Godfrey v. State

16 Citing cases

  1. Zant v. Redd

    249 Ga. 211 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 19 times

    Redd did not contend that the state could not reseek the death penalty, for Bullington clearly allows for it where a death penalty which is first imposed is set aside on legal grounds. See, Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Neither did Redd complain of the submission to the second sentencing jury of the one aggravating circumstance found by the first jury or of the one not submitted to that jury.

  2. Patrick v. State

    293 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 3 times

    The appellant's argument is that his double-jeopardy plea should have been sustained under the authority of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 ( 101 S.C. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270) (1981), which was rendered by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to our earlier remand. However, we have recently held in Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982), in accordance with our earlier decision in Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981), that the ruling in Bullington v. Missouri, supra — that the state cannot seek the death penalty on resentencing after the original sentencing jury has imposed a life sentence — does not apply where the jury has imposed the death penalty and the death penalty is vacated on legal grounds as opposed to grounds that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Cf. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 ( 98 S.C. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1) (1978).

  3. Burden v. State

    250 Ga. 313 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 18 times

    6. The imposition of the death penalty for each of the murders of the three children may be supported by the aggravating circumstance that each was committed during the murder of Louise Wynn. Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219 (23) ( 275 S.E.2d 29) (1981); Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 429 ( 238 S.E.2d 12) (1977). But, in these circumstances, the doctrine of "mutually supporting aggravating circumstances" precludes reciprocal use of the murders of the three children as aggravating circumstances to support the imposition of the death penalty for the murder of Louise Wynn. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 368 (12) ( 283 S.E.2d 238) (1981); Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 624-25 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). The death penalty for the murder of Louise Wynn therefore is set aside, and the case remanded for resentencing.

  4. State v. Cullen

    646 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 23 times
    In Cullen, this court rejected a similar argument by a defendant who asserted that a trial does not begin until the jury is sworn.

    See State v. Pina, 440 A.2d 962, 965 66 (Conn. 1981) (holding that where the sentence imposed did not make the statutorily required indication of whether the terms shall run concurrently or consecutively, the sentence may be corrected without imposing double jeopardy); Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 284 S.E.2d 422, 425-26 (1981) (holding that where the Supreme Court had reversed defendant's death penalty sentence on the grounds it was a standardless and unchannelled imposition, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude reimposition of death penalty on remand because the reversal was for trial error, not insufficiency of the evidence); and People v. Maldonado, 82 A.D.2d 576, 442 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N Y App. Div. 1981) (distinguishing Bullington on the grounds it was a capital case in which a trial was held on the issue of punishment, and on the grounds that the present case involved trial error rather than insufficiency of the evidence) See also Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1981) (holding that because Montana's sentencing proceeding does not resemble a trial, Bullington does not preclude an imposition of the death penalty on retrial, even though the judge in the first trial refused to impose that penalty).

  5. Young v. State

    303 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 28 times

    Thus, I am forced to conclude that Young cannot be resentenced to death. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 625 (dissenting opinion by Hill, P. J.) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 919 (1982).

  6. Padgett v. State

    307 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    [Cit.] Since the distinction between questions which ask jurors how they would decide issues of a case if and when such issues are presented and questions which merely inquire whether jurors can start the case without bias or prior inclination is not always crystal clear, the `control of the voir dire examination is vested in the sound legal discretion of the trial judge and will not be interfered with by this court unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion.' Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 12 ( 243 S.E.2d 59) (1978)." See also, Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 621 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Under the circumstances of this case we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion.

  7. Godfrey v. Francis

    251 Ga. 652 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that the appellant did not have "a constitutional right to the presence of counsel during the state’s psychiatric examination" and that " full, separate, second [Miranda] warning was not necessary" because the appellant had been given "a full and proper Miranda warning at the time of his arrest." (citation and punctuation ‘ omitted)

    On direct appeal, we concluded that the two statutory aggravating circumstances, the murders of the two women, were mutually supporting, vacated the death penalty for the murder of his wife Mildred Godfrey, and affirmed the sentence of death for the murder of Chessie Wilkerson, his mother-in-law. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Godfrey then filed for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.

  8. Whalen v. State

    492 A.2d 552 (Del. 1985)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that trial court's instruction implying that the jury had to be unanimous in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment violated defendant's constitutional rights because "this instruction could have been clearer — and should have been"

    Consequently, a new jury has been impaneled in numerous subsequent Georgia cases when the original decision was remanded for a new penalty hearing. See, Godfrey v. State, Ga.Supr., 248 Ga. 616, 284 S.E.2d 422 (1981); Stevens v. State, Ga.Supr., 245 Ga. 583, 266 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1980); Burger v. State, Ga.Supr., 245 Ga. 458, 265 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1980); Sprouse v. State, Ga.Supr., 242 Ga. 831, 252 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1979); Fleming v. State, Ga.Supr., 243 Ga. 120, 252 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1979). A similar conclusion was reached in Messer v. State, Fla.Supr., 330 So.2d 137 (1976), where the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that a new jury should be impaneled even though it would "result in a hearing before a different jury from that which heard the evidence upon which the verdict of guilty was rendered".

  9. Spraggins v. State

    255 Ga. 195 (Ga. 1985)   Cited 11 times

    As pointed out in Zant v. Redd, supra, 249 Ga. at p. 212, "Redd did not contend that the state could not reseek the death penalty, for Bullington clearly allows for it where a death penalty which is first imposed is set aside on legal grounds. See Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Neither did Redd complain of the submission to the second sentencing jury of the one aggravating circumstance found by the first jury or of the one not submitted to that jury.

  10. Page v. State

    361 S.E.2d 153 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    However, it was clear that the jury intended to find an aggravating circumstance and to recommend the death penalty. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 618 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981); Zant v. Redd, 249 Ga. 211 ( 290 S.E.2d 36) (1982). Furthermore, the evidence supported that verdict.