The amendment did not broaden the scope of the act or affect its financial features. Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730; Brown v. Stewart, 134 N.C. 357."
Nor does the Journal of either House show the purpose or effect of the several amendments which were adopted, and thereafter included in said bill as the same was passed and ratified. In the absence of any showing by the Journals that the amendments, or any one of them, were material ( Gregg v. Comrs., 162 N.C. 480; Bank v. Lacy, 151 N.C. 3; Comrs. v. Packing Co., 135 N.C. 62; Brown v. Stewart, 134 N.C. 357; Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730), the validity of the act cannot be successfully called in question, because the bill, as amended, was not again read three times in each House, with the yea and nay vote on the amended bill entered on the Journals. It is only when the bill has been amended in a material matter that it is required that the amended bill shall be read over again three times in each House, with the yeas and nays on the second and third readings entered on the Journal.
This Court has uniformly held that these provisions of the Constitution are mandatory, and that any act of the Legislature passed in violation thereof is, at least to the extent of such repugnance, absolutely void. Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N.C. 214; 34 L.R.A., 487; Commissioners v. Snuggs, 121 N.C. 394; 39 L.R.A., 439; Charlotte v. Shepard, (678) 120 N.C. 411, and 122 N.C. 602; Rodman v. Washington, 122 N.C. 39; Commissioners v. Call, 123 N.C. 308; 44 L.R.A., 252; Commissioners v. Payne, 123 N.C. 432; McGuire v. Williams, 123 N.C. 349; Smathers v. Commissioners, 125 N.C. 480; Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730; Commissioners v. DeRossett, 129 N.C. 275; Black v. Commissioners, 129 N.C. 121; Hooker v. Greenville, 130 N.C. 472. In McGuire v. Williams, supra, this Court says: "It must be considered a settled rule that the provisions of the Constitution in relation to municipal indebtedness and taxation are mandatory, and will be strictly enforced by this Court.
State v. Liedtke, 9 Neb. 490, 4 N.W. 75; Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306, 96 N.W. 212, 98 N.W. 1075, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 136; State v. Dillon (1900) 42 Fla. 95, 28 So. 781; Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503; School Dist. v. Chapman (C.C.A.) 152 F. 887; Johnson v. Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 99 P. 1059, 16 Ann. Cas. 974; State v. Crowe, 130 Ark. 272, 197 S.W. 4, L.R.A. 1918A, 567, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 460; Wilson v. Young County H. F. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 262 S.W. 873; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Brake v. Callison (C.C.) 122 F. 722. While plaintiff cites authorities to the contrary, including Norman v. Kentucky Board, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S.W. 901, 18 L.R.A. 556, Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 49 P. 985, 38 L.R.A. 74, Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730, 36 S.E. 167, he relies in argument particularly on Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 258 N.W. 190, 197. In this latter case there was involved the question whether chapter 89 of the Laws of the Forty-fifth General Assembly had been enacted by the General Assembly in a constitutional manner.
28 So. 781; People v. Thompson, 2 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 481, 7 P. 142; Board of Com'rs. v. Strait, 36 Colo. 137, 85 P. 178; Johnson v. City of Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 99 P. 1059, 16 Ann. Cas. 974; State v. Cronin, 72 Neb. 636, 101 N.W. 325; Browning v. Powers (Mo. Sup.) 38 S.W. 943; Robertson v. People, 20 Colo. 279, 38 P. 326; State v. Ryan, 92 Neb. 636, 139 N.W. 235, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 224; State v. Cox, 105 Neb. 75, 178 N.W. 913; Loomis v. Callahan, 196 Wis. 518, 220 N.W. 816; People v. Edmands, 252 Ill. 108, 96 N.E. 914; Mechanics Building Loan Assn. v. Coffman, 110 Ark. 269, 162 S.W. 1090; State v. Corbett, 61 Ark. 226, 32 S.W. 686; Callison v. Brake (C.C.A.) 129 F. 196; Stephens v. Board of Commissioners, 79 Kan. 153, 98 P. 790; Brake v. Callison (C.C.) 122 F. 722; School Dist. No. 11 v. Chapman (C.C.A.) 152 F. 887. In a few jurisdictions, a contrary rule prevails: Norman v. Kentucky Board of Managers, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S.W. 901, 18 L.R.A. 556; State v. Boyer, 84 Or. 513, 165 P. 587; Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730, 36 S.E. 167, 169; Norman v. Kentucky Board of Managers of World's Columbian Exposition, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S.W. 901, 18 L.R.A. 556; Claywell v. Board of Com'rs., 173 N.C. 657, 92 S.E. 481; Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 49 P. 985, 38 L.R.A. 74. Such is the history of legislative procedure in relation to the matters referred to and the status of judicial decision in this country.
" To the same effect are the following: Roane Iron Co. v. Francis, 130 Tenn. 694, 172 S.W. 816; Ex parte May, 118 Tex.Crim. 165, 40 S.W.2d 811; Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 49 P. 985, 38 L.R.A. 74; Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730, 36 S.E. 167. That such is the proper construction of this term as used in the Constitution conclusively appears from that instrument itself.
The act of 4 March, purporting to validate the proceedings of the board of commissioners, was passed in accordance with the constitutional requirements and was not amended, changed, or modified as to its terms in any respect by the act which five days afterwards referred the question of issuing the bonds to the voters of the county. In Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730, cited by the appellant, the act authorizing a subscription for stock in a railroad company was amended on the third reading, and the question was whether the amendment was material. In the present case the object of the later act was to ascertain the will of the taxpayers — to give them an opportunity by means of a referendum to share in the legislative power which is reserved to the people (25 R.C.L., 804, sec. 53), and not to raise money on the credit of the county, or to pledge the faith of the county, or to impose a tax.
It is also true that an amendment will not ordinarily be deemed material unless it purports to levy a tax or to create or increase a debt, or to change the rate of interest or the time of payment, or otherwise to broaden the scope of the amended act, or materially to affect its financial features. Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730; Brown v. Stewart, 134 N.C. 357; Comrs. v. Stafford, 138 N.C. 453; Bank v. Lacy, 151 N.C. 3; Gregg v. Comrs., 162 N.C. 479; Brown v. Comrs., 173 N.C. 598; Wagstaff v. Highway Comm., 177 N.C. 354. In our interpretation of the statutes, none of these provisions appears in or is directly or indirectly made a part of the act before us, but simply the substitution of a new board by whom authorized taxes may be levied.
This provision is mandatory and the proposition established by the decision in Smathers v. Comrs., 125 N.C. 480, 34 S.E. 554. See, also, Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730; Black v. Comrs., 129 N.C. 121; Comrs. v. DeRosset, 129 N.C. 275; Brown v. Stewart, 134 N.C. 357; Comrs. v. Packing Co., 135 N.C. 62; Claywell v. Comrs., 173 N.C. 657; Road Comrs. v. Comrs., 178 N.C. 61. A different state of facts were presented in Brown v. Comrs., 173 N.C. 598, and Edwards v. Comrs., 183 N.C. 58. On the entire record, we think the judgment of the court below correct.
Although the section of the Constitution just referred to — requiring that statutes for creating debts or imposing taxes shall be enacted with certain specified formalities — refers in express terms to the State, counties, cities and towns, it has been directly held that the same applies also to townships as constituent parts of counties and will render ineffective any legislation of that character which fails to comply with its requirements. (65) Wittkowsky v. Comrs., 150 N.C. 90. True we have held in Wagstaff v. Comrs., 177 N.C. 354; Gregg v. Comrs., 162 N.C. 479; Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730, and other cases where the question was directly considered, that when a principal statute had been enacted in accord with the constitutional provision referred to, an amendment "which does not increase the amount of the debt or the taxes to be levied or otherwise materially change the original bill will be upheld and constitute a portion of the law without the observance of the stated formalities," but we are of opinion that an amendment of the kind presented here, which purports to change the method of maintaining a separate township road system from a bond issue restricted in amount to current taxation from year to year, indefinite as to time, might, in its practical application, work such a change in the burdens imposed that it could, in no sense, be regarded as immaterial within the meaning of the principle and must be set aside because it was not passed with the formalities required by the organic law. Bennet v. Comrs., 173 N.C. 625.