Opinion
No. 99-CV-4307-JPG.
January 8, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 106) made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by defendant/third-party plaintiff Fastenal Company.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The reviewing court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396. Where the moving party fails to meet its strict burden of proof, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion. Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992).
In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26; Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
BACKGROUND
Federal Express owned and operated the Federal Express Indianapolis Terminal. Federal Express was constructing a second Indianapolis terminal. To that end, it employed Smoot Construction Company ("Smoot"), who in turn employed D.W. Nicholson Corporation ("D.W. Corporation") as an independent contractor to fabricate and install certain conveyors for use in the terminal as part of the construction project. D.W. Corporation employed Adam Goines ("the Plaintiff"), an Illinois citizen, to work on the construction project. Specifically, the Plaintiff installed various conveyor beds and controlled and managed the placement of a chain link fence in close proximity to the work area. While assisting in the placement of an 1,800 pound section of conveyor bed which was approximately 25 feet overhead, the Fast Tool Lift-All nylon strap used to lift the conveyor bed snapped. The Plaintiff was struck on the head and legs by the conveyor bed and thrown to the ground. The Plaintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries to his head, neck, back, and arms, and he continues to suffer the lingering effects of these injuries today.
Among the other claims in his Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff brought a general negligence claim against Fastenal Company, a Minnesota corporation, for negligently (1) selling its straps without adequate warnings or instructions as to their proper use, (2) selling its straps with incorrectly-rated capacity information, and (3) manufacturing and selling the straps that did not meet Fastenal's own design specifications for strength and which violated other industry standards. See Second Amended Complaint, Count V (Doc. No. 26). The Plaintiff also brought a strict liability claim against Fastenal based in large part on the same underlying misconduct. See Second Amended Complaint Count VI (Doc. No. 26).
Fastenal then sued, among others, Lift-All Company ("Lift-All"), a Pennsylvania corporation. (Doc. No. 73). Fastenal alleged that Lift-All manufactured the nylon strap and sold it to Fastenal. Thereafter, Fastenal filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 106), along with supporting memoranda (Doc. Nos. 107, 109).
ANALYSIS
In its motion for summary judgment Fastenal argues that it is entitled to summary judgment for three reasons: (1) Fastenal argues that there is no evidence of a defect in the subject product; (2) Fastenal argues that it was not the manufacturer of the product at issue, but rather was a mere distributor of the product and that under the Indiana Product's Liability Statute, a mere distributor may not be held liable under either strict products liability or negligence; and (3) Fastenal argues that it neither owed, nor breached, any duty under a negligence theory because it did not design or manufacture the product.
1. No Evidence of a Defect
Fastenal contends that summary judgment is warranted due to the Plaintiff's failure to produce evidence demonstrating a defect in the safety strap. On the other hand, the Plaintiff argues that Fastenal's argument is premature because discovery is ongoing.
This Court agrees that Fastenal's argument is premature. Discovery is ongoing, and the Plaintiff may yet disclose expert opinion evidence or other evidence that the safety strap was defective. At this point, Fastenal has failed to meet its burden, under Rule 56, of demonstrating that there is no material issue of fact as to whether the safety strap was defective and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that, under Rule 56, where the moving party fails to meet its strict burden of proof, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion)
2. Shelter for Seller Under Products Liability Act
Section 34-20-2-3 (hereinafter "Section 3") of the Indiana Products Liability Act ("IPLA") provides as follows:
A product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort may not be commenced or maintained against a seller of a product that is alleged to contain or possess a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer unless the seller is a manufacturer of the product or of the part of the product alleged to be defective.
I.C. § 34-20-2-3. In this case, Fastenal contends that it was merely a seller of the safety strap and not a manufacturer. Along with its motion for summary judgment, Fastenal has submitted an affidavit of John Milek, Fastenal's corporate counsel, stating that Fastenal sells but does not manufacture nylon safety straps. Milek Affidavit ¶ 3. In his response to Fastenal's motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff does not deny that Lift-All was the actual manufacturer of the product.
Thus, it is clear that but for some exception, Section 3 would apply to bar the Plaintiff's strict products liability claim against Fastenal. Whether the exception, set forth in I.C. § 34-20-2-4 (hereinafter "Section 4"), applies in this case is a separate question.
It is not immediately clear that Section 3 is relevant to the Plaintiff's negligence claim against Fastenal. The plain language of Section 3 does not include negligence claims. Section 3 provides that a "product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort" cannot be maintained against the seller of a product unless the seller is the manufacturer. Despite Section 3's plain language, Fastenal argues that it applies identically to strict liability and negligence claims and cites Stegemoller v. Acands, Inc., 749 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind.App. 2001) (stating that the IPLA governs "all actions brought against a manufacturer or seller of that product for physical harm caused by the product").
Although Stegemoller is arguably distinguishable from this case, the Plaintiff has chosen to not address the question of whether Section 3 is relevant and applicable to his negligence claim. Apparently, the Plaintiff concedes that Section 3 applies, in general, to products liability negligence claims. Therefore, this Court starts its analysis of the IPLA with the assumption that Section 3 applies identically to the Plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims.
Next the Court must focus, as the Plaintiff does, on the exception to Section 3 created by Section 4, which provides:
If a court is unable to hold jurisdiction over a particular manufacturer of a product or part of a product alleged to be defective, then that manufacturer's principal distributor or seller over whom a court may hold jurisdiction shall be considered, for the purposes of this chapter, the manufacturer of the product.
I.C. § 34-20-2-4. The Plaintiff argues that this Court is unable to "hold jurisdiction over" Lift-All and that, therefore, Fastenal should be "considered" the manufacturer of the product. In other words, the Plaintiff argues that Section 4 requires that this Court treat Fastenal as the manufacturer of the safety strap-regardless of whether Fastenal actually manufactured it. Of course, that conclusion depends upon the premise that this Court is "unable to hold jurisdiction over" Lift-All. Thus, a key question is: What does "unable to hold jurisdiction over" mean?
The Plaintiff's argument that he believes that this Court is "unable to hold jurisdiction over" Lift-All is not persuasive. Plaintiff puts forward three premises: (1) that Plaintiff currently has no direct claim against Lift-All, (2) that Fastenal's claim against Lift-All is the only claim against Lift-All, and (3) that summary judgment in Fastenal's favor would necessarily dispose of the only pending claim against Lift-All. So far, the Plaintiff is unquestionably correct. The conclusion that the Plaintiff draws from these three premises, however, is questionable — very questionable. The Plaintiff argues as follows, "Summary Judgment in Fastenal's favor would necessarily dispose of the only pending claim against Lift-All, thereby eliminating this Court's ability to hold jurisdiction over Lift-All." Dismissal of a party, however, does not, by itself, eliminate this Court's ability to hold jurisdiction over that party.
The Plaintiff fails to set forth any other argument as to why this Court is "unable to hold jurisdiction" over Lift-All. Fastenal suggests one on behalf of the Plaintiff. Fastenal states, "In his response [to the motion for summary judgment], Plaintiff erroneously contends that this Court does not `hold jurisdiction over the manufacturer' because the statute of limitations for a direct claim against Lift-All has expired." This is a creative and generous interpretation of the Plaintiff's response. In fact, neither party has even discussed the issue of whether the statute of limitations would actually bar the Plaintiff from bringing a suit directly against Lift-All.
See I.C. § 34-20-3-1 (the statute of limitations provision of the IPLA).
Assuming arguendo that the Statute of Limitations applies, the determinative question is whether the running of the statute of limitations renders this Court "unable to hold jurisdiction over" Lift-All within the meaning of Section 4. If this Court is "unable to hold jurisdiction" over Lift-All, then this Court must treat Fastenal as the de facto manufacturer. Again, we come back to the question: what does "unable to hold jurisdiction" mean? Unfortunately, the parties have shed little light on this issue.
Indiana Courts have stated that "jurisdiction" is comprised of three elements: (1) jurisdiction of the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction of the person; and (3) jurisdiction of the particular case. Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d 990, 997 (Ind.App. 2001); Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind.App. 2000). The question raised by Fastenal (attributed to the Plaintiff) is whether the statute of limitations divests this Court of jurisdiction over the particular case — that is the case against Lift-All.
Section 4, however, is ambiguous as to whether it is referring to one particular element of jurisdiction or all three elements, and the parties have not clarified the situation. The plaintiff apparently just assumes that "jurisdiction" in Section 4 refers to the power to hear a particular case. On the other hand, Fastenal states that Section 4 "clearly refers to personal jurisdiction." The mere insertion of the word "clearly," however, does not convince this Court of the correctness of Fastenal's position, and Fastenal offers no other support for its position.
Moreover, even if Section 4 does refer to the Court's jurisdiction to hear a particular case, it is not clear that the running of the statute of limitations divests this Court of that type of jurisdiction. In Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d 990, (Ind.App. 2001), the Indiana Appellate Court held that whether the running of a statute of limitations divests a court of jurisdiction to hear a particular case depends on whether the relevant statute of limitations is a "nonclaim statute" or a general statute of limitations. Neither party has briefed the issue of whether the IPLA statute of limitations is a "nonclaim statute" or a general statute of limitations.
Again, the Plaintiff apparently assumes that if the statute of limitations has run then this Court has been divested of jurisdiction. Fastenal, on the other hand, cites Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind.App. 2000) for the proposition that the expiration of the statute of limitations never defeats jurisdiction. However, Troxel does not support that proposition. The holding of Troxel is that a probate decision issued by a Court without jurisdiction is not void, but merely voidable. Id. at 750. The Appellate Court in Troxel did not decide whether the running of the statute of limitations divested the trial court of jurisdiction. Rather, the Appellate Court concluded that even if a trial court does not have jurisdiction, the "jurisdictional defect is waived" if the trial court's decision is "not attacked in a timely manner." Id. at 750.
As a practical matter, the parties have left this Court on its own to determine: (1) the meaning of the phrase "unable to hold jurisdiction"; (2) whether the IPLA Statute of Limitations would apply to bar a suit by the Plaintiff against Lift-All; and (3) whether the IPLA Statute of Limitations is a "nonclaim" statute or a general statute of limitations. This Court, however, is not obliged to make arguments on behalf of the parties and doing so would be contrary to the adversarial system of the federal courts.
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden to persuade the Court that there are no material issues of fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, Fastenal, the moving party, has not convinced the Court that application of the IPLA entitles it to summary judgment.
3. No Duty
"In order to prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant breached a duty owed to him which proximately caused the injury." Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1198 (Ind.App. 1993).
Fastenal argues that the Plaintiff's negligence claims against Fastenal should be dismissed because Fastenal (in Count V of the Second Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 26) owed the Plaintiff no duty with respect to the safety strap. Fastenal relies on Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1198 (Ind.App. 1993). In Lucas, the plaintiff was a worker who was injured when a derrick from a utility truck fell on top of him. Id. Among other claims, the plaintiff brought a products liability suit, under a negligence theory, against the installer of the derrick. Id. The Appellate Court stated as follows: "With regard to design, manufacture, assembly, or installation of the derrick, [the installer] breached no duty of care. [The installer] did not design and was not the manufacturer of the derrick." Id. at 1198.
Similarly, in this case, there is no evidence that Fastenal designed or manufactured the safety strap. Although the Plaintiff argues that Fastenal should be treated as the manufacturer under the IPLA, the Plaintiff apparently concedes that Fastenal did not actually manufacture the safety strap. Therefore, Fastenal could not have owed the Plaintiff a duty to reasonably design and manufacture the safety strap. Accordingly, this Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Fastenal on the Plaintiff's negligent design and manufacture claim against Fastenal.
In this case, however, the Plaintiff has also asserted a claim for negligent failure to warn. See Second Amended Complaint, Count V, ¶ 4 (alleging that Fastenal "[n]egligently and carelessly sold a nylon strap without adequate warnings or instructions as to its proper and safe use"). Under Indiana law, in order to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the Plaintiff must show: (1) the seller supplied the product with a concealed danger; (2) the seller knew or had reason to know of the concealed danger; (3) the seller failed to adequately warn of the concealed danger; and (4) the failure to warn was a proximate cause of the injury. See Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1198 (Ind.App. 1993).
In Lucas, the plaintiff brought a negligent failure to warn claim as well as his negligent manufacture and design claim. The Appellate Court, however, did not grant summary judgment as to the failure to warn claim. The Appellate Court listed the elements of a failure to warn claim and stated, "[The installer's] task was to show the uncontroverted nonexistence of at least one of these elements. [The installer] has failed." Id.
Similarly, in this case, Fastenal has failed to meet its burden of proving that one of the elements of the Plaintiff's failure to warn claim does not exist. See Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that, under Rule 56, where the moving party fails to meet its strict burden of proof, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court hereby GRANTS, in part, Fastenal's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 106), as follows: The Plaintiff's claim against Fastenal for negligent manufacture and design, found in Count V of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 26) is dismissed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case.
The remainder of Fastenal's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
To clarify, this Order does not dismiss Count V of the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety and does not dismiss Count VI of the Second Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.