Opinion
Argued January 10, 1951
Decided March 22, 1951
Equity — Practice — Rules of Civil Procedure — Applicability to equitable proceedings — Courts — Jurisdiction — Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23.
1. The Rules of Civil Procedure presently in force do not apply to equitable proceedings. [65]
2. A rule of civil procedure is applicable to equity practice only when the Supreme Court so provides. [65-6]
3. The question of a court's jurisdiction to hear and decide a case in equity may be raised pursuant to the provisions of the Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23. [66-7]
Courts — Jurisdiction — Administrative board — State Tax Equalization Board — Review of findings — Act of June 27, 1947, P. L. 1046.
4. A court of common pleas has no power to review the findings of the State Tax Equalization Board: Act of June 27, 1947, P. L. 1046, § 13. [66-8]
5. A bill in equity may not be used as a substitute for an appeal in order to circumvent a legislative prohibition of an appeal. [69]
Mr. Justice CHIDSEY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Before DREW, C. J., STERN, STEARNE, JONES, BELL and LADNER, JJ.
Appeal, No. 24, May T., 1951, from decree of Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Commonwealth Docket, 1950, No. 174 and Equity Docket, No. 1944, in case of Glen Alden Coal Company v. John N. O'Neil et al., members of State Tax Equalization Board et al. Decree affirmed.
Bill in equity.
The facts are stated in the opinion by RICHARDS, P.J., specially presiding, of the court below, as follows:
The plaintiff filed its bill of complaint seeking to restrain the State Tax Equalization Board from certifying finally to the Superintendent of Public Instruction the valuation of all taxable real property in Newport Township School District, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The burden of the complaint is that the determined valuation is grossly excessive, particularly as to coal lands owned by the plaintiff, and that the finding is arbitrary, capricious and unlawful. The bill avers, that as a taxpayer, its interests will be adversely affected, and that an inequitable allocation of state subsidies to school districts will result. We are asked to restrain the other defendants from performing any functions relating to the payment of the subsidy to the school district based upon the valuation fixed by the Board. Upon presentation of the bill, a rule was granted upon the defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue as prayed for.
Thereafter, the Attorney General entered an appearance de bene esse for the defendants. He then presented a petition under the Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, questioning the jurisdiction of this court. A rule was granted upon the plaintiff to show cause why the bill should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed an answer which, inter alia, denied the right of the defendants to raise the question of jurisdiction under the Act of 1925, asserting that the provisions of that Act have been suspended by the rules of civil procedure. The correctness of this contention must be determined by an examination of the rules and relevant decisions.
Rule 1017 mentions the allowable pleadings in actions of assumpsit. Under this rule questions of jurisdiction may be raised by preliminary objections. A note of the procedural Rule Committee states that this practice replaces practice under the Act of 1925, supra, and that this Act is suspended except as to appeals. However, Rule 1451 states that certain acts are suspended "insofar as they apply to the practice and procedure in actions governed by Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent hereinafter set forth. . . ." Paragraph (b) of this rule deals with the suspension of acts relating to pleadings. Sub-paragraph (7) suspends Sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1925, supra, except as to appeals. Generally the rules require that the practice and procedure of the various actions covered by the rules conform to the rules applying to assumpsit unless other specific provision to the contrary is made. However, while various forms of action are covered by the rules, there is nothing dealing specifically with equitable actions. We can find nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme Court, to indicate that they were intended to apply to equitable proceedings. While our attention has been directed to Equity Rule No. 92, we can find nothing there to satisfy us that the equity rules were abrogated by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Equity Rule 92 merely provides that rules of civil procedure which are applicable to equity practice shall prevail over equity rules inconsistent therewith. In our opinion, a Rule of Civil Procedure is applicable to equity practice only when the Supreme Court so provides. We cannot see that it has as yet so provided. We are confirmed in this conclusion by the comment about this rule found in Haskell v. Heathcote, 363 Pa. 184, beginning on page 189. There Mr. Justice PATTERSON, speaking for the Supreme Court, held that a rule of civil procedure applicable to a suit in assumpsit did not set aside the provisions of Equity Rule No. 48. He then proceeded to discuss Equity Rule No. 92, and the misinterpretation thereof. He said: "The obvious intent and purpose of Equity Rule 92 was to provide merely for automatic suspension of existing equity rules in favor of Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by this Court in terms applying to all civil actions or later adopted rules specifically made applicable to suits in equity." As we have already noted, we can find nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure which apply to all civil actions and nothing which makes them specifically applicable to suits in equity. If our conclusion in this respect be correct, there is nothing in R. C. P. 1451 (b)(7) which suspends the Act of 1925, so far as equity is concerned. It follows, that the defendants had the right to proceed under that Act in the instant case.
Note: Since this opinion was prepared, the Procedural Rules Committee has submitted Recommendation No. 26, containing "Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure Governing The Action in Equity". Rule 1550 suspends Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Act of 1925, supra, except as to appeals. This would seem to indicate, that in the opinion of the Committee, the rules of civil procedure now promulgated by the Supreme Court are not applicable to actions in equity, and that the Act of 1925 is not suspended in equitable actions by the existing rules.
We turn now to the matter of jurisdiction. The State Tax Equalization Board was created by the Legislature by the Act of June 27, 1947, P. L. 1046. The object of the Act is expressed in its title, namely, "Providing for equalization of assessed valuations of real property throughout the Commonwealth for use in determining the amount and allocation of Commonwealth subsidies to school districts". The Board is required to determine the market value of taxable real property in each school district. Their determinations are used solely for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the state subsidy for each school district and have no bearing whatever upon local taxes. The scheme was devised to provide a common and equitable basis for the allocations rather than the variable and inequitable bases resulting from local determinations. The Act provides that when the taxable value of the real estate is determined by the Board, a local school district which feels aggrieved may object. Thereupon the Board shall grant a hearing and afford an opportunity to the district to submit evidence and present argument. At the conclusion thereof, the Board is required to make such modifications and adjustments of its findings and computations as to it shall appear proper or it may dismiss the objections. In either event the decision of the Board shall be final. The valuation so adjusted shall form the basis upon which valuations for the purpose of determining the amounts of Commonwealth subsidies shall be determined.
It is clear, therefore, that the Board is a legislative device used to bring about uniformity in valuations used in determining state subsidies to school districts. Only school districts are given the right to question its findings and determinations. The right given to them is a restricted one. It is confined to the offering of testimony and the presentation of argument. The Board is not obliged to adduce testimony at the hearing or to divulge the basis of its findings, Its duty is confined to consideration of the testimony offered at the hearing and arguments made thereon. It may modify its findings or dismiss the objections. Its action is final, which can mean only that an appeal is prohibited. Consequently no court has appellate jurisdiction to review its findings.
We feel that this case is controlled by the doctrine laid down in Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514. The opinion in that case, written by Mr. Justice STERN states: ". . . where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal the scope of appellate review is limited to the question of jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceedings; the merits of the controversy cannot be considered even though the interpretation given to the facts or the law by the governmental agency or the court below may have been erroneous." (p. 518)
The same case holds that a statutory prohibition of appeal may not be circumvented by some other process. ". . . since plaintiff could not, by appeal or writ of certiorari, vest jurisdiction in the court to consider the merits of its case, it cannot, by indirection, in order to accomplish that same object, circumvent the statutory prohibition by resort to some other process. Indeed a writ of mandamus is here especially inappropriate because plaintiff's petition is to have the disallowance of its claim revoked and an award made in its favor for the amount of its claim whereas such a writ may be used only to compel the performance of a purely ministerial or mandatory duty, as, for example, in Hotel Casey Co. v. Ross, 343 Pa. 573, 23 A.2d 737, and Soble v. Hines, 347 Pa. 536, 32 A.2d 742. It is elementary that it cannot be used to control the exercise of discretion or judgment on the part of a public official or an administrative or judicial tribunal; nor to review or compel the undoing of action taken by such an official or tribunal in good faith and in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, even though, in fact, the decision rendered may have been wrong; nor to influence or coerce a particular determination of the issue involved; nor to perform the function of an appeal or writ of error even though no appeal or writ of error be permitted by law. The writ, being used here only as a veiled substitute for an appeal, should not have been allowed to issue, or, after issuance, should have been quashed, for while, ordinarily, the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over mandamus proceedings directed against public officials or tribunals, in the present case jurisdiction to review the action of the Board of Arbitration was denied it by statutory mandate and that prohibition must prevail regardless of the procedural device by which such review is sought." (p. 520)
The bill in the instant case does not question the jurisdiction of the Board to fix valuations in accordance with the legislative mandate. Neither does it charge the Board with failure to follow the procedure laid down by the Act when an aggrieved school district objects to its findings. It does not, therefore, bring before us a question of jurisdiction or the regularity of the proceedings as required by the first portion of the opinion above quoted. Under these circumstances we may not consider the merits of the controversy. Furthermore, the Act gives the plaintiff no status to object to the findings and determinations of the Board. There being 2544 school districts in the State, and an untold number of taxpayers, the whole scheme of allocating subsidies might well be disrupted were each school district and each taxpayer given the right of appeal or its equivalent. No doubt this consideration motivated the legislature. In addition, a bill in equity may not be used as a substitute for an appeal in order to circumvent the legislative prohibition. This too is made clear by the opinion quoted above.
While perhaps not relevant on the subject of jurisdiction, it might be observed that the State Board is much more likely to bring about uniformity of valuation than are the various school districts, and valuations fixed some twenty years ago are no criterion of existing values. It is common knowledge that prices have gone up and that the purchasing value of the dollar has decreased. To be of any service, valuations must be determined on the basis of present day conditions.
In our opinion this court has no jurisdiction to consider the present controversy, and there is no need to discuss the other reasons set forth in the defendants' petition. Consequently, the bill and the rule granted thereon should be dismissed.
Plaintiff appealed.
Earl G. Harrison, with him, Arlin M. Adams, J. H. Oliver, William A. Schnader and Schnader, Harrison, Segal Lewis, for appellant.
George W. Keitel, Deputy Attorney General, with him H. Albert Lehrman, Deputy Attorney General and Charles J. Margiotti, Attorney General, for appellees.
The decree of the court below is affirmed on the opinion of President Judge RICHARDS of the Dauphin County Orphans' Court, specially presiding. See, also, Newport Township School District v. State Tax Equalization Board, 366 Pa. 603, 79 A.2d 641.
Appellant to pay costs.