Thus, evidence relating to the various 3. aspects of petitioner's probable guilt or innocence has been properly excluded by this court on previous occasions. Gluff v. Rouls, Superintendent, Indianapolis Police Dept. (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176; Cook v. Rodger, Sheriff (1939), 215 Ind. 500, 20 N.E.2d 933. In the instant case therefore, the issue is not whether petitioner could have been in the state so as to commit the crime, but rather is whether the man sought to be extradited is indeed the same man arrested under the warrant.
It has been thoroughly established that the warrant of arrest [6] is prima facie evidence that the relator in habeas corpus proceedings is properly charged with a crime, and the burden of proof is upon him to overcome the presumption. People ex rel. Albert v. Commissioner of Correction, Sup., 111 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309; Gluff v. Rouls, 228 Ind. 186, 188, 91 N.E.2d 176; Annotation 81 A.L.R. 552, 563; 40 A.L.R. 2d 1151, 1158. 22 Am. Jur., Extradition, section 27, p. 267. Both under the act and the Federal Constitution the charge of [7] crime made in the demanding state need not be technically correct; a substantial charge of crime in the required papers submitted by the demanding state is a sufficient basis for extradition.
It is in the nature of a collateral attack, and appellant cannot in this case properly complain that the Uniform Extradition Act prevents him from going behind the proceedings pending against him in the demanding state. In fact, this Court in Gluff v. Rouls (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 188, 91 N.E.2d 176, 177, refused in an extradition case to permit the accused in habeas corpus to go behind the proceedings in the demanding state to show a defense there on the merits, the Court in the opinion by Emmert, J., stating: State ex rel. Allen v. Fayette Circuit Court (1948), 226 Ind. 432, 81 N.E.2d 683; Wright v. The State (1854), 5 Ind. 290, 61 Am. Dec. 90.
It has long been the recognized practice that errors occurring at and during the trial on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be raised by a motion for a new trial. Gluff v. Rouls (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176; Darst v. Forney, Sheriff (1928), 199 Ind. 625, 159 N.E. 689; Thornton v. Devaney (1944), 223 Ind. 47, 57 N.E.2d 579. There is also a failure to set out at any place in the brief the exhibits introduced by the appellee Sheriff showing his authority for holding the appellant.
In habeas corpus proceedings it 1. has been the practice in this state to file motions for new trial when a party suffers an adverse decision. See Scott v. Scott (1949), 227 Ind. 396, 86 N.E.2d 533; Gluff v. Rouls (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176. In the latter case we held that alleged errors in the trial court on refusal to hear evidence must first be presented in the trial court in a motion for a new trial.
No question is thus presented for consideration, however, for the motion for new trial wholly fails to set out any of the questions, objections, answers or rulings of the court in connection therewith. Weer v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787, 37 N.E.2d 537; Gluff v. Rouls (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176; Morris v. Nixon (1946), 117 Ind. App. 106, 67 N.E.2d 319. We find no reversible error.
However, appellant, by his failure to include it in his argument, has waived this error and we can not consider it for the benefit of appellant. Tate v. West (1950), 120 Ind. App. 519, 94 N.E.2d 371; Gluff v. Rouls (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176. Appellant's sole assignment of error herein was the overruling of his motion for a new trial.
It is a well established rule of this jurisdiction that in order to present any question in this court as to the admission of evidence the motion for a new trial must state the 1. question or the substance thereof, the objection or the substance thereof, the ruling of the court, and the answer or substance thereof. Gluff v. Rouls, Superintendent, Indianapolis Police Department et al. (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176; David v. David (1946), 116 Ind. App. 603, 66 N.E.2d 284; Morris et al. v. Nixon (1946), 117 Ind. App. 106, 67 N.E.2d 319; Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Sargent, Admrx. (1949), 119 Ind. App. 195, 83 N.E.2d 793, (Transfer denied). Appellant asserts the trial court erred in permitting the appellee Vera Peglow, in answer to a question, to state her opinion of the value of the real estate after the accident.
All other questions presented in said brief we treat as waived. Gluff v. Rouls (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176. We will discuss the questions presented in the order above set out.
Many of the propositions and points assigned by the appellant are not treated in her brief 19. under the heading "Argument" as required by Rule 2-17 and we therefore consider them waived. Gluff v. Rouls (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N.E.2d 176. Having considered all questions properly presented and finding no error the judgment is affirmed.