Opinion
01-CV-00659Sr.
May 17, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to have the undersigned conduct all further proceedings in this case, including entry of final judgment. Dkt. #7.
Currently before the Court is the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), for failure to state a cause of action. Dkt. #14. For the following reasons, the defendant's motion is granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by Summons and Complaint filed August 28, 2001 in New York State Supreme Court, County of Erie. Dkt. #2, Exh. A. The defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint on August 30, 2001. Dkt. #1, ¶ 3. By Notice of Removal filed September 18, 2001, the defendant removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. #1.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendant, while "acting under color of his authority as a Senior Investigator for the State of New York, State Education Department, Office of Professional Discipline, negligently, carelessly and recklessly, misrepresented certain facts to the Town of Aurora Justice Court for the purposes of obtaining confidential and sealed criminal court information against the plaintiff." Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶ 4. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant misrepresented to the Town of Aurora Justice Court that plaintiff was professionally licensed and was the subject of a disciplinary hearing when, in fact, plaintiff had merely applied for a license to practice physical therapy. Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶¶ 3, 5.As a result of this misrepresentation, the Town of Aurora Justice Court, pursuant to a pending disciplinary hearing exception to the confidentiality requirement normally afforded such documents under New York state law, provided the defendant with a confidential probation report and sealed criminal information which had previously been dismissed. Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶ 8. The defendant allegedly presented this information to the Office of Professional Discipline and to the New York State Physical Therapy Board. Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶ 8. As a result, approximately twenty-one months elapsed from the date plaintiff applied for his physical therapy license until plaintiff received his license. Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶¶ 3, 10.
Plaintiff claims that this delay impacted his ability to gain employment in his chosen profession and damaged his character and credibility. Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶ 10. Accordingly, plaintiff claims that he was deprived "of the privileges and immunities guaranteed to plaintiff as a citizen of the United States by the United States Constitution, New York State Constitution, New York statutes and common law and Federal Statute including 42 USCA Sec. 1983." Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶ 9.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Dismissal Standard
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998); Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1994); Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int'l Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1992). However, legal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness. Albany Welfare Rights Organization Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
The court is required to read the complaint broadly and with great latitude on a motion to dismiss. Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutr. Inst., 751 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 1985). The court's function on a motion to dismiss is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). The complaint will be dismissed only if "it appears beyond doubt" that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 2001). Stated another way, I must determine whether the plaintiff has stated any valid ground for relief in his complaint. Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994).
Constitutional Claim
As the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly noted, "§ 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). "To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, respondents must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Thus, the Court must determine the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed before it can assess whether the defendant violated that right. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
The defendant argues that plaintiff has not and cannot allege violation of any constitutional right, but is simply seeking compensation for the delay in the issuance of his physical therapy license. Dkt. #15, p. 4. Plaintiff responds that he has alleged violation of his privacy rights by virtue of the defendant's dissemination of confidential information obtained from the Town of Aurora Court by misrepresentation, and violation of his property right to a physical therapy license.
Protected Privacy Interest
Case law characterizes two types of constitutionally protected privacy interests: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and the individual "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). In the instant case, plaintiff invokes his interest in avoiding disclosure of a confidential probation report and sealed criminal information by the Town of Aurora Justice Court. Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶ 8. However, the Court is persuaded that plaintiff does not possess a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the disclosure of such information to the professional licensing board investigating his application for a physical therapy license. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (no constitutional right of confidentiality in publication of arrest); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 802 (2d Cir. 1992) (violation of CPL § 160.50, which requires return of all official records and papers relating to arrest or prosecution upon termination of criminal proceeding in defendant's favor, does not implicate constitutional rights); Johnson v. Columbia University, 2003 WL 22743675, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2003) (no constitutional right to confidentiality of brother's family court record); Pritzker v. City of Hudson, 26 F. Supp.2d 433, 439-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (collecting cases holding that the violation of CPL § 160.50 does not implicate constitutional considerations); J.C. McRary v. Jetter, 665 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (no constitionally protected interest in the confidentiality of youthful offender file).
Even if the Court were to find that plaintiff possessed a protected privacy interest in such information, the duty to uphold that interest would not lie with the defendant in this action. Plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable for the Town of Aurora Justice Court's disclosure of confidential information based upon the defendant's alleged misrepresentation of the plaintiff's professional status to the court. Dkt. #2, Exh. A, ¶ 8. While the allegation of misrepresentation may support a common law claim of negligent misrepresentation against the defendant, it does not transform a tort into a constitutional claim. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-33 (1986); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 701.
See Soucie v. County of Monroe, 736 F. Supp. 33, 36-37 (W .D.N.Y. 1990) (youthful offender has protected privacy interest in presentence report); Anderson v. City of New York 611 F. Supp. 481, (S.D .N.Y. 1985) (sustaining § 1983 claim premised upon violation of CPL § 160.50).
See Heard v. City of New York, 82 NY2d 66, 73-74 (1993).
Protected Property Interest
Property interests, of course are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules of understanding that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Thus, to possess a constitutionally protected property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.Id.
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a legitimate claim of entitlement to a physical therapists license. Section 6734 of New York's Education Law sets forth requirements which must be met to obtain such a license, including the requirement that the applicant possesses "experience satisfactory to the board" and "good moral character as determined by the department." The regulations supporting this statute afford the Committee on the Professions broad discretion in assessing an applicant's moral character. See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.1 et seq. Such discretion negates an applicant's claim of entitlement to such a license and "suffices to defeat the existence of a federally protected property interest." RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989); see Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs lacked property interest where zoning board possessed discretion in deciding request for junkyard permit); Caruso v. City of NY, 1999 WL 408616, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 1999) (no property interest in obtaining Special Patrolman designation), aff'd 225 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2000); Percesepe v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 1996 WL 1057165, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1996) (no legitimate claim of entitlement to obtain crane operator's license), aff'd 125 F.3d 844 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1107 (1999); Conrad v. County of Onondaga Examining Bd. for Plumbers, 758 F. Supp. 824, 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (no legitimate claim of entitlement to become master plumber).
CONCLUSION
In light of plaintiff's failure to assert a constitutionally protected interest, his federal claims are dismissed. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Pritchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[I]t is axiomatic that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims when it dismisses the federal claims prior to trial."). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. #14), is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.