Opinion
21A-DC-2502
01-30-2023
Brandon Godsey, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Amanda Godsey, Appellee-Respondent.
Attorney for Appellant Alexander N. Moseley Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Katherine A. Harmon Jessie D. Cobb-Dennard The Northside Law Firm Westfield, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court The Honorable Paul A. Felix, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29C01-1911-DC-10404
Attorney for Appellant Alexander N. Moseley Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Katherine A. Harmon Jessie D. Cobb-Dennard The Northside Law Firm Westfield, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON REHEARING
Riley, Judge.
[¶1] Appellant-Petitioner, Brandon Godsey (Father) has petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the standard of review contained in our original memorandum decision is erroneous. We grant his petition for the limited purpose of correcting our standard of review.
[¶2] A petition for rehearing is a vehicle that affords the reviewing court an "opportunity to correct its own omissions or errors.'" Griffin v. State, 763 N.E.2d 450, 451(Ind. 2002) (citation omitted). In our memorandum decision in Godsey v. Godsey, No. 21A-DC-2502, (Ind.Ct.App. Sep. 6, 2020), the standard of review cited inferred that no party had requested findings and that the trial court had entered sua sponte findings. This is the standard of review we elected:
Where, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon without an Indiana Trial Rule 52 written request from a party, the entry of findings and conclusions is considered to be sua sponte. Dana Cos., LLC v. Chaffee Rentals, 1 N.E.3d 738, 747 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. When the trial court enters specific findings sua sponte, the "findings control our review and the judgment only as to the issues those specific findings cover. Where there are no specific findings, a general judgment standard applies, and we may affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial." Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Jones, 953 N.E.2d 608, 614 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied. We apply the following two-tier standard of review to sua sponte findings and conclusions: whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Barkwill v. Cornelia H. Barkwill Revocable Trust, 902 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied. We will only set aside findings and conclusions if they are clearly erroneous, that is, when the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Id. "A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Id. In conducting our review, we consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Samples v. Wilson, 12 N.E.3d 946, 950 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id.Slip op. *4. During the evidentiary hearing, the trial court asked Father's and Mother's attorneys if they wished to submit proposals for findings. According to the transcript, it appeared as if neither party submitted a request for findings of fact during the offer. The trial court ordered the parties to submit proposals within 15 days of the offer. A closer look at the chronological case summary, however, indicates that Father did indeed make a request for special findings. Because Father requested special findings in this case, we grant his petition to correct our standard of review, which we now state as follows:
[W]hen a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to a party's request, we engage in a two-tiered standard of review. We must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and then whether the findings support the judgment. The court's findings and judgment will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any facts or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. The judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the findings. In making these determinations, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, but we will consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences therefrom.
When, as here, the court has made special findings pursuant to a party's request under Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), this court may affirm
the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings. Before affirming on a legal theory supported by the findings but not espoused by the trial court, we should be confident that its affirmance is consistent with all of the trial court's findings of fact and the inferences drawn from the findings.Henry v. Henry, 758 N.E.2d 991, 992-93 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (citations omitted).
[¶3] Father argues that our analysis of the issues of physical and legal custody, relocation, weekly child support, and property division need to be revised due to our application of an incorrect standard of review. We disagree. Even with our application of the correct standard of review, our assessment of those issues remains the same since the findings are supported by the evidence or reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Furthermore, the findings adequately support the trial court's decision. Accordingly, we grant Father's petition for rehearing for the limited purpose of correcting our standard of review. We affirm our opinion in all other respects.
[¶4] May, J. and Tavitas, J. concur