Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-000400-MR
04-22-2016
JARED JAMES GODIN APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jared Godin, Pro Se West Liberty, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Susan Roncarti Lenz Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 12-CR-00143-001 & 12-CR-00228-001 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, KRAMER AND NICKELL, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Jared Godin, pro se, appeals from an order of the Pulaski Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate his criminal convictions filed pursuant to RCr 11.42. Godin contends that his court-appointed attorney failed to inform him that by entering his plea of guilty, he waived his right to contest the validity of the search of his residence resulting in the criminal charges against him. Having considered the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable case law, we affirm the order of the Pulaski Circuit Court.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr).
On April 5, 2012, Godin was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine, first offense; tampering with physical evidence; and controlled substance endangerment to a child, fourth degree. He was later indicted for an additional count of manufacturing methamphetamine.
Following his indictment, Godin, was represented by Andrea Simpson of the Department of Public Advocacy. Counsel filed a series of motions that included a motion to suppress evidence seized from Godin's residence by a local constable and an officer of the Burnside Police Department. With respect to the motion to suppress, Godin argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the search of his home was conducted without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances. Godin claimed that the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and that it was conducted without his consent. The motions were set to be heard by the circuit court on June 26, 2012.
An agreed order entered on June 26, 2012, indicated that Godin decided to enter a plea of guilty. The Commonwealth had offered him a sentence of thirty years in prison, probated for a period of five years, in exchange for his unconditional guilty plea. Godin accepted the Commonwealth's offer, and he was set to be released on bond to home incarceration.
On July 26, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), to determine whether Godin's guilty plea was entered voluntarily. Following this hearing, the circuit court made a written finding in its July 31, 2012, order of adjudication of guilt reciting that:
the Defendant understands the nature of the charges against him, that the Defendant's plea is voluntary, that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to trial by jury, privilege against self-incrimination, and right of confrontation, and that there is a factual basis for Defendant's plea.He agreed to the terms of the plea agreement on the record. The court advised Godin that the bond conditions were also being incorporated into the plea agreement. The written bond agreement was signed by Godin and filed in the record on August 1, 2012. Godin acknowledged that if he violated the law before final sentencing, the plea agreement would no longer be binding, and he would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Final sentencing was set for October 5, 2012.
On August 17, 2012, Godin appeared in court with his attorney and asked to be released from home incarceration so that he could look for work. The court agreed to release him from home incarceration, but it advised Godin again of the consequences of violating the terms of his plea agreement.
Subsequently, the Commonwealth alleged that Godin had committed several violations of the conditions of his bond: punching his wife in the eye (fourth-degree assault), alcohol intoxication, disorderly conduct, bribery, and contempt of court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Godin did in fact violate the conditions of his bond. As a result, the court concluded that the Commonwealth was relieved of its obligation under the plea agreement. Godin was sentenced to fifteen years for both offenses of manufacturing methamphetamine, to run consecutively, for a total of thirty-years' imprisonment.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Godin's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Godin v. Commonwealth, 2012-SC-000808 (rendered December 19, 2013). Subsequently, Godin launched a collateral attack against the judgment. He filed a timely motion for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of the motion, Godin alleged that his trial counsel had proved deficient for a multitude of reasons, including her failure to pursue the motion to suppress evidence. Godin requested that an evidentiary hearing be conducted to resolve his claims and that he receive appointed counsel to assist him.
In an order entered on September 22, 2014, the trial court granted Godin's motion for appointment of counsel. It set the matter for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the allegation that trial counsel had been deficient by failing to pursue the motion to suppress. On the strength of the record, the trial court rejected Godin's remaining claims regarding counsel's performance.
Attorney Simpson, Godin's trial counsel, testified at the evidentiary hearing conducted on November 21, 2014. Following the hearing, the circuit court found that Simpson had adequately advised Godin of his rights before he entered his guilty plea:
[C]ounsel credibly testified that she generally notifies her clients that once a plea agreement is accepted there will be no further hearings made upon motions previously filed such as the present suppression motion.Godin's own testimony convinced the court that he had been satisfied with counsel's representation at the time that the guilty plea was negotiated. From the evidence presented, the court found that Godin had not expressed "any concern regarding his outstanding suppression motion" and that he had "significant credibility issues." The circuit court found that Godin's pleadings and testimony established that "his only real interest was to be released from custody and not, as he now complains, to achieve a legal victory based upon illegal police conduct." The circuit court concluded that Godin had failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient in her representation.
The circuit court also concluded that even if trial counsel had pursued the motion to suppress, Godin could not show that he was prejudiced by her failure to do so. The court found that exigent circumstances clearly justified the warrantless entry into Godin's home and that if the motion to suppress had been pursued, it would have been summarily denied.
The trial court denied Godin's motion for relief in an order entered on January 13, 2015. Godin was permitted to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and counsel was appointed to represent him.
On September 8, 2015, the Department of Public Advocacy filed a motion with this Court to withdraw as Godin's counsel. In the motion, counsel indicated that the post-conviction proceeding was not one "that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense." By order entered September 29, 2015, this Court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and ordered that Godin's pro se brief be filed.
On appeal, Godin contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for post-conviction relief. He argues that if he had been aware that his suppression motion was pending before the trial court, he would not have pled guilty but that he either would have demanded a ruling upon the motion or would have elected to enter a conditional plea of guilty. He expressly abandoned the other allegations that he had made against counsel, which were rejected by the trial court.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged analysis to be used in criminal cases, determining whether the performance of a defendant's trial counsel was so deficient as to merit relief from his conviction.
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was indeed deficient. The movant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. He bears the burden of proof and must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1969); McKinney v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1969).
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. When a Fourth Amendment claim is involved in an allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim was meritorious. In order to demonstrate actual prejudice, he must also demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted but for the allegedly tainted evidence Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2583, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). If an evidentiary hearing is conducted, the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court erred by concluding that the movant received adequate assistance. Ivey v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506 (Ky.App. 1983).
The trial court did not err by concluding that there was no deficiency in the performance of Godin's trial counsel. The court was persuaded by Attorney Simpson's testimony that she adequately advised Godin of the consequences of entering a guilty plea -- which included waiving a ruling with respect to the pending motion to suppress. The court specifically rejected Godin's contradictory testimony as being incredible.
Additionally, Godin could not establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test because his suppression motion most likely would not have been successful. As described by Constable Mike Wallace, the scene at Godin's home on the day that he was arrested indicates that exigent circumstances were present to justify the initial intrusion into Godin's home. Godin's wife then consented to a search of the residence. Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Godin's motion for relief.
We affirm the order of the Pulaski Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jared Godin, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky