Going v. Pagani

31 Citing cases

  1. Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.

    292 Conn. 150 (Conn. 2009)   Cited 70 times
    Addressing claim likely to arise during proceeding on remand

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976); Schomer v. Shilepsky, 169 Conn. 186, 191, 363 A.2d 128 (1975). "Implicit in this standard is the requirement . . . that the expert's knowledge or experience must be directly applicable to the matter specifically in issue.

  2. State v. Sherman

    38 Conn. App. 371 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 40 times
    Concluding that prosecutor's questions “did not directly undermine the court's ruling,” despite fact that trial court “sustain [ed] the defendant's objection to the questions, it did so on the theory that the questions were similar to those meant to be precluded by the motion in limine,” particularly because trial court gave prompt curative instruction to jury

    The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law. State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 166, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985); State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 716, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985); State v. Biller, supra; State v. Wilson, 180 Conn. 481, 489-90, 429 A.2d 931 (1980); Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976); State v. Elliott, 8 Conn. App. 566, 572, 513 A.2d 1285, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 813, 517 A.2d 630 (1986). `In order to render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must be a factual basis for the opinion.

  3. Marsala v. Groonell

    2001 Ct. Sup. 11267 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)

    Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in admitting Mantho's testimony because the testimony had a proper factual foundation. The defendants rely on Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 372 A.2d 516 (1976), to support their argument that because Mantho did not visit the scene of the collision until August 1998, more than three years after the accident, his testimony should have been excluded because it was not based on his personal observations. In Going, like in the present case, the accident reconstructionist did not visit the scene of the accident until three years after the incident and after the road had been repaved.

  4. Borkowski v. Borkowski

    228 Conn. 729 (Conn. 1994)   Cited 414 times
    Reversing trial court's ruling and remanding for new hearing on motion for modification where trial court applied wrong standard of law

    Thus, "[t]he facts upon which an expert's opinion is based are an important consideration in determining the admissibility of his [or her] opinion." Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 34, 372 A.2d 516 (1976). The plaintiff's testimony concerning the cause of her injury and the subsequent deterioration of her medical condition furnished the facts upon which Becker's expert testimony was based.

  5. Skrzypiec v. Noonan

    228 Conn. 1 (Conn. 1993)   Cited 89 times
    Affirming jury's verdict that defendants, psychiatrist and social worker, acted negligently in disclosing confidential information about plaintiff

    This broad discretion extends to the admissibility of expert testimony which the trial court finds is without probative value for the jury. Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976). Here the trial court ruled that the plaintiff's questions were phrased so that the answers elicited would not have been helpful to the jury in determining Leibowitz' experience with the issues at hand.

  6. State v. Douglas

    203 Conn. 445 (Conn. 1987)   Cited 35 times

    The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law. State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 166, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985); State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 716, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985); State v. Biller, supra; State v. Wilson, 180 Conn. 481, 489-90, 429 A.2d 931 (1980); Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976); State v. Elliott, 8 Conn. App. 566, 572, 513 A.2d 1285, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 813, 517 A.2d 630 (1986). "In order to render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must be a factual basis for the opinion."

  7. State v. Kemp

    199 Conn. 473 (Conn. 1986)   Cited 126 times
    In State v. Kemp, supra, 199 Conn. at 476, 507 A.2d 1387, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a defendant's request to present expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony, reasoning that the factors affecting such reliability were within the common knowledge of jurors and that defendants were protected adequately through cross-examination, closing argument and jury instructions that called attention to those factors.

    The court's decision "is not to be disturbed unless [its] discretion has been abused, or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law. Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976)." State v. Biller, supra.

  8. State v. Girolamo

    197 Conn. 201 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 31 times

    " `[U]nless that discretion has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law,'" its ruling will not be disturbed. (Citation omitted.) Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976). "The true test for the admissibility of expert testimony is `whether the witnesses offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world, which renders their opinions founded on such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or the jury in determining the questions at issue.

  9. State v. One 1977 Buick Automobile

    493 A.2d 874 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 37 times
    In State v. One 1977 Buick Automobile, 196 Conn. 471, 485, 493 A.2d 874 (1985), the court noted that forfeiture actions are civil actions in rem, that is, actions against the res.

    We agree that the facts upon which an expert Opinion is based are important in considering the relevance, and hence the weight, as well as the admissibility of the testimony. See Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 34, 372 A.2d 516 (1976). Nevertheless, we do not find the foundation inadequate in this case.

  10. State v. Palmer

    196 Conn. 157 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 92 times
    In State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985), this court observed that a guilty plea under Alford is a "judicial oxymoron" because a guilty plea is a confession of guilt.

    The trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless that discretion has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law, its ruling will not be disturbed. Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976). The issue here was not solely whether the composite sketch and the photograph looked alike. For that purpose expert testimony was unnecessary and would have been inadmissible.