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rejecting petitioner's argument that the limitations period should not bar his habeas corpus petition because he was unaware of the applicability and operation of the limitations period
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Case Number: 00-74589
May 9, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
Petitioner Francis N. Godek, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Parnall Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On April 18, 2001, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Petitioner filed a response to the motion for summary judgment on May 1, 2001. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment.
II. Procedural History
Following a bench trial in Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit, Michigan, Petitioner was convicted, on September 2, 1992, of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of four to fifteen years imprisonment.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied on July 28, 1995. Petitioner did not file an application for leave to appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision to the Michigan Supreme Court.
On February 6, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion on October 21, 1997. People v. Godek, No. 92-001435 (Wayne County Circuit Court Oct. 21; 1997). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals. By Order dated May 10, 1999, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Godek, No. 215011 (Mich.Ct.App. May 10, 1999). Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied on December 28, 1999. People v. Godek, 461 Mich. 943 (1999).
On October 23, 2000, Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on April 18, 2001. Petitioner filed a response to the motion for summary judgment on May 1, 2001.
III. Analysis
Respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is barred from review because it is untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA" or "the Act") applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief was filed after April 24, 1996. Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the limitations period for filing an application for habeas corpus relief, apply to Petitioner's application. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 337 (1997).
Among other amendments, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a one-year limitations period within which habeas petitions challenging state court judgments must be filed. In most cases, a prisoner is required to file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of completing direct review of the habeas claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Where a prisoner's conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the prisoner is permitted one year from the AEDPA's effective date to file a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court. Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1999).
In the pending case, Petitioner's conviction became final before the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Therefore, absent state collateral review, Petitioner would have been required to file his application for habeas corpus by April 24, 1997 to comply with the one-year limitations period. However, the time during which a prisoner seeks collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitations period. Section 2244(d)(2) provides:
The time during which a properly filed application for postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner's one-year limitations period commenced to run on April 24, 1996, when the AEDPA became effective. The one-year limitations period continued to run until February 6, 1997, when Petitioner filed his motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The filing of the motion for relief from judgment, a properly filed application for state collateral review, tolled the limitations period with seventy-six days remaining. Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment was denied by the trial court on October 21, 1997. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals. On May 10, 1999, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Godek, (Mich.Ct.App. May 10, 1999), Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied on December 28, 1999. People v. Godek, 461 Mich. 943 (Mich. Dec. 28, 1999).
The one-year limitations period, of which only seventy-six days remained, resumed running on December 28, 1999, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal and Petitioner, therefore, had no properly filed application for collateral review pending in state court. Thus, to be timely, Petitioner had to file his petition by March 14, 2000. Petitioner, however, did not file his petition until October 23, 2000, over seven months beyond the one-year limitations period.
Petitioner argues that his petition is timely because he filed it within one year from the date the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. However, the limitations period did not begin to run anew when the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The time during which a petitioner has a properly filed application for collateral review pending in state court is excluded from the one-year limitations period, but the limitations period is not reset upon the conclusion of state collateral review. Neal v. Bock, ___ F. Supp.2d ___ 2001 WL 314525, *4 (E.D. Mich. March 28, 2001). See also Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000), ("[T]he proper calculation of Section 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision excludes time during which properly filed state relief applications are pending but does not reset the date from which the one-year statute of limitations begins to run."), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 104 (2000). Accordingly, the petition was untimely.
Petitioner also argues that his petition should not be barred by the statute of limitations because he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period based upon his ignorance of the one-year limitation period. Petitioner claims that he was unaware of the limitations period until April 1997, because the prison library did not receive a copy of the AEDPA revising 28 U.S.C. § 2244 until that time. However, even assuming that Petitioner did not receive notice of the new limitations period until April 1997, that does not entitle him to equitable tolling. An essential component of the doctrine of equitable tolling is a petitioner's diligent pursuit of federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Morgan v. Money, 2000 WL 178421 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000) (holding that a petitioner must show that he exercised due diligence in pursuing § 2254 relief to support equitable tolling). See also Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that petitioner "did not meet the high threshold for obtaining [equitable tolling] because he did not act diligently to pursue his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in either state or federal court"); Craddock, 2000 WL at *2 ("The doctrine of equitable tolling is not applicable in this case because [petitioner] did not diligently pursue federal habeas relief"); Jones v. Gundy, 2000 WL 745411 (W.D. Mich. June 8, 2000) (rejecting a petitioner's argument for equitable tolling where petitioner did not diligently pursue his rights and failed to provide any explanation to excuse such failure).
In Petitioner's case, the one-year limitations period, of which seventy-six days remained, resumed running on December 28, 1999, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Petitioner waited over seven additional months before filing his habeas corpus petition. He does not claim that during that seven-month period he was prevented in any way from filing a habeas petition. Thus, even assuming he did not receive notice of the limitations period until April 1997, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he failed to diligently pursue federal habeas corpus relief.
Finally, Petitioner argues that the limitations period should not bar his habeas corpus petition because he was unaware of the applicability and operation of the limitations period. "Ignorance of the law does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling."Neloms v. McLemore, 2000 WL 654942, *2 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2000), citing Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Washington v. Elo, 2000 WL 356353, *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 29, 2000) (holding that "neither excusable neglect nor ignorance of the law alone are sufficient to invoke equitable tolling"); Moore v. Hawley, 7 F. Supp.2d 901, 904 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same); Sperling v. White, 30 F. Supp.2d 1246, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing cases establishing that ignorance of the law, illiteracy, and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). Therefore, Petitioner's ignorance of the law is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, Petitioner's application is barred by the one-year limitations period.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the habeas corpus petition was filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Further, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which would warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).