (noting that discharged employee seeking damages for retaliatory discharge had “unsuccessfully applied for 20–25 different jobs,” thus indicating that “other potential employers would be reluctant to hire her because she was fired after suffering an on-the-job injury”). 2. Mental Anguish

"Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826, 828 (Ala. 1994). The substantial evidence rule requires that the nonmovant must present "substantial evidence" supporting each element of his cause of action.

However, due process does not require a purely mathematical formula or predetermined ratio. "In retaliatory discharge cases preceding BMW of North America v. Gore, supra, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed punitive damages awards having diverse punitive-to-compensatory ratios in the following cases: Motion Industries, Inc. v. Pate, 678 So.2d 724 (Ala. 1996), 5.25:1; Heil Co. v. Crowley, 659 So.2d 105 (Ala. 1995), 10:1; Lozier Corp., supra, 9:1 (resulting after the Supreme Court reduced the compensatory damage award); Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1992), 1:1.22; and Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826 (Ala. 1994), 1:1.5. ". . . .

§ 6-11-20(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975. This Court will not disturb a jury verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that the verdict was plainly and palpably wrong and unjust. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826 (Ala. 1994). "Clear and convincing evidence," for purposes of punitive damages awards, is "[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.

Again, we note that there is a strong presumption in favor of jury verdicts and that this Court will not disturb a verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that the verdict was plainly and palpably wrong and unjust. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826 (1994). We hold that Crowley's evidence, "when weighed against evidence in opposition," would produce in the minds of jurors "a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion."

Our supreme court has also stated that "[i]n reviewing punitive damages awards, this Court must presume that the jury awarded the proper amount of punitive damages and may not disturb the verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that the verdict was `plainly and palpably wrong and unjust.'" Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313, 322 (Ala. 1992)). As discussed above, Jackson presented sufficient evidence in support of her wantonness claim; given that the jury in this case was the ultimate trier of fact, we cannot say that it erred in determining that the evidence supporting that claim was clear and convincing, and it does not appear that the verdict was otherwise "plainly and palpably wrong and unjust."

"In reviewing the punitive-damages award, we `must presume that the jury awarded the proper amount of punitive damages and [we] may not disturb the verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that the verdict was "plainly and palpably wrong and unjust."' Gold Kist, Inc. v. Griffin, 657 So.2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1992)). We have stated that punitive damages are especially appropriate in retaliatory-discharge cases, based on `the gravity of wrongfully depriving [the employee] of what was [his] livelihood, [and] . . . the chilling effect of retaliatory discharges.' Lozier Corp. v. Gray, 624 So.2d 1034, 1037 (Ala. 1993); see also Montgomery Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Golson, 725 So.2d 996, 1000 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998).