Langlands v. State, 282 Ga. 103, 105 (2) ( 646 SE2d 253) (2007). See also Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 618 (1) ( 284 SE2d 422) (1981). BERNES, Judge.
A defendant who procures the setting aside of a judgment against him generally "`may be tried anew . . . upon another indictment, for the same offense of which he had been convicted.' [Cit.]" Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 618 (1) ( 284 SE2d 422) (1981) (quoting Ball v. United States, 163 U. S. 662 ( 16 SC 1192, 41 LE 300) (1896)). Ordinarily, where a "defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel but the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to convict, the proper remedy is to reverse defendant's conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.
While the applicable Code sections "extend the proscription of double jeopardy beyond those constitutional limits," by their language, they apply only to criminal proceedings, not to civil proceedings. State v. Martin, 173 Ga. App. 370, 3701 ( 326 S.E.2d 558) (1985); OCGA §§ 16-1-6, 16-1-7, 16-1-8; see Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 619 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Moreover, these sections, too, are triggered only after jeopardy attaches.
Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 638 ( 300 S.E.2d 640) (1983). See, e.g., Burden v. State, 250 Ga. 313, 316 ( 297 S.E.2d 242) (1982), Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 625 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981); Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 368 ( 283 S.E.2d 238) (1981). Because we find that each death sentence is supported by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, we need not and do not reach the issue whether the evidence of McMichen's harassment of Luan throughout the ten or more months preceding her death was sufficient to support a finding of psychological torture under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (7).
The Georgia trial court again sentenced Godfrey to death, and the Georgia Supreme Court again affirmed. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 284 S.E.2d 422 (1981). The U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider Godfrey's case again.
However, this argument has been decided adversely to the defendant by the United States Supreme Court in Poland v. Arizona, supra, as well as by this court in Zant v. Redd, supra. See also Page v. State, 257 Ga. 538 ( 361 S.E.2d 153) (1987); Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 618 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). It is uncontroverted that the jury found an aggravating circumstance and returned a verdict in favor of the death penalty.
However, it was clear that the jury intended to find an aggravating circumstance and to recommend the death penalty. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 618 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981); Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982). Furthermore, the evidence supported that verdict.
As pointed out in Zant v. Redd, supra, 249 Ga. at p. 212, "Redd did not contend that the state could not reseek the death penalty, for Bullington clearly allows for it where a death penalty which is first imposed is set aside on legal grounds. See Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Neither did Redd complain of the submission to the second sentencing jury of the one aggravating circumstance found by the first jury or of the one not submitted to that jury.
Consequently, a new jury has been impaneled in numerous subsequent Georgia cases when the original decision was remanded for a new penalty hearing. See, Godfrey v. State, Ga.Supr., 248 Ga. 616, 284 S.E.2d 422 (1981); Stevens v. State, Ga.Supr., 245 Ga. 583, 266 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1980); Burger v. State, Ga.Supr., 245 Ga. 458, 265 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1980); Sprouse v. State, Ga.Supr., 242 Ga. 831, 252 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1979); Fleming v. State, Ga.Supr., 243 Ga. 120, 252 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1979). A similar conclusion was reached in Messer v. State, Fla.Supr., 330 So.2d 137 (1976), where the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that a new jury should be impaneled even though it would "result in a hearing before a different jury from that which heard the evidence upon which the verdict of guilty was rendered".
On direct appeal, we concluded that the two statutory aggravating circumstances, the murders of the two women, were mutually supporting, vacated the death penalty for the murder of his wife Mildred Godfrey, and affirmed the sentence of death for the murder of Chessie Wilkerson, his mother-in-law. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Godfrey then filed for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.