In such cases, counsel is permitted to apply for independent fees over and above that which they receive from their clients ( see e.g., Central Railroad Banking Co., of Ga. v. Pettus, supra at 125; Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. of Phila. v. American Radiator Std. Sanitary Corp., 487 F2d 161, 165-166; but see Maurer v. International Re-Insurance Corp., 33 Del Ch 456, 464-465, 95 A2d 827, 831-832). However, it is unclear whether the courts of this state have uniformly adopted such a rule ( compare Proskauer Rose Goetz Mendelsohn v. National Westminster Bank U.S.A., 179 AD2d 611, 612, with Matter of Richards v. United Health Servs., 121 AD2d 68, 72, and Strong v. Dutcher, 186 App Div 307, 316). Nonetheless, even assuming that such a recovery might be permissible in New York, it appears clear that recovery in a common-fund case is limited to "exceptional cases" in which "dominating reasons of justice" require the allowance of counsel fees ( Sprague v. Ticonic Natl. Bank, supra at 167; see generally Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y. v. Gerosa, 30 Misc 2d 481).

There are no factual allegations in their complaint to meet even the most basic pleading requirements of CPLR 3013 and support the Broome plaintiffs' assertion that $30 or $32 million should have been returned. Even under the common fund doctrine, the Broome plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorneys' fees from defendants, over and above the $23.6 million defendants voluntarily paid the limited partners, for purportedly compelling them to return such funds (see, Proskauer Rose Goetz Mendelsohn v. Natl. Westminster Bank, 179 A.D.2d 611, 612). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

There are no factual allegations in their complaint to meet even the most basic pleading requirements of CPLR 3013 and support the Broome plaintiffs' assertion that $30 or $32 million should have been returned. Even under the common fund doctrine, the Broome plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorneys' fees from defendants, over and above the $23.6 million defendants voluntarily paid the limited partners, for purportedly compelling them to return such funds (see, Proskauer Rose Goetz Mendelsohn v. Natl. Westminster Bank, 179 A.D.2d 611, 612) THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

There are no factual allegations in their complaint to meet even the most basic pleading requirements of CPLR 3013 and support the Broome plaintiffs' assertion that $30 or $32 million should have been returned. Even under the common fund doctrine, the Broome plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorneys' fees from defendants, over and above the $23.6 million defendants voluntarily paid the limited partners, for purportedly compelling them to return such funds (see, Proskauer Rose Goetz Mendelsohn v. Natl. Westminster Bank, 179 A.D.2d 611, 612). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

In any event, it does not appear that this avenue is applicable to the facts surrounding the fees incurred on behalf of the County. See,e.g., City of Fort Smith v. S.W.Bell Telephone Co., 220 Ark. 70, 247 S.W.2d 474 (1952) and Proskauer RoseGoetz Mendelsohn v. National Westminster Bank U.S.A., 179 A.D.2d 611, 579 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1992). White County is free to provide for the payment of its attorneys fees in any manner it sees fit, and to provide for an equitable distribution of that burden, so long as compliance is had with applicable laws. It may not, however, in so doing, allocate taxes levied and dedicated for particular purposes to other purposes.