Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 638 ( 300 S.E.2d 640) (1983). See, e.g., Burden v. State, 250 Ga. 313, 316 ( 297 S.E.2d 242) (1982), Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 625 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981); Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 368 ( 283 S.E.2d 238) (1981). Because we find that each death sentence is supported by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, we need not and do not reach the issue whether the evidence of McMichen's harassment of Luan throughout the ten or more months preceding her death was sufficient to support a finding of psychological torture under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (7).

Consequently, a new jury has been impaneled in numerous subsequent Georgia cases when the original decision was remanded for a new penalty hearing. See, Godfrey v. State, Ga.Supr., 248 Ga. 616, 284 S.E.2d 422 (1981); Stevens v. State, Ga.Supr., 245 Ga. 583, 266 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1980); Burger v. State, Ga.Supr., 245 Ga. 458, 265 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1980); Sprouse v. State, Ga.Supr., 242 Ga. 831, 252 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1979); Fleming v. State, Ga.Supr., 243 Ga. 120, 252 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1979). A similar conclusion was reached in Messer v. State, Fla.Supr., 330 So.2d 137 (1976), where the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that a new jury should be impaneled even though it would "result in a hearing before a different jury from that which heard the evidence upon which the verdict of guilty was rendered".

On direct appeal, we concluded that the two statutory aggravating circumstances, the murders of the two women, were mutually supporting, vacated the death penalty for the murder of his wife Mildred Godfrey, and affirmed the sentence of death for the murder of Chessie Wilkerson, his mother-in-law. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Godfrey then filed for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.

Thus, I am forced to conclude that Young cannot be resentenced to death. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 625 (dissenting opinion by Hill, P. J.) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 919 (1982).

See State v. Pina, 440 A.2d 962, 965 66 (Conn. 1981) (holding that where the sentence imposed did not make the statutorily required indication of whether the terms shall run concurrently or consecutively, the sentence may be corrected without imposing double jeopardy); Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 284 S.E.2d 422, 425-26 (1981) (holding that where the Supreme Court had reversed defendant's death penalty sentence on the grounds it was a standardless and unchannelled imposition, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude reimposition of death penalty on remand because the reversal was for trial error, not insufficiency of the evidence); and People v. Maldonado, 82 A.D.2d 576, 442 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N Y App. Div. 1981) (distinguishing Bullington on the grounds it was a capital case in which a trial was held on the issue of punishment, and on the grounds that the present case involved trial error rather than insufficiency of the evidence) See also Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1981) (holding that because Montana's sentencing proceeding does not resemble a trial, Bullington does not preclude an imposition of the death penalty on retrial, even though the judge in the first trial refused to impose that penalty).

Redd did not contend that the state could not reseek the death penalty, for Bullington clearly allows for it where a death penalty which is first imposed is set aside on legal grounds. See, Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Neither did Redd complain of the submission to the second sentencing jury of the one aggravating circumstance found by the first jury or of the one not submitted to that jury.

6. The imposition of the death penalty for each of the murders of the three children may be supported by the aggravating circumstance that each was committed during the murder of Louise Wynn. Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219 (23) ( 275 S.E.2d 29) (1981); Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 429 ( 238 S.E.2d 12) (1977). But, in these circumstances, the doctrine of "mutually supporting aggravating circumstances" precludes reciprocal use of the murders of the three children as aggravating circumstances to support the imposition of the death penalty for the murder of Louise Wynn. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 368 (12) ( 283 S.E.2d 238) (1981); Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 624-25 ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). The death penalty for the murder of Louise Wynn therefore is set aside, and the case remanded for resentencing.

A defendant who procures the setting aside of a judgment against him generally "`may be tried anew . . . upon another indictment, for the same offense of which he had been convicted.' [Cit.]" Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 618 (1) ( 284 SE2d 422) (1981) (quoting Ball v. United States, 163 U. S. 662 ( 16 SC 1192, 41 LE 300) (1896)). Ordinarily, where a "defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel but the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to convict, the proper remedy is to reverse defendant's conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.

The Georgia trial court again sentenced Godfrey to death, and the Georgia Supreme Court again affirmed. Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 284 S.E.2d 422 (1981). The U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider Godfrey's case again.

As pointed out in Zant v. Redd, supra, 249 Ga. at p. 212, "Redd did not contend that the state could not reseek the death penalty, for Bullington clearly allows for it where a death penalty which is first imposed is set aside on legal grounds. See Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 422) (1981). Neither did Redd complain of the submission to the second sentencing jury of the one aggravating circumstance found by the first jury or of the one not submitted to that jury.