Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:96cv143-D-A
August 13, 1997
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the court is the motion of the defendant for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf. Finding that the motion is well taken, the court shall grant the motion and dismiss the plaintiff's claims in this cause.
Factual Background
The defendant, Sodexho Food Services, Inc. ("Sodexho"), operates the food service portions of the Northeast Mississippi Community College ("NEMCC") located in Booneville, Mississippi. These operations primarily consist of the main cafeteria and the "Tiger Den," a restaurant which functions as more of a short-order establishment. In March of 1994, the defendant hired the plaintiff, Joan Goddard, as supervisor of the Tiger Den to control its daily operation.
The plaintiff and her husband owned the Tiger Den prior to its purchase by NEMCC and operated the establishment under the name, "The Wagon Wheel."
In 1995, John M. Herbert III replaced Claude Wright as manager of both food service operations at NEMCC. Shortly after assuming the mantle of this management position, Herbert terminated Goddard's employment. This action followed, wherein the plaintiff charges that the defendant terminated her in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623, et seq., At the time relevant to the activities in this lawsuit, the plaintiff was sixty-four (64) years old. The defendant has moved this court for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf, and the parties have briefed the issued before the court.
Discussion
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden rests upon the party seeking summary judgment to show to the district court that an absence of evidence exists in the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996); Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). Once such a showing is presented by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, by specific facts, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n. Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1996); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantive law will determine what is considered material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099; Gibson v. Rich. 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, "[w]here the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099. Finally, all facts are considered in favor of the non-moving party, including all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254;Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994); Matagorda County v. Russell Law. 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994);Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996); Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines. Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1996). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little. 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted); see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 111 L.Ed. 695, 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990).
Age Discrimination
As a claim arising under the ADEA, the plaintiffs charge of discrimination is subject to the McDonnell Douglas shifting burden of production. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indust., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993); but see O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1308, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) ("We have never had occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it."). Therefore, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish her prima facie case.
At the summary judgment stage, however, plaintiff need not present a prima facie case of discrimination, but must simply raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a prima facie case. Thornborough v. Columbus Greenville R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 641 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1985). In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in the typical termination case, the plaintiff must prove that:
(1) she was discharged;
(2) she was qualified for the position;
(3) she was within the protected class at the time of discharge; and
(4) she was (a) replaced by someone outside the class;
(b) replaced by someone younger; or
(c) otherwise discharged because of her age.O'Connor. 116 S.Ct. at 1310; Bodenheimer. 5 F.3d at 957; Rifakes v. Citizens Utilities Co., ___ F. Supp. ___ (N.D. Tex. 1997) (1997 WL 222907, *2). Once the plaintiff puts forth proof on each element of a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge. See, e.g., Grimes v. Texas Dept. Of Mental Health. 102 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Time Warner Operation. Inc., 98 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1996); Polanco. v. City of Austin, Tex., 78 F.3d 968, 975 (5th Cir. 1996). The defendant's burden is merely one of production, and it need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason. St. Mary's. 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2748; Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft. 55 F.3d 1086, 1091 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1995); Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. If believed, this reason offers sufficient grounds to terminate the plaintiff.
Once the employer articulates its nondiscriminatory motive, the plaintiff must prove that the articulated legitimate reason was a mere pretext for a discriminatory decision and that discrimination was a motivating factor behind the employer's decision. The prima facie case drops out of the analysis, and the burden of persuasion to establish the statutory violation ultimately rests with the plaintiff, "who must establish the statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence."
Even if the plaintiff succeeds in revealing that the defendant's reasons for terminating her were false, she still bears the ultimate responsibility of proving the real reason was "intentional discrimination." Saint Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ("It is not enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination."). This is not to say that the employee is required to prove that the reason is in fact false, but only that the proffered reason was nog factor in that decision. Again, a plaintiff is not required to prove that discrimination based upon age was the sole reason for the termination, because the employer may be held liable under Title VII even if legitimate reasons also played a role in the plaintiff's termination.
[S]ince we know that the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of," we also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1785, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). Determining that a particular reason did not actually serve as the sole basis for termination is an entirely different inquiry than determinating whether the proffered reason is in fact true or false. For example, whether a person is incompetent is a different question from whether an employer fired that person for being incompetent. It is important to remember the distinction.
Nevertheless, the fact that a plaintiff may establish genuine issues of material fact as to her prima facie case does not necessarily mean that she may avoid summary judgment on her discrimination claims. LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools. 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996). Rather, to avoid the grant of a properly made motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must ultimately present evidence sufficient to make a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent. LaPierre. 86 F.3d at 450.
[A] jury issue will be presented and a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment . . . if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [age] was a determinative factor in the actions of which the plaintiff complains.Id. (citing Rhodes. 75 F.3d at 994). According to the United States Supreme Court, such evidence of pretext may permit a trier of fact to infer that the discrimination was intentional:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required. . . ."St. Mary's. 509 U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Such a rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, coupled with the elements of the prima facie case, will not always support the submission of the claim to a jury, however. LaPierre. 86 F.3d at 450;Rhodes. 75 F.3d at 994. The Fifth Circuit has made clear that a plaintiff does not automatically create a jury issue by "proving the elements of a prima facie case and presenting a fact issue as to the truth of the defendant's proffered rationale." LaPierre. 86 F.3d at 449; Rhodes. 75 F.3d at 993. Instead, the traditional "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" standard governs, and "there must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question." LaPierre, 86 F.3d at 449 (citing Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc)).
After review of all of the submissions of the parties in this case, the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence which, taken as a whole, creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in her termination. Aside from the fact that she was apparently replaced by someone outside of the protected class, there is little before the court that would justify a finding by a reasonable juror that age was a substantial factor in the decision to terminate her. Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the court finds that demonstration of the prima facie case, coupled with evidence of the falsity of the proffered reasons for the plaintiff's termination, are insufficient to create a jury question on the issue of age discrimination.
In her brief, Ms. Goddard argues to the court that there is proof before the court that other employees outside of the protected class were disciplined less severely for similar conduct, i.e., after conflicts with fellow employees. She contends that this fact stands as proof of age discrimination. Upon review of the evidence in this regard, however, the court finds that there is insufficient proof that these other employees were "similarly situated" in a management position such as Goddard's. Swanson v. General Services Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1186 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1997); Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086. 1090 (5th Cir. 1995). Additionally, the plaintiff herself alludes to another potential motivation for her firing which is unrelated to age discrimination — an alleged affair between Herbert and Goddard's replacement. While there is no real proof of any such relationship before the court, the evidence presented to the court regarding the treatment of the plaintiff is as consistent with a finding that the defendant was motivated by favoritism based upon reasons other than illegal age discrimination as it is with a finding of age discrimination. As such, the proof before the court is merely that of discrimination, and not of illegal discrimination based upon age.
The court does find that there is sufficient evidence before the court for a trier of fact to determine that the proffered reasons for Ms. Goddard's termination do not ring true. As already discussed, however, this is not automatically sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of discrimination. As the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence to meet the dictates of Rhodes' second requirement, the defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted. The plaintiff has simply failed to present to this court sufficient evidence to permit a trier of fact to determine that her age was a significant factor in her termination by the defendant.
The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the defendant in this case for the plaintiff's termination are that 1) the plaintiff failed to keep the Tiger Den in a sanitary condition, and that 2) Herbert disagreed with the plaintiff's managerial style. The plaintiff has proffered evidence to the court which, if believed, would refute both of these reasons as the true motivation behind her termination.
Conclusion
Upon consideration of the motion of the defendant for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of age discrimination, the court finds the motion well taken and shall grant the motion. The plaintiff has failed to present to this court sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to determine that her age was a substantial factor in her termination. There is no genuine issue of material fact in this matter, and the defendant is entitled to the entry of a judgment as a matter of law.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to a memorandum opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED THAT:) the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED;
) the plaintiff's claims in this cause are hereby DISMISSED;
) this case is CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.