Opinion
2012-12-27
Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale (Evan H. Krinick of counsel), for appellant. Heller, Horowitz & Feit, P.C., New York (Martin Stein of counsel), for respondent.
Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale (Evan H. Krinick of counsel), for appellant.Heller, Horowitz & Feit, P.C., New York (Martin Stein of counsel), for respondent.
, J.P., MOSKOWITZ, DeGRASSE, MANZANET–DANIELS, CLARK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling–Cohan, J.), entered April 19, 2012, which denied defendant's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims for tax escalation damages and substantial completion/lost profits damages, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.
“An action for legal malpractice requires proof of three elements: (1) that the attorney was negligent; (2) that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's losses; and (3) proof of actual damages” ( Brooks v. Lewin, 21 A.D.3d 731, 734, 800 N.Y.S.2d 695 [1st Dept. 2005], lv. denied6 N.Y.3d 713, 816 N.Y.S.2d 749, 849 N.E.2d 972 [2006] ). “[T]he failure to show proximate cause mandates dismissal of a legal malpractice action regardless of whether the attorney was negligent” ( Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Stern, 99 A.D.3d 58, 63, 949 N.Y.S.2d 50 [1st Dept. 2012] [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
In this action for legal malpractice, defendant met its burden on summary judgment of “showing an absence of proximate cause” between the alleged negligence and plaintiff's losses ( Levine v. Lacher & Lovell–Taylor, 256 A.D.2d 147, 151, 681 N.Y.S.2d 503 [1st Dept. 1998] ). The documentary evidence establishes that plaintiff, and defendant, the firm that represented plaintiff in the negotiation and drafting of the lease, requested that the landlord agree to utilizing a later base year than 2004/05 for real estate tax escalation and the landlord refused. The documentary evidence also establishes that plaintiff knowingly accepted the landlord's terms on this issue. In addition, defendant demonstrated that the landlord would not have agreed to an additional penalty beyond deferment of rent for late completion of the construction required for plaintiff to use the premises for its business.
Plaintiff failed “to demonstrate a material issue of fact on the question of proximate cause” ( Levine, 256 A.D.2d at 151, 681 N.Y.S.2d 503). Notably, neither of plaintiff's experts contradicted defendant's expert's testimony that, at the time the subject lease was being negotiated, the real estate market strongly favored landlords.
Plaintiff's claim that it would have pursued alternative space is speculative and therefore insufficient to establish that defendant's malpractice, if any, was a proximate cause of plaintiff's loss ( see Brooks, 21 A.D.3d at 734–735, 800 N.Y.S.2d 695).