Opinion
No. CV-095013548
May 12, 2010
MEMORANDUM DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE# 113
FACTS
On October 22, 2009, the plaintiff, David Godbout, filed this wrongful discharge action against the defendant, Watson Foods Co., Inc. On February 16, 2010, the defendant filed an answer, eight special defenses and a prayer for relief. On February 25, 2010, the plaintiff filed this motion to strike and a memorandum in support. In response, on March 10, 2010, the defendant filed an objection to the motion and a memorandum in opposition. On March 17, 2010, the plaintiff filed a reply memorandum.
The plaintiff alleges the following facts in his amended complaint. The defendant's business involves mainly the manufacture of food products destined for human consumption or use, and are sold to end use consumers and other parties such as companies and distributors with the general public being the ultimate consumer. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant from September 9, 2008, until September 18, 2009. During that time, the plaintiff was responsible for, among other things, the product information sheets (sheets) for the defendant's food products. The sheets contained several sections, including a description section, an ingredients section and a product specification section. The plaintiff was also responsible for performing "formulation work on [the defendant's] new and existing products" and insuring that the formulas produced were correct. "The food products produced by the [d]efendant . . . are subject to regulatory requirements, notably the United States Food and Drug Administration . . . and Connecticut's Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act . . ."
On November 20, 2009, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint as a matter of right, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-59. Thus, the amended complaint is the operative complaint.
The plaintiff produced a sheet for a customer of the defendant that was assessed by a quality control technician at the defendant's company. The technician presented an incorrect formula for the same product, which differed from the plaintiff's formula. The technician's version of the formula eliminated ingredients that should have been disclosed. On or about September 17, 2009, the plaintiff issued a new sheet template for his department that came with instructions that the purpose of the template was to ensure that the sheets did not exclude any ingredients that were required to be included by law. The plaintiff was terminated following the discrepancy between the sheets and the plaintiff's issuance of the new template.
The defendant, as a producer of food products, is required by federal and Connecticut law to fully disclose all raw materials used in their food consumables. Several compounds were routinely not listed on the defendant's ingredient statements, which the defendant referred to as "trade secrets." The defendant never informed the plaintiff regarding its "trade secret" policies, but the plaintiff was informed that he was ultimately terminated for disclosing "trade secrets." The plaintiff was discharged due to his activities with respect to insuring compliance with the United States Food and Drug Administration as well as Connecticut food laws.
SPECIAL DEFENSES AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The defendant asserts eight special defenses. The plaintiff moves to strike all eight of the defendant's special defenses, as well as the defendant's request for relief and the "first phrase or paragraph of the [s]pecial [d]efenses. . . " The defendant objects to the plaintiff's motion with respect to the third, forth, seventh and eighth special defenses, as well as the request for an award of costs. The defendant has not objected to, or addressed, the motion to strike with respect to the opening phrase or the first, second, fifth and sixth special defenses.
The defendant includes the following language prior to asserting its special defenses: "Without assuming the burden of proof of such defenses that it would not otherwise have, [d]efendant affirmatively asserts the following defenses . . ."
The third special defense alleges that the complaint should be dismissed because all actions taken by the defendant with respect to the plaintiff were undertaken in good faith and for legitimate business reasons. The fourth special defense alleges a claim for mitigation of damages. The seventh special defense alleges that "[t]he [c]omplaint fails to state facts sufficient to sustain a claim for, or recovery of, punitive damages." The eighth special defense alleges that "[a]n award of punitive damages would be contrary to [d]efendant's good faith efforts to comply with the law." The defendant's prayer for relief requests a judgment in its favor, costs, disbursements and attorneys fees.
LAW OF MOTION TO STRIKE
"Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39(a). "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
DISCUSSION I. Special Defenses
"Generally speaking, facts must be pleaded as a special defense when they are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action . . . The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway . . . Whether facts must be specially pleaded [however] depends on the nature of those facts in relation to the contested issues." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Almada v. Wausau Business Insurance Co., 274 Conn. 449, 456, 876 A.2d 535 (2005). "[T]he list of special defenses in [Practice Book] § 10-50 is illustrative rather than exhaustive . . . Practice Book [§ 10-50] lists some of the defenses which must be specially pleaded and proved." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kosinski v. Carr, 112 Conn.App. 203, 209 n. 6, 962 A.2d 836 (2009).
In Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 853 A.2d 460 (2004), the Connecticut Supreme Court highlighted the difference between a general denial and a special defense by discussing the admissibility of evidence under the two types of pleadings. "We previously have recognized the difficulties that inhere in distinguishing between evidence that may be presented following a general denial and evidence that, because it is consistent with the allegations of a complaint but nevertheless tends to extinguish a cause of action, must have been specially pleaded as a defense in order to be admissible . . . [D]enial of a material fact places in dispute the existence of that fact. Even under a denial, a party generally may introduce affirmative evidence tending to establish a set of facts inconsistent with the existence of the disputed fact . . . If, however, a party seeks the admission of evidence which is consistent with a prima facie case, but nevertheless would tend to destroy the cause of action, the `new matter' must be affirmatively pleaded as a special defense." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 502.
"This concept is explained well by the following illustration: D is liable to P if a, b, and c are true unless d is also true. If d contradicts a, b, or c, then evidence of d may be admitted under a denial. If, however, the existence of d does not negate the existence of a, b, or c, but independently destroys liability, then evidence of d may be admitted only under a special defense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 502 n. 19.
A
The defendant's third special defense provides: "Plaintiff's [c]omplaint should be dismissed because all actions taken by [d]efendant with respect to [p]laintiff were undertaken in good faith and for legitimate business reasons." The plaintiff moves to strike the third special defense on several grounds, including the ground that the defendant's allegations conflict with the facts pleaded by the plaintiff in his complaint. In response, the defendant argues that "[i]n this case, in asserting its [t]hird, [s]eventh and [e]ighth [s]pecial [d]efenses, [d]efendant intended to put the [c]ourt and [p]laintiff on notice that it would be challenging [p]laintiff's entitlement to punitive damages."
The defendant's argument is misplaced with respect to the third special defense. The third special defense is limited to the assertion that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because the defendant acted with good faith and for legitimate business reasons. In fact, the special defense does not even include the words "punitive damages." This language does not apprise the court and the plaintiff that the plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages is a challenged issue.
The remaining issue is whether the defendant's claim that it acted in good faith is appropriate as a special defense. "In common usage, the term good faith has a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or obligation . . . It has been well defined as meaning [a]n honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious . . . It is a subjective standard of honesty of fact in the conduct or transaction concerned, taking into account the person's state of mind, actual knowledge and motives." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 412-13, 948 A.2d 1009 (2008).
Based on the foregoing definition, the defendant's good faith claim is not consistent with the allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint. The allegations in the special defense contradict the plaintiff's express and implied allegations that the defendant terminated the plaintiff for the plaintiff's efforts to comply with state and federal law. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 51-57. Allowing the third special defense to stand would shift the burden to the defendant to prove that it acted in good faith; see, e.g., Verspyck v. Franco, 274 Conn. 105, 112, 874 A.2d 249 (2005); which would essentially relieve the plaintiff of his burden to show bad motive with respect to his wrongful termination claim. The court doubts that this is the result that the defendant intended when pleading the third special defense.
The facts pleaded by the defendant in the third special defense contradict the facts pleaded by the plaintiff in his amended complaint. Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted with respect to the third special defense.
B
The defendant's fourth special defense provides: "To the extent that the [p]laintiff failed to mitigate, minimize or avoid any damages allegedly sustained, any recovery against [d]efendant must be reduced accordingly." The plaintiff moves to strike this special defense on the grounds that the allegations in the special defense are too vague to apprise the plaintiff of the factual basis for the defense, and that the allegations are conclusory and therefore not acceptable as a special defense. In response, the defendant argues that the fourth special defense puts the plaintiff and the court on notice that mitigation of damages will be an issue at trial. Further, the defendant argues that judges of the Superior Court have approved the use of a special defense to plead mitigation of damages.
This court previously considered the issue of whether failure to mitigate damages is an appropriate special defense in Wegryn v. Smith Nephew, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5013243 (March 5, 2008, Cosgrove, J.) ( 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 119). "A special defense apprise[s] the court and opposing counsel of the issue to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until trial is underway . . . Raising the issue of mitigation of damages as a special defense also clarifies the general denial by informing the plaintiff that the defendant seeks to be benefited by a particular matter of fact, and he should, therefore, prove the matter alleged by him . . . [which] requires him to prove an affirmative fact. Allowing the defendant to plead this special defense places the burden of proof on the defendant to produce affirmative evidence supporting a failure to mitigate defense. The shift in burden of proof and persuasion from the plaintiff to the defendant for failure to mitigate is consistent with the shift in burden for those special defenses listed in the Practice Book.
"The Supreme Court of Connecticut implicitly found failure to mitigate to be a valid special defense in Preston v. Keith [ 217 Conn. 12, 20 n. 9, 584 A.2d 439 (1991)] when the Court distinguished that case from a prior case stating, `[b]ecause the defendant in the present case has not pleaded mitigation of damages as a special defense, Wassell does not control.' . [In Mauro v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 31 Conn.App. 584, 593-94, 627 A.2d 443 (1993), the] Connecticut Appellate Court also implied that failure to mitigate damages is a valid affirmative defense when that court held that the defendant was entitled to a jury charge of mitigation of damages because he asserted it as a special defense and produced some evidence to support the claim . . ."Based on the fundamental purpose of a special defense to apprise the plaintiff of the issues to be tried, and that a defense of failure to mitigate places the burden of proof on the defendant, this court is persuaded that the special defense of `mitigation of damages' is a proper special defense." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wegryn v. Smith Nephew, Inc., supra, 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 120-21. In the present case, the fourth special defense sufficiently apprises the plaintiff and the court that mitigation of damages is at issue. Whether the defendant can produce sufficient evidence to support that defense is ultimately an issue for a fact finder. Based on the foregoing, the motion to strike is denied with respect to the fourth special defense.
C
The defendant's seventh special defense provides: "The [c]omplaint fails to state facts sufficient to sustain a claim for, or recovery of, punitive damages." The defendant's eighth special defense provides: "An award of punitive damages would be contrary to [d]efendant's good faith efforts to comply with the law." The plaintiff moves to strike both of these special defenses on the multiple grounds, including the grounds that the allegations are not proper as a special defense and that the defendant has the burden of alleging a recognizable special defense. In response, the defendant reiterates its argument that the special defenses were intended to put the court and the plaintiff on notice that the plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages is a disputed issue.
The self-represented plaintiff has moved to strike the seventh and eighth special defenses on numerous grounds and provided authority for each of these grounds. The court will construe these grounds broadly, noting that "[w]here a layman appears pro se, the court follows a liberal policy and carefully considers a pro se party's claims as far as they are fairly presented upon the record to ensure that no injustice has been done to him under the law." Anghel v. Saint Francis Hospital, 118 Conn. App. 139, 139 n. 1, 982 A.2d 649 (2009), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 932, 986 A.2d 1055 (2010).
The defendant cites Crown Linen Service, Inc. v. Seacrest Retirement, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5010158 (February 26, 2009, Bentivegna, J.), in support of its argument that "[c]ourts differ in how strictly they apply the general rule that a special defense should be limited to facts, consistent with the [c]omplaint, which show that the plaintiff has no cause of action." In Crown Linen Service, Inc., the plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Id. In response, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses, alleging, among other things, that the liquidated damages clause of the underlying contract violated public policy. Id. The plaintiff moved to strike the special defense, but the court, Bentivegna, J., denied the motion, finding that "the second special defense properly apprises the court and opposing counsel that the validity of the liquidated damages clause will be an issue at trial." Id. This is distinguishable from the present case, however, where the defendant's special defense challenges the plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages.
Even if the court were to agree that the allegations in the seventh and eighth special defenses are sufficient to raise the issue of the plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages, the special defenses fail because they do not allege "that the plaintiff has no cause of action . . ." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 10-50. "A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief." Gallo v. G. Fox Co., 148 Conn. 327, 330, 170 A.2d 724 (1961). In contrast, punitive damages are a type of relief that are awarded on the basis of a particular group of facts, specifically, "for outrageous conduct, that is, for acts done with a bad motive or with a reckless indifference to the interests of others." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209, 245, 919 A.2d 421 (2007).
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges a cause of action for wrongful discharge and requests punitive damages in his prayer for relief. Unlike the situation in Crown Linen Service, Inc. v. Seacrest Retirement, LLC, supra, Docket No. CV 07 5010158, where the special defense challenged the validity of a clause in the underlying contract, the special defense in this case challenges the plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages, not the cause of action that would give rise to the plaintiff's entitlement. Accordingly, the special defenses are improper. The motion to strike is granted with respect to the seventh and eighth special defenses.
II CT Page 13011
At the conclusion of the defendant's special defenses, the defendant requests that the court "[e]nter judgment in its favor on all claims alleged in the [c]omplaint; award the [d]efendant the costs, disbursements and reasonable attorneys fees associated with this proceeding; and grant [d]efendant such other and further relief as the [c]ourt may deem just and proper." The plaintiff moves to strike the defendant's request for costs, disbursements and attorneys fees on several grounds, including the ground it is improper to set forth a prayer for relief following special defenses. In response, the defendant argues that the motion to strike should be denied with respect to its claim for costs because costs could be legally awarded to the defendant.
"[T]he prayer for relief attached to and based upon . . . affirmative defenses is procedurally improper . . . A prayer for damages is only appropriate as part of a counterclaim." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kimball v. Timothy J. King Builder, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 066390 (March 13, 2002, Foley, J.) ( 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 576, 577). See also Betts v. Bank of America, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 4025739 (March 14, 2007, Rittenband, J.T.R.); Langer v. Hoffman Fuel Co. of Stamford, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 97 0157960 (March 4, 1998, Karazin, J.) ( 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 477, 478-79). In the present case, the defendant's answer included eight special defenses and a prayer for relief, but not a counterclaim. Thus, the defendant's prayer for relief is procedurally improper. The motion to strike is granted with respect to the prayer for relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the motion to strike is granted with respect to the third special defense, the seventh special defense, the eighth special defense and the defendant's prayer for relief. The motion to strike is denied with respect to the fourth special defense.
Absent objection, the motion to strike is granted with respect to the phrase "[w]ithout assuming the burden of proof of such defenses that it would not otherwise have, [d]efendant affirmatively asserts the following defenses . . ." and the first, second, fifth and sixth special defenses.