Opinion
No. C 08-2544 PJH.
March 19, 2010
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's opposition brief and for summary judgment came on for hearing on January 20, 2010 before this court. Plaintiff, Mark Goings ("plaintiff" or "Goings"), appeared through his counsel, Jeffery Kallis. Defendants City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco Police Department, Police Chief Heather Fong, Sergeant David Elliott, and Officer Paul Dennes (collectively "defendants"), appeared through their counsel, Robert Bonta. Having read all the papers submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment, for the reasons stated at the hearing, and as follows.
BACKGROUND
This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff generally alleges that in August 2007, he was wrongfully detained at the San Francisco International airport by defendants Officer Dennes and Sgt. Elliott of the San Francisco Police Department, in violation of plaintiff's federal and constitutional rights. See generally Complaint ("Complaint").
A. Specific Allegations
Plaintiff, who is employed as a police officer, was once married to Shirley Goings, and the two have a minor child together, Aubrey Goings. The marriage was terminated in February 2006, resulting in issuance of a child custody order by a California state court, governing the custody arrangement between the parents. See Complaint at ¶ 13.
In accordance with the terms of that order, plaintiff (accompanied by his girlfriend at the time) took his daughter with him on a trip to Hawaii, from August 1, 2007 to August 14, 2007. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff's return flight from Hawaii arrived at SFO on Tuesday, August 14, at approximately 9:30 p.m. Id. The carrier was United Airlines. Plaintiff alleges that he and his ex-wife had agreed, in accordance with the custody order, that Ms. Goings would pick Aubrey up either at the assigned gate or at baggage claim. See Complaint, ¶ 13.
Approximately 35 minutes prior to landing, however, plaintiff alleges that he and the other passengers on the United flight were notified over the intercom that "the authorities in San Francisco will be boarding the aircraft upon our arrival at the airport." Id. at ¶ 14. Once the flight arrived in San Francisco, the plane was stopped on the tarmac and held for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. Id. at ¶ 16. The flight then proceeded to the gate, and upon arrival at the gate a further announcement was made that all passengers were to remain seated, with the exception of Mr. Goings — who was asked to proceed to the front of the airplane. Id. Plaintiff, with his daughter, proceeded to the front of the aircraft, where they were met by a uniformed and armed officer — defendant Officer Dennes. Complaint, ¶ 17. Officer Dennes requested that plaintiff identify himself, and then ordered plaintiff and his daughter to proceed with him up the jetway. Id. at ¶ 18. Despite several inquiries by plaintiff, Officer Dennes allegedly failed to inform plaintiff as to the reasons for the Officer's request. Id.
Once in the airport terminal, Sgt. Elliott appeared, and informed plaintiff, in response to plaintiff's further inquiries, that defendants were "just trying to keep [Mr. Goings] out of trouble." Complaint, ¶ 19. Sgt. Elliott then allegedly told plaintiff that Shirley Goings had called the police and advised them that she feared plaintiff might bypass baggage claim and fail to hand over their daughter as agreed. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that he then made several unambiguous requests to be allowed to proceed with his daughter (and his accompanying girlfriend) to the baggage claim area, so that he could give is ex-wife physical custody of their daughter, and retrieve his baggage. Id. at ¶ 21. According to plaintiff, however, defendants denied these requests and refused to allow Mr. Goings and his daughter to leave. Instead, plaintiff and his daughter were ordered to remain where they were and were kept in the airport terminal against their will for ten to fifteen minutes, at which point the officers informed plaintiff that he should accompany the officers to the baggage claim area. See Complaint, ¶¶ 21-22.
Plaintiff further alleges that, although he made further inquiries as to why he could not go with his daughter to the baggage area unescorted, defendants failed to provide any factual basis other than to state that they were there in order to protect the plaintiff-protection which plaintiff had not requested. Id. at ¶ 24.
Halfway to the baggage claim area from the terminal, plaintiff alleges that he advised defendants that he refused to go any further with them and that they should either arrest him, or let him go. After several further refusals by the plaintiff to allow himself to be accompanied to the baggage claim area, defendants finally told the plaintiff that he and his daughter could leave, and plaintiff proceeded to the baggage claim area unaccompanied.Id. at ¶ 25.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 20, 2008. Plaintiff originally asserted therein four causes of action against defendants: (1) false imprisonment and unlawful detention, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against defendants Elliott and Dennes); (2) false detention, arrest, and/or imprisonment, pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 52 et seq. (defendants Elliott and Dennes); (3) conspiracy to violate civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civil Code § 52 et seq. (defendants Elliott and Dennes); and (4) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, underMonell liability principles (defendant City and County of San Francisco). See Complaint, ¶¶ 26-58.
However, after defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment as to all causes of action, plaintiff subsequently sought leave to withdraw and/or dismiss his fourth cause of action against defendants Heather Fong, and the City and County of San Francisco. The court having GRANTED plaintiff's request at the hearing, defendants now seek summary judgment as to the remaining first three causes of action, against defendants Elliott and Dennes, only.
In connection with the motion, defendants have also moved to strike plaintiff's late-filed opposition, while plaintiff, for his part, has also separately filed evidentiary objections.
Plaintiff's opposition brief and evidentiary objections were filed on January 6, 2010, a full week after the deadline to file any opposition had already passed. The late-filed documents were submitted with no explanation for the belated filing, nor did plaintiff otherwise request leave of court to file his papers late. At the hearing on the matter, plaintiff furthermore failed to present a satisfactory explanation for the late filing of his papers. As a result, and in view of the undue prejudice plaintiff's late-filed papers caused defendants-who were unable to prepare and submit a reply brief in advance of the hearing — the court accordingly GRANTS defendants' motion to strike the opposition brief. The court also takes the opportunity to OVERRULE plaintiff's evidentiary objections, as they are overly broad, and without substantive merit.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003).
On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
B. Analysis
Defendants' motion raises and requires resolution of five arguments: (1) whether, for purposes of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, plaintiff's August 2007 encounter with defendant officers was consensual; (2) whether, if not, defendants Elliott and Dennes had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain/arrest plaintiff for violation of a court order, keeping a child from a lawful custodian; and/or kidnapping; (3) whether, even if probable cause/reasonable suspicion was lacking, defendants' actions are protected by the qualified immunity doctrine; (4) whether plaintiff can prove a viable conspiracy claim as alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civil Code § 52; and (5) whether plaintiff can satisfy the elements of his independent claim under Civil Code § 52 et seq.
1. Whether the August 2007 Encounter was Consensual
Defendants first assert that plaintiff's false detention and imprisonment claims pursuant to § 1983 fail, because the undisputed facts demonstrate that no detention or arrest occurred. Rather, defendants contend that plaintiff's encounter with the officers was consensual — a circumstance that triggers no Fourth Amendment scrutiny. To this, plaintiff responds that from start to end, the encounter between plaintiff and defendants was marked by a sufficient show of force and followed by sufficient demands from the officers, as to invalidate any claim that the encounter was consensual.
Courts have long held that consensual encounters do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980) (noting that "not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons"); see also, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (a police officer may approach a citizen, ask him for identification, ask him questions, and request consent to search him without implicating the Fourth Amendment). The test for whether an encounter with police is consensual is whether the citizen recognizes that he or she is free to leave. In making this determination, courts look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter and ask whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would feel that "`he was not at liberty to ignore the police and go about his business.'" See Florida v. Bostik, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
Here, plaintiff submits the following facts in support of the purportedly "non-consensual" nature of the August 14 2007 incident: just before the United flight in question landed, while plaintiff was on board in the company of his girlfriend Candice McGregor and his daughter Aubrey Goings, an overhead announcement was made informing all passengers on the airplane that the "authorities" were going to meet the plane in San Francisco, and would be boarding the aircraft. See Kallis Declaration, Ex. 1 at 147:6-11; Ex. 5 at 28:7-17. Two further announcements to the same effect were made once the United flight landed on the tarmac, and then once the plane had arrived at the bridge and connected to the jetway, a further specific announcement was made requesting Mr. Goings to proceed to the front of the airplane. See Kallis Decl., Ex 1 at 148:14-17; Ex. 5 at 28:15-17, 31:14-19. Plaintiff, along with his daughter, complied with the request to proceed to the front of the airplane. Once he arrived at the front of the airplane, he was met by Officer Dennes, who was standing at the front door to the airplane, uniformed and armed, and instructed plaintiff to "come with [him]." See id., Ex. 1 at 161:14-17; 196:4-13; 197:10-17. Plaintiff complied, and after crossing into the terminal and meeting defendant Elliott, defendant Elliott told him that Ms. Goings had called the police and that she was indicating that plaintiff had not planned on exchanging Aubrey at the baggage claim, and was going to bypass the baggage claim. See Bonta Decl., Ex. D at 203:16-25. After engaging in a series of questions and answers with defendant Elliott, plaintiff indicated he wanted to proceed toward baggage claim, and he did so, escorted initially by defendants Dennes and Elliott. See Bonta Decl., Ex. D at 214:14-215:11. When plaintiff finally told defendant Elliott that it was unnecessary for defendant to take plaintiff and his daughter to baggage claim, however, the defendant officers finally agreed, and plaintiff proceeded to baggage claim on his own. Bonta Decl., Ex. D at 216:8-21.
Defendant generally challenges plaintiff's proffer of facts with the following additional facts that tend to establish the consensual nature of any exchange: that neither defendants Elliott nor Dennes ever told plaintiff he was under arrest or was being detained, nor did they threaten at any time to put plaintiff in jail or take him to a station; that plaintiff was never handcuffed; that, when plaintiff expressed a desire to finally proceed unaccompanied to the baggage claim, the officers complied with plaintiff's request. See Bonta Decl., Ex. D at 210:22-211:7; 216:8-21. Defendant Elliott also specifically asked plaintiff during their encounter if plaintiff would mind if defendant Elliott walked with him to the baggage claim area, to which plaintiff essentially responded "not at all;" and plaintiff's girlfriend, Ms. McGregor, testified that defendant Elliott asked plaintiff whether defendant Elliott needed to be there for the exchange at the baggage claim area, and plaintiff responded to the effect of, "if you want to be there, you can" or "no, you should go just so Shirley knows . . . ". See Bonta Decl., Ex. B. at 120:20-121:7; Bonta Decl., Ex. C at 84:8-16. Furthermore, when specifically asked whether plaintiff was consensually responding to the officers' questions and in turn asking his own questions of the officers, plaintiff answered "yes." Bonta Decl., Ex. D at 212:18-22.
On balance, and looking to the totality of circumstances surrounding the August 2007 encounter, the court concludes that the encounter between plaintiff and defendant officers did not begin as a consensual one. The fact that the airline made several announcements indicating that "authorities" would be meeting the plane upon landing, that plaintiff was individually singled out and brought to the front of the plane, where he was met by a fully armed and uniformed officer, and the fact that the plaintiff was escorted down the jetway so that he could "talk to the sergeant," compel the conclusion that a reasonable person faced with the same display of force would not feel that he or she "was [] at liberty to ignore the police and go about his business." Bostik, 501 U.S. at 434.
To be sure, the encounter from that point onwards developed in such a way that, at some later point in time, it very well may have become consensual. Indeed, as defendants note and plaintiff's own testimony corroborates, plaintiff himself viewed much of the interaction with defendants as a consensual exchange, and it was plaintiff who eventually terminated the encounter when he finally and unequivocally expressed his desire to proceed to the baggage claim area alone. Regardless whether the encounter eventually became a consensual one, however, the fact remains that at the outset, and in view of the display of force demonstrated to plaintiff, the encounter could not be so classified.
Thus, the court cannot conclude, as defendants urge, that the encounter between plaintiff and defendants triggered no Fourth Amendment scrutiny — and therefore no section 1983 liability — as a matter of law. Rather, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the encounter began as a non-consensual detention, at a minimum.
2. Reasonable Suspicion/Probable Cause for Detention/Arrest
Defendants next contend that, even if the encounter with plaintiff was non-consensual, plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims still fail because the undisputed facts demonstrate that defendants Elliott and Dennes had probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion to arrest or detain plaintiff for violations of Cal. Penal Code § 166 (violation of lawful court order); Cal. Penal Code § 278 (keeping child from lawful custodian); Cal. Penal Code § 278.5 (keeping child from lawful custodian or of person from right to visitation); and Cal. Penal Code § 207 (kidnapping).
A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity. See United States v. Woods, 720 F. 2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (detention under the Fourth Amendment "must be justified by some objective manifestation that [subject was], or [was] about to be, engaged in criminal activity"). Probable cause to arrest, by contrast, exists when under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officer, a prudent person would conclude that there is a fair probability that the arrestee had committed or was committing a crime. United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986). The inquiry focuses on the perspective of the person allegedly seized, rather than the subjective beliefs of the law enforcement officers. Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The proper focus when determining coerciveness or restraint sufficient to constitute an arrest or detention is not on the subjective belief of the agents. Rather we review the situation from the prospective of the person seized."). The plaintiff in a civil rights action has the burden of proving lack of probable cause, after a defendant has provided "some evidence that the arresting officers had probable cause at the moment of the arrest." Dubner v. City County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001).
With respect to the statutory provisions at issue, Cal. Penal Code § 166 provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he/she is guilty of: "willful disobedience of the terms as written of any process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by any court, including orders pending trial;" or else is guilty of "resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or process of any court." Cal. Penal Code §§ 278 and 278.5 violations occur when a person, with the intent to detain and conceal a child from its parent or person having lawful charge of the child, regardless of whether the detention and concealment actually occur, takes or entices away the child. See, e.g., People v. Bormann, 6 Cal. App. 3d 292 (1970). Finally, Cal. Penal Code § 207 prevents the forcible taking of a person or child.
Defendants assert that the undisputed facts demonstrate the existence of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause as to plaintiff's violation of all these statutes. First, defendants point to the emails exchanged between the plaintiff and Ms. Goings prior to August 14, as well as the child custody order in the case — both of which Ms. Goings handed to defendants — which indicated that plaintiff may have violated, or might be about to violate, a provision of the custody order requiring thirty days' notice from one parent to the other, prior to a travel departure. See Def. Br. at 13. Plaintiff's email to Ms. Goings admitted, for example, that he was "late in providing a specific `official' itinerary."See Bonta Decl., Ex. A at Ex. C-5 to depo. Furthermore, plaintiff's arrival with his daughter was a few hours short of violating the 14 day vacation time frame imposed by the court order. See id. at 14. All of which is sufficient, defendants contend, to demonstrate a probable violation of Penal Code § 166 — which prohibits violation of a court order. Second, and as for Penal Code § 278, 278.5, and 208, all of which have to do with the unlawful taking of a child, defendants assert that based on the fact that Ms. Goings initially provided to defendants information that she had been denied access to the United gate and so feared her child would be taken past the baggage claim area and not dropped off, this information constituted articulable facts and/or probable cause for detention and arrest, based on a violation of the foregoing statutes. See Bonta Decl., Ex. A at 99:18-25; 108:1-23; id., Ex. C at 72:22-73:3.
On balance, the court agrees that this undisputed evidence was sufficient to provide to the defendant officers some objective manifestation that plaintiff was about to be involved in unlawful activity; specifically, the unlawful violation of the child custody order in place between the parties, and by necessary overlap, a violation of the Penal Code provisions in question. Defendants' evidence, combined with the fact that plaintiff himself testifies that he instructed United Airlines to prevent Ms. Goings from going to the gate, and that the defendant officers themselves confirmed and were aware that Ms. Goings had been barred from the gate, constitute specific articulable facts upon which a prudent person might believe that a violation of the above statutes was about to be committed. See, e.g., Bonta Decl., Ex D at 249:20-250:6.
Plaintiff attempts to materially dispute this conclusion with evidence purportedly establishing that defendants did not at the time (and do not now) articulate any specific facts regarding plaintiff's own conduct that might suggest violation of the Penal Code provisions in question. Plaintiff testified, for example, that he specifically asked defendant Elliot during their encounter whether, if plaintiff "would have proceeded past baggage claim," plaintiff "would have committed a crime" — to which defendant Elliott responded, "no." See Bonta Decl., Ex. D at 205. This re-telling furthermore agrees with defendant Elliot's own re-telling, in which he states that during his encounter with plaintiff, "[a]t that point no law had been broken. In my eyes no law had been broken." See id., Ex. C at 82. The subsequent police incident reports filed in connection with the encounter, moreover, themselves state only that civil standbys — and nothing criminal — took place. See Kallis Decl., Exs. 13-16 (background event chronology noting incident as "civil standby for child exchange"; incident report listing type of incident as "civil standby").
Ultimately, however, this evidence fails to materially dispute the foregoing evidence establishing the existence of reasonable suspicion to detain plaintiff at the outset. The question for the court, in other words, is whether the defendant officers could point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provided some objective manifestation that plaintiff was about to engage in criminal activity, at the time that the defendant officers initially met plaintiff at the airplane and detained him for questioning. And in view of the undisputed facts in evidence, the court concludes that the answer to this question is yes. To that end, it is immaterial whether, during the investigatory questioning that followed and resulted, defendant Elliott ultimately determined that no law had been broken, or that the police incident reports recounted the lack of criminal activity. Indeed, the purpose of the investigatory detention was precisely so that the defendant officers could more accurately determine whether plaintiff was going to engage in any unlawful activitity. And here, the initial detention resulted in an encounter spanning approximately 10 to 20 minutes, and lasted only long enough for the officers to determine that no such activity was ultimately going to be committed here, and plaintiff was eventually allowed to continue on to the baggage claim area unescorted. See Bonta Decl., Ex. C at 83:3-7.
Although the court concludes that the defendant officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain plaintiff for investigatory questioning when they met him at the airplane and began their encounter with plaintiff, however, the court cannot similarly conclude that probable cause to arrest plaintiff existed. The foregoing facts simply do not demonstrate any basis for concluding that there was "a fair probability" that plaintiff had committed or was committing a crime.
In sum, therefore, on the basis of the purportedly undisputed facts thus far presented, the court holds that defendant officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain plaintiff for investigatory question during the encounter in question, and that the detention lasted only long enough for the officers to determine that defendant was not about to engage in criminal activity. Thus, defendants' encounter with plaintiff, to the extent it constituted a seizure of plaintiff's person pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, was reasonable.
Accordingly, the court hereby GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's section 1983 claim.
3. Qualified immunity
Defendants also argue that, even if defendants did not have reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to arrest plaintiff, defendants are nonetheless protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. In view of the foregoing ruling, the court need not and does not reach defendants' qualified immunity defense. The court furthermore notes, however, that even if the court had not determined that reasonable suspicion to investigatively detain plaintiff existed, it would nonetheless have likely determined that the undisputed facts show that "a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause [or reasonable suspicion] could have existed to arrest the plaintiff," such that qualified immunity would apply. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F. 3d 423, 437 (9th Cir. 2002).
4. Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiff alleges that defendants are also liable for conspiracy to violate plaintiff's civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civil Code § 52 et seq. Because plaintiff fails to establish defendants' liability for a section 1983 violation, however, plaintiff's conspiracy claim fails as to the section 1983 claim. Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to violate Civil Code § 52.1, this claim also fails, in view of the following discussion regarding the merits of plaintiff's Bane Act claim. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in defendants' favor as to plaintiff's cause of action for conspiracy to violate civil rights.
5. California Civil Code § 52 et seq.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges defendants' violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52 et seq. See Complaint, ¶¶ 33-45. Plaintiff appeared to make clear at the hearing on the matter that plaintiff is specifically alleging a violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 — known as the Bane Act. Section 52.1, subdivision (a), permits the state Attorney General or any city or district attorney to sue in equity "[w]henever a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state. . . ." Subdivision (b) of section 52.1, by contrast, allows anyone whose rights have been interfered with as described in subdivision (a) to sue for damages or for equitable relief. See Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(b).
Plaintiff here alleges that when he was unlawfully detained by defendants and subjected to false imprisonment, defendants interfered with his federal constitutional rights to be free from illegal detention and false arrest. Defendants, however, respond that a Bane Act claim fails for two reasons: (1) the claim is barred because plaintiff neglected to include the Bane Act as a charge in his tort claim filing — a prerequisite to the instant suit; and (2) plaintiff has failed to allege any false arrest, illegal detention, or use of violence coupled with interference of a separate and independent state or federal constitutional right — which the defendants assert the Bane Act requires.
As to the former objection, it is without merit. A copy of plaintiff's administrative tort claim is attached as Ex. 16 to the Kallis Declaration. The claim states, in the "basis of claim" section: "Officers Dennes and Elliott [violated] 52 et seq." While not a model of specificity, this is sufficient, in the court's view, to satisfy tort claim requirements.
As to defendants' latter objection, the question whether section 52.1 requires allegations of violence or threat of violence separate and independent from an alleged unreasonable search and/or arrest, has not been authoritatively answered by the California state courts. As defendants point out, other district court cases indicate that section 52.1 creates a remedy for violations of independent statutes, and that a plaintiff's false arrest claim cannot be a freestanding basis for a § 52.1 claim. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Hayward, 2008 WL 2357249 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Notwithstanding this, however, other district court cases, and a review of California case law suggest the opposite: i.e., that the best interpretation of the Bane Act as it currently stands is that section 52.1 does not require violence or threat of violence tied to a separate and independent right. See Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820, 843 (2004); Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1998); Stamps v. Super. Ct., 136 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1448 (2006); see also Cole v. Doe 1 Thru 2 Officers of City of Emeryville Police Dept., 387 F.Supp. 2d 1084, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (the "[u]se of law enforcement authority to effectuate a stop, [and] detention (including use of handcuffs) . . . can constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion under the Bane Act") (relying on California cases interpreting the Bane Act).
Ultimately, the court need not resolve this dispute here. For, even if the court were to conclude that plaintiff need not prove violence or threat of violence tied to a separate independent right in order to state a Bane Act claim, and that any alleged unlawful detention and imprisonment by defendants may on its own qualify as a direct violation of the Bane Act, plaintiff's claim would still substantively fail. For the reasons already articulated in connection with plaintiff's section 1983 claim, the court concludes that no wrongful detention actually occurred here. Thus, no actionable claim premised on a wrongful detention can be stated under the Bane Act.
Accordingly, summary judgment in defendants' favor as to plaintiff's claim pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 is similarly GRANTED.
C. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Specifically, defendants' motion is GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's first cause of action alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's second cause of action alleging violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52; and GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's third cause of action alleging conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civil Code § 52.