Glynn v. Gloucester

59 Citing cases

  1. White Construction Co. v. City of Gloucester

    441 N.E.2d 1044 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 2 times
    In White Constr. Co. v. Gloucester, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1004, 1006 (1984), recovery was allowed to the contractor where there was a tenable master's finding that "White had complied with all the applicable claims procedures of the contract necessary to preserve the contract price adjustment dispute for arbitration."

    The city has failed to comply with the procedural steps necessary to secure judicial review of the evidentiary basis for the master's findings. See Miller v. Winshall, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 312, 315-317 (1980); Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 458 n. 6 (1980). There is nothing in the cases cited by the city ( Minot v. Minot, 319 Mass. 253, 257-259 [1946]; Gil-Bern Constr. Corp. v. Medford, 357 Mass. 620, 623 [1970]; Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 456-459) to support its contention that the trial judge should have acted sua sponte to assure the city a fair and adequate basis for appellate review of its claims notwithstanding its failure to adhere to the requirements of Mass.R.Civ.P. 53(e), as amended, 367 Mass. 917 (1975), and Rule 49(7) of the Superior Court, as amended (1976).

  2. Sutton Corporation v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm

    38 Mass. App. Ct. 764 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 6 times

    At the same time, "[o]n a public construction contract . . . if the contractor encounters materially different conditions from those predicted by the plans, specifications, preliminary borings and estimates, the contractor must follow the procedures spelled out in the contract . . . to adjust the price before unilaterally accruing expenses to be pursued later on breach of contract or quantum meruit theories." Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 460 (1980). D. Federico Co. v. Commonwealth, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 252.

  3. Glynn v. Gloucester

    21 Mass. App. Ct. 390 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 10 times

    CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court on July 23, 1976. Following the decision of this court in 9 Mass. App. Ct. 454 (1980), the case was heard by Joseph S. Mitchell, Jr., J., on a master's report. Charles P. Burgess for the plaintiff.

  4. Lawrence-Lynch Corp. v. Dep't, Envtl. Manage

    17 Mass. App. Ct. 954 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    We affirm. If a contractor performs extra work or incurs added expense on a public construction contract it must follow the procedures outlined in the contract before unilaterally accruing costs and expenses, or show that the public agency has waived or excused compliance with the terms of the contract. Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 460-461 (1980). In addition, if the claim arises from the contractor's wilful and substantial deviation from the plans and specifications, the contractor must show that there was compliance with G.L.c. 30, § 39I. Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 461.

  5. EARTH TECH v. PERINI/KIEWIT/CASHMAN, No

    No. 030566BLS (Mass. Cmmw. Sep. 23, 2004)

    On a public construction contract, . . . if the contractor encounters materially different conditions from those predicted in the plans, specification, preliminary borings and estimates, the contractor must follow the procedures spelled out in the contract . . . to adjust the price before unilaterally accruing expenses to be pursued later on breach of contract or quantum meruit theories . . . Generally, a failure by the contractor to invoke its remedies under the agreement . . . will preclude all relief . . . unless the contractor can demonstrate that the particular claim falls outside the contract, and because the agency's conduct constitutes a true breach. Glynn v. City of Gloucester, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 454, 460-61 (1980). "A contractor who fails to adhere to the strict claims provision of a public works contract forfeits all rights of recovery of damages or extra compensation unless the agency waives compliance therewith or the contractor is excused from compliance."

  6. JRJ Constr. v. R.W. Granger Sons, No

    No. 972194 (Mass. Cmmw. Jul. 29, 1999)   Cited 1 times
    Finding that architect had engaged in trade or commerce when it allegedly made had faith decision when resolving disputes over the scope of a subcontractor's obligations under building contract

    "On a public construction contract, if actions or requirements of the public agency necessitate changes in the work as it progresses, thereby causing the contractor to perform extra work or incur added expense, . . . the contractor must follow the procedures spelled out in the contract . . . to adjust the price before unilaterally accruing expenses to be pursued later on breach of contract or quantum meruit theories." Glynn v. Gloucester, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 394-95 (1986) (quoting Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 460 (1980)), rev. denied, 396 Mass. 1107 [1986). Pursuant to the subcontract between JRJ and Granger, JRJ assumed "all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor [Granger] . . . assume[d] to the Town . . ." (Subcontract, par.

  7. U.S. ex rel. Metric Elec., Inc. v. CCB, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-11934-RGS (D. Mass. Aug. 25, 2016)

    Putting aside the fact that CCB had the right (and responsibility) under the Subcontract to insure that workers were being paid in a timely fashion, a party asserting waiver bears the burden of proof. Sheehan v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 283 Mass. 543, 550 (1933); Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 462 (1980). When a waiver is not explicit, as is the case here, there must be clear, decisive, and unequivocal conduct indicating that the party claimed to have surrendered a right would not have insisted on adherence to the contractual requirement at issue.

  8. In re D. Federico Co., Inc.

    16 B.R. 282 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    This item is not a compensable extra. D. Federico Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, ___ Mass. App. ___, 1981 Mass. App. Ct.Adv.Sh. 184, 415 N.E.2d 855; Glynn v. City of Gloucester, 9 Mass. App. 454, 1980 Mass. App. Ct.Adv.Sh. 605, 401 N.E.2d 886. Exh. 4, The Technical Specifications states:

  9. In re D. Federico Co., Inc.

    8 B.R. 888 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981)   Cited 6 times

    Without such a showing, and Plaintiff admits that it did not conform to the relevant contract provisions, in order to recover the Court must find that the Authority had waived or excused compliance with the necessary formalities. Glynn v. Gloucester, Mass. App. Ct.Adv.Sh. 605, ___ Mass. App. ___, 401 N.E.2d 886 (1980). A contract implied in fact is a true contract containing all the necessary elements of a binding contract. It differs from other contracts only in that it has not been committed to writing or stated orally in express terms, but rather is inferred from the conduct of parties in the milieu in which they dealt.

  10. Celco Constr. Corp. v. Town of Avon

    87 Mass. App. Ct. 132 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The contracting authority is thereby able to obtain bid prices stripped of amounts incorporated by bidders to cover the risk, and bidders are able to bid with the assurance that they will be compensated for subsurface or latent site conditions that impose greater costs than reflected in the bid documents. See Glynn v. Gloucester, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 454, 461 n. 9, 401 N.E.2d 886 (1980). According to Celco, the presence of 2,524 cubic yards of rock on the project site, when the project bid documents estimated only 1,000 cubic yards, presents an appropriate occasion for an equitable adjustment to compensate it for the increased costs it incurred to remove the additional rock.