Opinion
03-29-1889
GOBERT et al. v. ECKHARD et al.
John W. Wartman, for complainants. Thomas P. Curly, for defendants.
Bill for injunction and receiver.
John W. Wartman, for complainants. Thomas P. Curly, for defendants.
BIRD, v. C. The complainants and defendants entered into an agreement by which they mutually agreed to enter into an association to be called the "Philadelphia Pleasure Club," intending under such name to establish a resort for pleasure at shooting, boating, fishing, and the like. They established by-laws for the government of themselves. One of said laws provided that each member should pay 50 cents each week until they had built a house. The second article provided that any member in arrears two months without cause should be expelled, and should forfeit all rights and privileges of the club; and this article also provided that any member failing to pay his share of the taxes, ground-rent, and insurance, for 30 days, should also be expelled. They leased a parcel of land in this state, and built a suitable house thereon, and furnished it; the house and furniture costing about. $600, which included a boat. The complainants say that they have been expelled from the use and enjoyment of the said club-house, and that without any reason or authority, and allege that the feeling between the complainants and the defendants has become so unfriendly that it is impossible to continue the club for the purpose for which it was intended, and that there can be no reasonable adjustment of the difficulties. The bill asks for a discovery of all of the assets of the club, for an injunction restraining the sale, or any other disposition of any of the assets of the club, and that any creditors may be paid what is justly due to them, and that a receiver may be appointed. The defendants deny that they have illegally and without authority of law expelled the complainants from the said club. This, it may be observed by the critical, is rather a denial of a conclusion than of a fact, which is very true, indeed; but it is a denial which follows the language of the bill as nearly as may be. If the denial be not a denial of fact, it may be said that the complainants have not presented any other facts to be denied. The defendants, in their answer, insist that the complainants were lawfully expelled, and that they are, by virtue of the said by-laws, the lawful custodians of the said club-house, boat, and furniture. Thus the inquiry is raised what was the true nature and character of the said club? Was it a mere partnership, as the complainants contend, subject to dissolution at the will of any of the members when irreconcilable differences arose, or was it of a more enduring character, and did it possess power of a nature sufficient, in the law, to permit a majority to expel the minority, when the action of the said minority should come within the scope of the by-laws? Since it is the agreement of the parties to do and to submit to these things, however harsh or disagreeable, it is very plain that the case is not fully ripe for discussion upon the return of the order to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed and an injunction issue. Therefore, without looking into the merits at all, I will only take steps to preserve the property until the final hearing, which seems to be proper, since the defendants reside out of the state; and to this end I will advise the continuance of the injunction restraining the defendants from selling, incumbering, or in any other manner disposing of the said property.