Opinion
98 C 0971, 98 C 0972
July 13, 2001
Plaintiffs ask me to vacate my order of April 4, 2001, awarding defendants costs in the amount of $6143.24, or $3071.62 per plaintiff. The basis for the motion is that they cannot pay the costs because they are indigent.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs, but allows denial of costs at the discretion of the trial court. The presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party may be overcome by a showing of indigence. See Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983). The Badillo ruling has been reconfirmed in McGill v. Faulkner, 18 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1994), which makes it plain that the losing party must provide specific evidence establishing such indigence as would prevent the losing party from paying the court imposed costs "at this time, or in the future." Id. Indigence is not well-defined under the case law, but at least one judge on this court has held that indigence is "not merely limited financial resources." Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 1997 WL 583063 *1 (N.D.Ill. 1997).
Kristina Goers filed an affidavit describing her income and living expenses, along with copies of bills and the like in support. The record reflects that she makes $624 per month in income after taxes, nearly 100 percent of which goes to basic living expenses. She receives food stamps and Medicaid assistance for the support of her daughter. Her income places her well below the "poverty threshold" for a family of two as calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000 ($11,869 per year). This showing suffices to establish the necessary indigence to enable me to exercise discretion in her favor. On the basis of Ms. Goers' indigence, I reduce the costs she must pay to $1000. Michael Delia's financial affidavit shows that he makes roughly $26,000 per year before taxes. After accounting for his basic monthly expenses, he has $400 to $500 per month remaining. The law of this circuit does not allow me to reduce Mr. Delia's costs on these facts as I cannot say that he would not be able to pay the costs "at this time or in the future."
I note that plaintiffs may well have brought this action in perfectly good faith with the honest belief that their rights were violated. Indeed, having heard all of the evidence, I believe that a reasonable jury might have found in Ms. Goers' favor on at least one of her claims. The Seventh Circuit has held, however, that the good faith of a losing party is not a legitimate reason for denying costs. See Reed v. Int'l Union of United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of America, 945 F.2d 198, 204 (7 th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff's motion to vacate costs [62] is granted in part and denied in part. The order of April 4, 2001 [61] is modified as follows: Kristina Goers shall pay $1000 in costs and Michael Delia shall pay $3071.62 in costs.
Plaintiffs ask me to vacate my order of April 4, 2001, awarding defendants costs in the amount of $6143.24, or $3071.62 per plaintiff. The basis for the motion is that they cannot pay the costs because they are indigent.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs, but allows denial of costs at the discretion of the trial court. The presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party may be overcome by a showing of indigence. See Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983). The Badillo ruling has been reconfirmed in McGill v. Faulkner, 18 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1994), which makes it plain that the losing party must provide specific evidence establishing such indigence as would prevent the losing party from paying the court imposed costs "at this time, or in the future." Id. Indigence is not well-defined under the case law, but at least one judge on this court has held that indigence is "not merely limited financial resources." Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 1997 WL 583063 *1 (N.D.Ill. 1997).
Kristina Goers filed an affidavit describing her income and living expenses, along with copies of bills and the like in support. The record reflects that she makes $624 per month in income after taxes, nearly 100 percent of which goes to basic living expenses. She receives food stamps and Medicaid assistance for the support of her daughter. Her income places her well below the "poverty threshold" for a family of two as calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000 ($11,869 per year). This showing suffices to establish the necessary indigence to enable me to exercise discretion in her favor. On the basis of Ms. Goers' indigence, I reduce the costs she must pay to $1000.
Michael Delia's financial affidavit shows that he makes roughly $26,000 per year before taxes. After accounting for his basic monthly expenses, he has $400 to $500 per month remaining. The law of this circuit does not allow me to reduce Mr. Delia's costs on these facts as I cannot say that he would not be able to pay the costs "at this time or in the future."
I note that plaintiffs may well have brought this action in perfectly good faith with the honest belief that their rights were violated. Indeed, having heard all of the evidence, I believe that a reasonable jury might have found in Ms. Goers' favor on at least one of her claims. The Seventh Circuit has held, however, that the good faith of a losing party is not a legitimate reason for denying costs. See Reed v. Int'l Union of United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of America, 945 F.2d 198, 204 (7 th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff's motion to vacate costs [62] is granted in part and denied in part. The order of April 4, 2001 [61] is modified as follows: Kristina Goers shall pay $1000 in costs and Michael Delia shall pay $3071.62 in costs.