Opinion
Civil Action No. 18-410
08-07-2020
JONATHAN K. GODINES, Petitioner, v. ROBERT D. GILMORE, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF FAYETTE, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
District Judge William S. Stickman/Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
The instant action involves a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the "Petition"). ECF No. 5. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice for Petitioner's failure to prosecute given that Petitioner failed to alert the Court after his state court remedies were exhausted and he failed to file a Response to the Order to Show Cause why the case should not be dismissed despite the Court giving him an extension of time to do so. ECF Nos. 8 and 10.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural History
Jonathan K. Godines ("Petitioner") initiated the Petition on March 30, 2018 by the docketing of a deficient Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis ("IFP Motion"). ECF No. 1. The Court ordered Petitioner to cure the deficiency, ECF No. 2, and he did so by filing a non-deficient IFP Motion. ECF No. 3. Accordingly, the Court granted the IFP Motion. ECF No. 4. The Clerk's Office then filed the Petition. ECF No. 5. The Petition attacked Petitioner's conviction for third degree murder. ECF No. 5 at 1. Petitioner also filed what he captioned as a "Motion for Leave to File a Stay in Abyeance Unto the Outcome of the State Court's Proceedings" ("Motion to Stay"). ECF No. 6. In the Motion to Stay, Petitioner represented that he had a second Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition then pending in the state courts and wished to exhaust his state court remedies. As such, Petitioner sought a stay of the federal habeas proceedings in this Court while he exhausted his state court PCRA litigation. Finding the request to be reasonable, the Court granted the Motion to Stay. ECF No. 7. In the April 25, 2018 Order granting the stay (the "Order Granting Stay"), the Court specifically directed that the "Parties are ORDERED to notify this Court in writing within 30 days after the Second PCRA proceedings are finally concluded." Id. at 1 - 2.
Given that the Petition had not been served prior to the Order Granting Stay being entered, the only "parties" to the case at that point was Petitioner.
In May of 2020, the Court discovered that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had decided Petitioner's appeal in the second PCRA proceedings on June 28, 2019, nearly one full year prior. Com. v. Godines, 714 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 2714629 (Pa. Super. June 28, 2019). Further, it appeared that Petitioner did not file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. No other activity appeared to have occurred in the state courts since the Pennsylvania Superior Court rendered its decision on June 28, 2019.
Accordingly, on May 19, 2020, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause, in which the Court took judicial notice of the foregoing facts and of Petitioner's failure to obey this Court's order granting the stay, which required Petitioner to "notify this Court in writing within 30 days after the Second PCRA proceedings are finally concluded[.]" ECF No. 8. The Order to Show Cause directed Petitioner to explain his failure for nearly a year to inform the Court of the exhaustion of his state court remedies as he was required to do by the Order Granting Stay. In the Order to Show Cause, the Court specifically directed Petitioner in his response to the Order to Show Cause to "inform the Court as to any reason he may have as to why the stay of this case should not be lifted and further, why the Petition should not be dismissed due to his failure to prosecute this case and/or obey this Court's Order, requiring that he inform this Court when the state court proceedings had terminated within 30 days thereafter." Id. at 2. Petitioner was given until June 10, 2020 to file his response and was warned that if he failed to file his response by that date, "this Petition shall be dismissed without further warning due to Petitioner's failure to prosecute." Id.
On June 10, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Time Extension, seeking an extension of time by which to file his response to the Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 9. The Court granted his request and extended the time until July 15, 2020 to file his Response. The deadline of July 15, 2020 passed, and Petitioner never filed a response to the Order to Show Cause, nor did he request an additional extension of time.
Petitioner did, however, file a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal ("IFP Motion on Appeal") on June 24, 2020. ECF No. 11. On the same date, Petitioner filed a boiler-plate Motion for Appointment of Counsel on appeal. ECF No. 12. In neither of those filings did Petitioner offer any explanation as to why he failed to inform the Court within 30 days after he had exhausted his state court remedies as he was required to do, nor did he respond to the Order to Show Cause.
On June 26, 2020, the Court denied Petitioner's IFP Motion on Appeal, as there was no appeal and even if there were, the grant of IFP status in this Court rendered it unnecessary for Petitioner to again seek IFP status for purposes of an appeal. ECF No. 13. The Court also denied Petitioner's boiler-plate Motion for Appointment of Counsel on appeal because there was no appeal. ECF No. 14.
B. Discussion
In light of Petitioner's failure to report to the Court the fact that he had exhausted his state court remedies and in light of the nearly one year delay since he had exhausted his state court remedies, his failure to offer any explanation for the delay and his failure to file a response to the Court's Order to Show Cause, the case should be dismissed for his failure to timely prosecute albeit without prejudice.
A district court has the inherent power to sua sponte dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a party's failure to comply with an order of court. Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994). A court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is committed to the court's sound discretion. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 1998) ("We review for abuse of discretion a district court's dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b)."), abrogated on other grounds by, Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). In exercising that discretion, a district court should, to the extent applicable, consider the six factors known as the Poulis factors when it levies the sanction of dismissal of an action for failure to obey discovery schedules, failure to prosecute, or to comply with other procedural rules. Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1330 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995).
See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) ("In considering the second Poulis factor . . ."). Poulis refers to Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
In Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set forth the following six factors to be considered: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. However, "Poulis did not provide a magic formula whereby the decision to dismiss or not to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint becomes a mechanical calculation easily reviewed by" the Court of Appeals. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that "not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint. See C.T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l. Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 696 (3d Cir. 1988). Instead, the decision must be made in the context of the district court's extended contact with the litigant." Id.
In light of Petitioner's failure to inform this Court of his having exhausted his state court remedies as he was required to do, and the consequent delay of nearly a year before this Court discovered his failure to do so, and in light of his failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause and offer any excuse as to why he failed to inform this Court of the fact that he exhausted his state court remedies, the Court finds the Poulis factors sufficiently met herein to justify dismissal of this case. Weighing heavily in this Court's judgment is Poulis factor 1, i.e., the extent of the party's personal responsibility. Petitioner alone is responsible for the delay of this case and solely responsible for her failures to respond to the Order to Show Cause and offer any explanation as to why he failed to inform this Court of his exhaustion of his state court remedies.
In addition, Poulis factor 6, the meritoriousness of the claim(s), weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. This is because, at the time of the filing the instant Petition, the Petition was untimely in violation of the one-year statute of limitations found in the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").
The relevant dates, as taken from the Superior Court opinion in Com. v. Godines, 2019 WL 2714629201, establish that the Petition was late by more than 200 days. Petitioner's conviction became final on December 31, 2014, which is 30 days after the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal where Petitioner did not file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Com. v. Godines, 116 A.3d 675 (Pa. Super 2014). Petitioner did not file his first PCRA petition until September 30, 2015. Godines, 2019 WL 2714629201 at *1 ("Godines filed his first pro se PCRA Petition on September 30, 2015."). Between December 31, 2014 and September 30, 2015, a total of 273 days out of the 365-day AEDPA limitations period were utilized.
Petitioner's first PCRA Petition ceased to be pending as of May 19, 2017, which is 30 days after the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial of relief in the first PCRA proceedings where Petitioner did not file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Com v. Godines, No. 1586 WDA 2016 (Pa. Super.). AEDPA's statute of limitations started running again thereafter and continued to run until, March 19, 2018. March 19, 2018 is the date that, based on the prisoner mailbox rule, Petitioner is deemed to have filed the instant Petition for the purposes of calculating AEDPA's statute of limitations, as that is the date, he ostensibly signed the IFP Motion. ECF No. 1 at 3. From May 19, 2017 to March 19, 2018, a total of 304 days passed. Adding the 273 days (which passed between the conviction becoming final and the filing of the first PCRA Petition) to these 304 days, yields a result of 577 days or 212 days beyond the 365-day AEDPA statute of limitations. Accordingly, the instant Petition violates AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations.
The docket for Petitioner's appeal to the Superior Court in the first PCRA proceedings is available at:
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/AppellateCourtReport.ashx?docketNumber=1586+WDA+2016&dnh=DTB3JYOXZO%2fgrqFbEUD%2faA%3d%3d (site last visited 8/7/2020).
A certificate of appealability should be denied as jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's case be dismissed without prejudice and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted, Date: August 7, 2020
/s/ Maureen P . Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE cc: The Honorable William S. Stickman
United States District Judge
JONATHAN K. GODINES
LG-0731
SCI Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370