Glenn v. State

1 Citing case

  1. Marpoe v. State

    NO. 03-17-00748-CR (Tex. App. Oct. 10, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    By doing so, "the [trial] court instructed the jury that a reasonable apprehension of danger, whether it be actual or apparent, is all that is required before one is entitled to exercise the right of self-defense against his adversary." See Valentine, 587 S.W.2d at 401; see, e.g., Goodson v. State, No. 05-15-00143-CR, 2017 WL 1360193, at *15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 12, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Glenn v. State, No. 13-12-00462-CR, 2014 WL 895510, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 6, 2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Cleary v. State, No. 05-11-00040-CR, 2012 WL 987762, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 26, 2012, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication); Dotson v. State, 09-08-00323-CR, 2009 WL 5205359, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 30, 2009, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Clark v. State, No. 04-02-00551-CR, 2004 WL 1835732, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 18, 2004, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, on this record, we conclude that the jury-charge instructions properly encompassed the theory of apparent danger and conclude that the trial court did not err by not submitting, sua sponte, a separate jury-charge instruction on "apparent danger."