Opinion
No. 04-14-00497-CV
02-03-2016
David C. GOAD, Appellant v. The COUNTY OF GUADALUPE, Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. 12-1923-CV
The Honorable William Old, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice DISMISSED AS MOOT
Appellant David Goad appeals the trial court's June 2, 2014 judgment in favor of Guadalupe County for delinquent property taxes for the tax years 2008 through 2011, and 2013. We dismiss the cause as moot due to voluntary satisfaction of the judgment.
In his brief, Goad raises several due process issues and asserts the Chief Appraiser of Guadalupe County committed fraud on the court in obtaining the judgment. In lieu of filing a brief, appellee Guadalupe County filed a letter with the court stating that, "[d]uring the pendency of this appeal, all amounts owed under the judgment have been paid" and "[t]here is no claim for a refund of the taxes paid." Appellee asserts the cause is moot due to Goad's voluntary payment of the judgment against him. We agree. Generally, when a judgment debtor voluntarily pays and satisfies a judgment against him, he waives his right to appeal and the cause must be dismissed as moot. Marshall v. Housing Authority of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006) (citing Highland Church of Christ v. Powell, 640 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1982)); see also Employees Finance Co. v. Lathram, 369 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1963). The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent a party who has freely decided to pay a judgment from changing his mind and seeking the court's aid in recovering the payment." Highland Church, 640 S.W.2d at 236. "Voluntary payment ends the controversy, and appellate courts will not decide moot cases involving abstractions." Id.
There is nothing in the record or briefing before us to indicate that Goad did not voluntarily make the payment in satisfaction of the judgment. See Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop. Owners, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 370, 370-71 (Tex. 1993); see also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Huizar, 740 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. 1987) (mere fact that judgment is paid "under protest" does not prevent the case from becoming moot upon payment). Further, appellate relief after payment of the delinquent taxes would be futile in this case. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Tex. 2002) (payment on a judgment does not moot an appeal if judgment debtor clearly expresses intent to exercise right of appeal and appellate relief is not futile); see also F.D.I.C. v. Spring Branch Ind. Sch. Dist., No. B14-91-00899-CV, 1992 WL 117402, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (not designated for publication) (holding that voluntary payment of taxes, penalties, and interest owed by judgment debtor satisfied all relief requested in the trial court, thereby disposing of the controversy and rendering the appeal and the cause moot).
Accordingly, because the controversy between the parties no longer exists due to voluntary satisfaction of the judgment, we not only dismiss the appeal as moot but also dismiss the cause as moot. See Gen. Land Office of the State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990) (citing City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 604-605 (Tex. 1985)).
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice